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Friday, April 30, 2021

Snake oil and bridges to sell the LCS saga





 Happened to be perusing my traps and lines this morning and came across this bit from CDR Salamander


CDR Salamander about the LCS 

Thursday, April 29, 2021

When You Fool Yourself, You are One


 He linked to the following report 



Rule of 3's


 I'm going to translate the above bureaucratic speak into plain English in a minute.

But before I do that I'm going into the rule of threes as far as surface ship operations go. One that tends to work and if you deviate from it you start reducing readiness and material condition.

The rule of threes is simple. Lets say you have 9 ships. Generally that means you really only have 3. Or maybe if you push it 4 or 5. But you can't push that envelop for long or things and people start breaking

So generally if you have 9 ships,  3 are in the yards (more on that later), 3 are operationally deployed or capable of such and 3 have exited the yards an in the work of phases. 

Its pretty simple and it works.  Yes you are only essentially getting 3 ships operational for the 9 you have under that model but those three ships are going to last a lot longer.

The problem is that the US Navy decided to get cute.

We have pushed the model to essentially wanting and having 6 ships operationally deployed, with 3 of those ships the ones that should be going into the yards and ready for what they called surge tasking. 

For those that don't know when ships come back from a 6-9 month deployment they are generally pretty beat up. This is especially s we don't make as many port visits, and that means thing like painting and other maintenance that can really only be done in port gets what they called deferred. Or in Simple English speak - it doesn't get done when it should have and is rescheduled. 

Paying the shop vice doing it yourself and delaying (deferring) the work

A good analogy would be changing the oil on your car. So rather than say every 3000 miles you decide to push it to 6000 miles and then 9000 miles. Well you can imagine what impact that would have on your cars engine. 

Have I done that occasionally because I was to busy, yes, but I try not to do it that much. Because my car's service life is going to be shorter and I'm going to have a buy a new car sooner.

So back to this 
Littoral Combat Ship: 

Unplanned Work 
on Maintenance Contracts 
Creates  Schedule Risk 
as Ships Begin Operations (gao.gov)

Unplanned work: This means you had no idea using the analogy above that when you finally went in for an oil change the mechanic noticed that you windshield wipers were shot, your tires bald, you had some coolant and oil leaks and your hoses needed to be replaced. Well remember you planned for a quick oil change, and so did your mechanic. But now instead of a 29.95 30 minute oil change you are looking at a 800 dollar several day overhaul job. 

Maintenance Contracts: Well way back in the day much of the basic stuff mentioned above, was taken care of by the crew of a ship. Think rather than taking your car to the shop you head over to auto zone pick up your parts jack up the car and do the work yourself. You save the 50 or more an hour labor because your doing it yourself and avoid the markup on the parts because you did it yourself. Downside is your Saturday is lost. Well now - especially for the LCS the crew is not capable of doing this themselves due to minimal manning so we have to book an appointment with the mechanic. So we call him and say hey I'm just coming in for an oil change but can you do a once over on the car to see if there is anything wrong. Mechanic say sure, why don't you come in around 10 and we will do the oil change and you will be on your way by 11 at the latest. So you go in drop your keys and sit in the waiting room reading an old sports illustrated or car mag. At 1030 the mechanic comes in pale faced and says your car is jacked up and its nor really safe to drive as the tires are bald and a bunch of other stuff is messed up. 

Uh oh what do we do now?

Creates Schedule Risk: The mechanic says says look, I've got 3 other cars coming in and this was not really what we discussed, this is going to take three days to fix with all my people. You say fine do what you have to. Well what does the mechanic say, well he looks at his appointment book and realizes he  needs to call Ms Jones, Mr Smith ..ect and tell them not to bring their cars in to execute their scheduled maintenance contracts because his lift is going to be full the next several days. Well Ms Jones and Mr Smith now have to reschedule their maintenance contracts  

Creates Schedule Risks part II. So while its up on the lift they find a bunch more stuff that is wrong that was not revealed by the once over, Your now looking at a couple weeks in the shop. So that road trip to the mid west you planned - that's out. And you also need to find another car to go to work with in the mean time. 

As ships begin operations:  Remember that 3/3/3 rule. 3 ships deployed, 3 ships in training and 3 ships getting ready to go. Well think of it like 9 cars in a big family who have to be able to have the capacity to have three cars on the road at all times. And after a set period of time they change out. Well now one of the cars that was supposed to change out is broken. So the intricate schedule you developed is out the window. 


