Was reading through this article and in my opinion it states the obvious. Or perhaps the obvious to those whom lived the wonderful years circa 1998 - late 2000's when transformationalism, minimal manning, and business speak wrecked established and functional systems to supposedly bring us to the next level.
To begin with glad that USNI reported on it, but this time they did not link to the orginal report
so here it is
Lets break this out into two different lines of thought.
1. Navy struggling to retain surface warfare officer
2. SWO's want more training
3. Specialized Career fields
I think that these are actually not tied together but are separate issues. Lets tackle the first one first though.
“U.S. Navy officials stated that SWO retention to the department head milestone is low and requires them to commission nearly double the number of SWOs every year than needed, to ensure they have enough department heads eight years later.”
This retention issue, and the company (U.S Navy) solution to this, is over 2 decades old. But let me divide into pre-2000 and post 2000. No not pre-911 and post 911. As the issues we are now facing with SWO's are a direct result of policies of Rumsfeld, his staff and his Admirals.
Pre-2000, I remember showing up to my first ship ( A wooden hulled minesweeper ) in the late 90's and we were rated for 6 officers but had 7. Two of us were Ensigns with one LTJG, Three LT's and one LCDR. With that configuration we all had multiple jobs. We were actually plus one officer, so we actually had a DCA and an Auxo. But with that few officers we all had real and full time primary duties, plus lots of collateral duties, and we had multiple watches to stand and roles to fill.
For my first 18 months aboard my primary job was the Deck Department Head (owned guns and deck) followed by being the the Gunno Divo, MWR officer, mess treasurer, Ammo Admin, Force Protection Officer, Ship Store officer...ect. Plus I think I stood every watch possible given our manning.
Post 2000. A couple years later circa 2000 ish I ended up on a brand new destroyer that I think was rated for about 20 officers but had about 28.
Of those I think 10 were Ensigns. We all noticed this bumper crop of Ensigns. So many in fact that we had to make jobs up for them, and a few got stashed in Chief overflow berthing
These first tour Divo's had what I used to consider a collateral duty as a primary job. Yes there were ensigns who's primary job was Mess Treasurer, Ships Store Officer. Those are not real primary duties or real jobs
This obviously was a change from USS first ship. Where I got more stick time on the bridge in my forst 6 months then I did my entire time on my second ship.
In addition there were so many Ensigns, that given the number it was difficult to get them stick time on the bridge.
"The USS Mustin (DDG-89) averaged 18 SWO trainees aboard the ship against a requirement for six. • The USS Monterey (CG-61) averaged 21 SWO trainees aboard the ship against a requirement for eight."
You can only have so many officers on the bridge. I think that lack of stick time really really hurt the generation of officers whom would have started taking command circa 2016 time frame.
This has second and third order implications down the road
"In group discussions we held as part of our review of SWO training in 2019, SWOs identified challenges that Division Officers face in obtaining opportunities to build experience in ship-driving skills.46 According to SWOs in seven of 24 group discussions with Department Heads and Division Officers, too many Division Officers were on board ships for each to get sufficient time to qualify as a SWO in a timely manner, or fully develop and maintain ship-driving proficiency. In one particular ship group discussion, 20 Division Officers participated, and according to these SWOs, too many SWOs were competing for the bridge time needed to become proficient at ship-driving. Four Department Heads from the same ship reported similar sentiments. The U.S. Navy’s two internal reviews reported similar findings; specifically, the U.S. Navy’s Strategic Readiness Review noted that the long-term practice of over-commissioning junior SWOs has directly contributed to declining SWO readiness, while the U.S. Navy’s Comprehensive Review noted that the U.S. Navy’s practices of over-commissioning SWOs makes it challenging to build proficiency and experience in ship-driving"
From the report
"The U.S. Navy commissions nearly double the number of SWOs needed to meet junior officer personnel needs, which can limit training opportunities aboard ships. The U.S. Navy also commissions junior officers expected to transfer to other U.S. Navy communities; and nuclear-trained SWOs who spend half as much time at sea on surface ships than their peers. We found that the U.S. Navy has not evaluated the effect its commissioning practices for SWOs have on training opportunities aboard ships."
So in short we know somethings wrong...
When I asked if this was just CRU/DES normalcy, the answer was that SWO retention sucked, and rather than fix the conditions causing this crappy retention BUPERS was going to flood the zone with new Ensigns.
So in short if retention went from 70 percent to 50 they would just make 30 percent more Ensigns and in four years (that's when the first wave of SWO's leave) problem solved.
" U.S. Navy officials stated that SWO retention to the Department Head milestone is low and requires them to commission nearly double the number of SWOs every year than needed, to ensure they have enough Department Heads 8 years later."
That way it would not matter what retention numbers were. Also it removed the need to root cause the issues causing retention. Because after all there might be some uncomfortable things discovered. And hey ships are not like colliding and running aground that often. And when they do no one is dying.
Fix SWO conditions. Why would we do that?
I myself ended up leaving the SWO community at about the 7 year mark in 2005 when I transferred to another community. One that at the time was not that much better, but better than the madness that was the SWO community mid 2000's.
From the GAO report:
"We found that from fiscal year 2004 through March 2020, SWOs separated from their community earlier and at higher rates than officers in similar U.S. Navy communities"
So I was one of the trend..In fact had I not transferred I would have left the Navy. To be clear I loved driving ships, but it was the brutal lifestyle of how I saw my Department heads and XO's. The number of divorces, and how ragged they had been run.
So why? Well this is when Navy leadership bought into all these business ideas about how to achieve efficiencies of scale and maximize force generation to support GWOT.