So how did we get here throwing stones at glass houses

So a while back I had a chance to tour and talk with some LCS sailors. I felt like I had entered the twilight zone where normal rules of surface ship operations do not apply.

To begin with the ships were purposely not manned at sufficient levels to do basic or intermediate level maintenance. I'll call that changing the oil, changing tires, coolant flush and maybe some  belts plus coolant change.

They are totally reliant on contractors to fix stuff. 

So again its my shop analogy.

But it gets worse. And I'll use another car analogy. 

Sometimes you get a complex repair, like changing out the engine in your car, because you blew it up as you forgot to check the oil. 

Now that is a repair beyond the ability of most. However, in my extended family's I have some non mechanics whom if we got together we could probably change the engine. I happen to have a decent size shop who the previous owners used to service semis. 

So I buy a case a beer we run out get the parts, swing my 5 tone crane and start the work. Its going to take a bit as we don't change engines out routinely, but we will get er done. 

The above is what we used to call SIMA or Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activities and our tender fleets whom could pretty much fix anything. 

We to my knowledge essentially defunded these and outsources it. The equivalent of me selling my shop and crane and deciding to take any work to a professional mechanic with all the increased costs but hopefully increased efficiency. In short we use contractors 

And these contractors are not (I could be wrong about this) onboard. (From GAO report)

Currently, the Navy is paying “fly-away teams,” meaning U.S. basedcontractors who travel overseas to conduct routine and non-major LCS maintenance, a higher cost unique to the LCS program. For example, Navy officials stated that starting in late 2020, they began sending flyaway teams to Panama to support LCS operating in the region. The Navy will continue to use fly-away teams of contractors at least until the METs are implemented, which the Navy expects to take approximately 5 years. Navy officials stated that they are still determining the balance of contractors and METs for future LCS maintenance.


Now it looks like someone finally realized that the above model is a bit stupid, and maybe those transformationalists and business process cult navalists from the 2000's may have been just a  but misguided 

While the Navy is introducing Navy-led Maintenance Execution Teams (MET) to take over some routine maintenance duties typically conducted by contractors, contractors will continue to play a role in the maintenance of LCS. The Navy is developing METs, which will consist only of Navy personnel separate from the LCS crew, to reduce the Navy’s reliance on contractors for LCS maintenance. The Navy expects that the METs will increase the self-reliance and flexibility of the ships to meet operational schedules and shift routine maintenance responsibility onto the Navy. Nevertheless, Navy officials stated that contractors will continue to have a role in routine maintenance in the near and long term as the METs are being stood up and after they are in place


MET = SIMA  thats what it looks like. 

But we have other problems with the whole LCS  design which was stupid from the get go and only really serves to line contractors pockets..assuming we can get them to come onboard to fix things in the first place 

here are a few nuggets

-the Navy and other contractors do not consistently have access to technical information necessary to maintain many systems and therefore need OEM support

-vendors from foreign countries provide a number of LCS systems, and Navy maintenance officials said it can be especially difficult to bring in foreign OEMs to execute ship repairs when LCS work is performed overseas during deployments. Specifically, officials said it is challenging to arrange access for foreign OEM technician

-the LCS program planned to use contracted maintenance, and as a result, program officials stated that they did not purchase the technical documentation necessary to maintain the systems used on the ship.

-The shortage of OEM technicians for the number of LCS currently in operation may increase the risk of schedule delays in the future as more LCS become operational. For example, maintenance officials stated that a commercial system had a broken part that required repairs and the OEM did not have a procedure to fix it. As a result, the Navy had to take the part from another ship to fix the first ship and put the broken part in storage

Even for routine maintenance, LCS is experiencing numerous instances of unplanned maintenance work, called growth work, which puts the program at greater risk of cost growth and schedule delays. A senior Navy maintenance official stated that the amount of growth work for LCS is “unbelievable.” In our analysis of 18 delivery orders, including 16 for non-major and routine maintenance, we found 760 requests for contract changes across both variants, with 651 requests due to growth work. Of those changes for growth work, the most common category—341 (52 percent)—was work that the Navy determined could not have been planned prior to the availability such as work that required inspecting the ship after the availability started. Figure 4 shows the breakdown of these categories in our sample

By the way "Growth" is the mechanic realizing you got big problems


So I have complained about the problem. What is the solution?

To start, we need to take back our maintenance, and our systems. Dialing 1-800 CON TRAC is not a solution when your in harms way.

Lets have the appropriate technical navy org take ownership of these systems, develop documentation and manuals. Lets break these contracts in for the good of the service and start developing "A" and        "C" schools

So unfortunately the snake oil salesman sold their oil to the navy and we bought the bridge that wasn't really for sale and never will be built and even it was we won't own it.

Its time to admit we go scammed go to the doctor and take the bitter medicine that is proscribed, and admit we can't afford to keep sending out car out for service and re-learn how do do that work in house with our own sailors. And yes increase manning as required. Maybe a module or two onthe LCS needs to go for a 30 man berthing for E-3 and below. 

Friday, April 23, 2021

Nobody is perfect but really? The U.S Navy needs someone or something to check our appearances before we are seen in public







Russian 
                                                        Russian
                                                                     Greek
                                                             Russian
                                                           Spanish


 For those that have been through the straits of strait of Dardanelles is a pretty long transit, and your highly visible to the public.  I had the privilege back in 2016 on Mount Whitney.  

Its a real shame when we send a US Destroyer that looks like it belongs in an episode of mad max and the  thunder dome through in such a condition. 

There is a person who has a hobby it is to take pictures of ships passing through you can find it here

 https://turkishnavy.net

My basic question is why do our ships look so crappy when other nations ships seem to be able to maintain their appearances fine. 

Maybe we can ask the Russians, Greeks or Spanish what their surface maintenance procedures are? 

Wednesday, April 14, 2021

Something old Something new something blue make the old new






Sitting here and checking my daily traps and lines for Navy developments worldwide, and its as always a bit distressing. It seems like when I do check both reliable and somewhat reliable sources concerning Navy developments there is a renaissance in Navy operational concepts going on everywhere but in the U.S Navy.  We seem to have a leadership / vision problem.  Mixed up with some good idea fairyisms. 



To sum it up we seem stuck in a rut where our Carriers are the offensive punch and the Surface Warfare Community is the escort function. 

My major problem with that is that the legs of our aircraft are simply put to short. And  no longer are capable against peer or near peer OPFOR

Yes we can add unmanned refueling, but still I am guessing that it is a couple tanks, or diminished armament carrying (external tank means less bombs and missiles) to get to the  1000-1500 mile range that I have arbitrarily chosen as the range that seems to correspond to the threat we face from near peer competitors. if we want to execute a strategic strike mission. 

And remember, double that to 2000 - 3000 miles for a manned asset that has to come home and then add another bit of distance in case they actual have to fight their way in and or out. 

Over at Navy Matters (navy-matters.blogspot.com) they present an interesting scenario where essentially our tomahawk missiles become game for  OPFOR as they are too slow, and that essentially the carrier air wing has to escort the missiles in . 

Also scenario where we have to mass 4 flat tops to accomplish the objective. My basic question is where is the tanking capacity to support that.

And when would we on short notice have the ability to surge 4 flat tops (I'm using Flat Tops to incorporate platforms like the America) 

The real issue I have with the scenario is that we would have to get within a 1000 miles (and I'm being generous here) to make this work. 

Simply put without a long range fighter and strike aircraft I'm not sure our carrier based business model works anymore and neither does our subsonic tomahawk capability. 

(Full disclosure I am nor have I ever been an airdale/ aviation type so some of the above and below may be inaccurate and is derived from wiki  and other easy web resources so maybe not totally right )

Cold war Era and then some: 

A-6 Intruder: Combat Range 878 Nautical miles 

F-14 Tomcat: Combat Range 580 Nautical Miles 

EA-6B  Prowler: Combat Range 2,022 Nautical Miles / 2400 tanks dropped

Current

F-18 Hornet:. Combat Range  400 Nautical miles

EA-F-18 Growler. Combat range 400 Nautical miles

F-35 C                 .Combat range 670 Nautical miles ( I think its less for the Navy version)

And these are just range issues, don't forget the "legacy" aircraft were much more capable at their designated missions. 

Think of having a broadsword and a spear vice a utility knife.  I'll take the former two please

My solution, break out the old blueprints for these legacy platforms, upgrade the avionics and call it a day.  That might go a ways to hep. Yes re-start the F-14, A-6, S-3 and EA-6B lines upgrade the avionics and call it done. Not real trade studies needed. Retraining yes, as there would once again be strike, fighter and ASW types. 

Simply put the 1990's to present Carrier Air Wing Experiment was predicated on the thoughts the Soviets were gone and no one else was around to challenge us and it would be much cheaper and more effective to cut the types and number of airframes being flown. Sometimes old tech and conops are better than what they replace. 

Yo be clear I'm not proposing we turn the navy back into its 1970's and 80's version, but we could take the good of those and update them rather than forcing tech were it is not needed. The below encapsulates what I think has gone wrong with the navy acquisitions for the last 20 years. Yes I can create an electronic bridge note that works well on a laptop. but why would I. A piece of paper works fins. And yes I know this is a comic, but our integrated ships control are now touch screens which must do wonders for night vision. So we kind of already did this . Vice good old analog (lead) glow in the dark controls. 



So to conclude, I think our chances with our current assets - even with the (very vulnerable in my opinion ) net centric advances - our chances  are not good if we actually had to execute the mission outlined in the 

Navy Matters: Missile Escort (navy-matters.blogspot.com) scenario.

I'm doing some mental rough order of PH/PK plus survivability of manned assets against a defended target and its not looking so good for the visiting team (thats us by the way). 

The numbers would be so bad we might as well call it a Doolittle raid. 

Because there are going to be a lot of vacant seats in the ready room. 

And it is a lot harder to put replacements in those seats then circa WW2

I have to somewhat agree maybe its time to turn the way we have been fighting the last 75 years on its head. 

Perhaps the Flat Tops should protect the shooters. Assuming we actually have something to shoot besides old school tomahawks 

Remember we lost roughly 100 carrier based aircraft in the battle of midway. Or about 44 percent of the total embarked. That's an average of about 75 aircraft per deck on three carriers. 

Today our CVN's carry about 45 or so strike fighter/ ew aircraft. 

Vice carrying roughly 75 per CV in World War two. 

So in context if you are to apply the math the three carriers at midway carried roughly 225 total aircraft and lost roughly 100 or about 45 percent of the planes. 

4 Aircraft carriers suffering similar losses today would be carrying about 180 aircraft and would expect to loose roughly 80 aircraft.

Yes Midway was a fight between Aircraft Carriers not an denied access strike that we are likley to face. But really what is the difference. 

If we are going to be the away team say against China, they have less need for aircraft carriers as they have ready made island and mainland runways. 

We are just going to be going against an adversary that has larger force generation capabilities than we do. 

So if you make me the decision maker for the day and tell me I am likely going to loose 45 percent of my aircraft to take out a critically strategic target with conventional means as my Tomahawk and other surface to surface missiles are not op to the task, 

I might have to make that decision. 

Well I shouldn't have to make that decision. Cause we can do better. 

But more concerning is how are we going to fight our way into a roughly 1000 mile range. The OPFOR is not going to leave the door open. 

So what am I going to do to keep the U.S Navy and partners from getting close enough to launch. 

well mines (which we are um suboptimal at), subs (also suboptimal unless we are talking another sub doing it ) and missiles (give us a B- and getting worse).  

And small disposable fast attack craft that can get into my vulnerability circle and get out quick after launching a couple of Anti Ship cruise missiles. 

I mention the word disposable as OPFOR really doesn't care if they survive. 

If a crappy missile boat can hit one of out DDG's. Flatops or large decks it has probably paid back the investment in the entire class of those ships that OPFOR built. 

So while we have been flailing around with LCS, Navy's 'Cheap' Littoral Combat Ships Cost Nearly As Much To Run As Guided Missile Destroyers (thedrive.com)

Zumwalt and abortive attempts to build the next generation CG to replace those that have clearly ben rolled up hard and packed away wet Vella Gulf crew remains onboard while ship is stricken with more mechanical problems (navytimes.com)

While at the same time trying to throw away capability that works US Navy Mark VI Patrol Boats Receive Reprieve - Naval News 

what have other countries been doing. 

well they are re-thinking how they fight. Like say putting ASCM's on an LPD. Nor strapping them on but actually integrating them. Makes sense right. Taiwan launches new naval vessel | NHK WORLD-JAPAN News

So lets go through a quick roundup of some what would appear successful acquisitions programs, these are in the last 6 months to a year by the way. 


China

China expects to launch its third aircraft carrier this year - Naval Post

China’s New Type 075 Amphibious Assault Ship starts the second round of sea trials - Naval Post

France:

[Video] Pierre Éric Pommellet's message on board the Alsace | Naval Group (naval-group.com)

French frigate Alsace - Wikipedia

Taiwan

Taiwan shipbuilder CSBC launches the 1st indigenous LPD - Naval Post

Taiwanese Navy launches first Tuo Chiang-class corvette - Naval Post


Japan:

 Mogami-class frigate - Wikipedia

Japan launches first ship of new frigate class (defensenews.com)

Japan launches, names new diesel-electric attack submarine - Naval Today

JS Taigei - Wikipedia

Spain

Navantia hosts launching ceremony for Spanish Navy's 1st S-80 submarine - Naval Today

S-80 Plus-class submarine - Wikipedia


UK

BAE Systems rolls out forward section of Royal Navy's new Type 26 frigate - Naval Today

Type 26 frigate - Wikipedia

Qatar

Fincantieri launches one, lays keel for another Al Zubarah-class corvette (navaltoday.com)

QENS Al Zubarah (F101) - Wikipedia

Fincantieri | Al Zubarah Class


Philippines

Philippine Navy's new frigate to be delivered ahead of schedule - Naval Today

Jose Rizal-class frigate - Wikipedia

HHI to deliver 2nd missile frigate to the Philippine Navy - Naval Post


Egypt

Egyptian Navy takes delivery of 1st locally built warship - Naval Today

Gowind® 2500 Corvette - Naval Technology (naval-technology.com)

Egyptian Navy's final Type 209/1400 submarine named, launched in Germany - Naval Today

SSK Manthatisi Class (Type 209/1400) Attack Submarine - Naval Technology (naval-technology.com)

Egypt’s navy modernization, The growth of new power in the Middle east - Naval Post

ENS Bernees 1003 joins Egyptian Navy - Naval Post

South Korea

Republic of Korea Navy commissions 2nd Daegu-class frigate - Naval Today

Daegu-class frigate - Wikipedia

South Korea's light aircraft carrier program officially begins - Naval Post

Daewoo launches 2nd KSS-III submarine for the ROK Navy - Naval Post

Ukraine

Ukraine ordered four ADA-class corvettes from Turkey - Naval Post


Russia

Lead Gremyashchy-class corvette joins Russian Navy fleet - Naval Today

Gremyashchiy-class corvette - Wikipedia

Russian Navy's Project 23900 LHDs Taking Shape in Kerch - Naval Post

A New Class of Ship by Russia, UMK Varan - Naval Post

Russia to commission 4th Project Buyan-M class corvette at the end of January - Naval Post

Saudi Arabia

Navantia splashes 2nd corvette for Saudi Navy - Naval Today

Navantia launches 3rd Avante-2200 class corvette, Hail 832, for the Royal Saudi Naval Forces - Naval Post

Israel

German shipbuilder delivers new corvette to Israel - Naval Today

INS Magen - Wikipedia

TKMS hands over 2nd Sa'ar 6 corvette to the Israeli Navy - Naval Post

Thyssenkrupp delivers first Saar 6 class corvette to Israeli Navy - Naval Post

India

First Visakhapatnam Class Destroyer Completes Basin Trials (defencexp.com)

Visakhapatnam-class destroyer - Wikipedia

Indian Navy expects to take delivery of INS Vikrant aircraft carrier by end of 2021 - Naval Post

India commissions VC11184 Ballistic Missile Tracking Ship - Naval Post

Indian shipbuilder GRSE lays keel of 3rd Project 17A Frigate - Naval Post

India launches 2nd Project 17A frigate "Himgiri" - Naval Post

Iran

Quad carrying C-802 catamaran

H I Sutton - Covert Shores

Iran’s Revolutionary Guard launches multipurpose carrier ship - Naval Post

Italy

Fincantieri | Multipurpose Offshore Patrol Vessel (PPA)

Fincantieri launches the 3rd PPA "Raimando Montecuccoli" - Naval Post

Indonesia

Indonesian North Sea Boats launches first X18 Tank Boat - Naval Post


Turkey

Turkish companies announce ASW variant of ULAQ USCV - Naval Post

Turkey launches first indigenous frigate - Naval Post


Royal Navy

Royal Navy commissions Madfox Unmanned Surface Vessel - Naval Post


Brazil

Brazilian Navy reclassifies Atlantico amphibious ship as aircraft carrier - Naval Post