What did that mean to the deckplate sailors (Officer and Enlisted). More work, less training, less resources, fewer availabilities, longer times at sea away from home. All bads. So you think SWO retention suffered...yup.
But did the Navy do a deep dive to see why retention was so bad.
Again the GAO report is revealing
"However, we found that the Commander, Naval Surface Forces, has not yet used available information gathered about SWO separation rates to develop a plan with clearly defined goals; performance measures that identify specific retention rates or determine if initiatives to improve retention are working as planned; and timelines to improve SWO retention rates. U.S. Navy officials stated that they are aware of the high separation rates for SWOs who have completed their mandatory service requirement, and that they would like to improve SWO retention. The U.S. Navy collects and analyzes data on SWO separation rates and they have an initiative underway to change the structure of retention bonuses, but they have not targeted or determined specific retention rates, according to U.S. Navy officials. While these activities could be elements of a larger plan to improve SWO retention, by themselves they do not represent a comprehensive approach to the situation."
Absolutely not. They already new the answer. CAPT Obvious.
As a cursory review would have revealed the same transformationalist, business driven policies that got CAPT Achmed Jones Smuckateli promoted to Admiral were the same ones causing the problem in the first place.
Back then circa 2000's, rather than addressing SWO culture they did not even bother to sweep the issue under the carpet they carpeted this issue with new ensigns.
Circa 2021 they are not going to fix the underlying issues, but rather going to resort to the tried and true.
Bribery and more Ensigns.
I was once told by a senior officer at BUPERS that junior officers are fungible. Which means interchangeable not requiring special care. In short if you don't like it leave...we will just make more.
Very Amizonian in the way we were treated 20 years ago.
So back then we were fungible until retention dropped below I think 40 or 50 percent at the 4 year mark and that's when the panic set in and the bribery (I mean retention bonus's) kicked in
And on to the training issue. Which is a big issue.
SWOS in a box and the follow implications of training and readiness
One of those transformationalist policies was getting rid of Surface Warfare Officer School for brand new ensigns ( I think circa 2003) and sending Ensigns out with a Surface Warfare Officer School in a box (of DVD's).
Maybe today’s Navy is just not very good at driving ships (navytimes.com)
"Yet many current and former officers say the problem dates back to 2003, when the Navy made severe cuts to SWO’s initial training under the belief the young officers would just learn their trade at sea.
At the same time, the Navy’s growing reliance on technology has eroded basic seamanship skills, former officers say.
Another factor is the timing of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, when the surface warfare community was hit hard by the demand for individual augmentees to support those ground operations, further robbing these officers of shipboard training and experience.
“There is a growing suspicion among a small circle of current and former COs that chickens may be coming home to roost,” retired Capt. Kevin Eyer, who commanded three Aegis cruisers, wrote in Proceedings Magazine online after the McCain collision.
The growing problem has festered in a SWO culture that many believe is notoriously toxic. Competition and careerism make officers afraid to voice concerns and create an “everyone for themselves” mentality.
“Most department heads I had were afraid to go to the captain with anything that might look bad for them — they did everything they did to protect their own reputations and wanted nothing to hamper them from eventually getting in the CO seat themselves,” said former Lt. Jonathan Parin, who served onboard the destroyer James E. Williams
"The Navy is unique in other ways. It is a warfighting force, and training and maintenance are the bedrocks that sustain its operations. As OpTempo per ship increased over the past 20 years, officer and enlisted training was sacrificed to save money. I was part of the first “SWOS in a box” class that was sent directly to a ship after commissioning—instead of getting intense surface warfare training at Surface Warfare Officer School."
If you think that might not have worked out so well - your right. In fact if you think about it the skippers of both the McCain nd Fitzgerald were likely some of the first to matriculate into the SWO community not having attended SWOS.
So any officer that matriculated to being an officer between 2003 - and 2013 essentially had a rushed training in my opinion. And guess what (I realize below is old)
So Officer that became SWO's in 2003 are now assuming command of Destroyers.
And the postmodem comprehensive report reveals what they caused (in my opinion)
CNO USS Fitzgerald and USS John S McCain Response.pdf (navy.mil)
So since Admiral Achemed Smuckateli and company long since retired by the late 2010's we came up with a very original thought bring back Surface Warfare Officer School, oh and all that training we cut or was lost because it was in sub opitimal to funding streams...lets bring it back.
Want to caveat my next statement, as I am very much on the outside looking in when it comes to SWO stuff, the last time I was at sea is now over 5 years ago (2016) and it was for a very short period of time and I was basically a professional passenger onboard a command ship.
Yes I stood a watch, but it was not on the bridge or in CIC and had zero to do with ships operations
The last time I had a conversation with a SWO was likewise about 5 years ago (2016) .
But from those conversations little had changed since the mid 2000's. Realize that this was as WTI's were being introduced. This was also prior to the collisions that ripped the cover off serous institutional Surface Navy issues.
So maybe it has gotten better.... but I doubt it. Why?
Well the GAO. For the government accountability office to get involved it means something is not right . So this time the Navy may actually have to confront the issue as the GAO has given recommendations. Which to no surprise the Navy has concurred with. As to implementing them....
So without further delay here they are:
- 1. Evaluate why SWOs separate to improve retention.
- 2. Develop a plan to increase the retention of female SWOs.
- 3. Use logbook data to better understand limited training opportunities for junior officers.
- 4. Better understand training requirements of junior officers who may not remain SWOs.
- 5. Reevaluate the need for nuclear-trained SWOs.
- 6. Continually review SWO career paths to include evaluating specialized career paths.
- 7. Implement workforce strategies and pilot programs to consider potential changes
2. Lets due some reproductive math here. If you want to keep more females you go to stop with this fleet response plan non sense. I remember when sailors would plan pregnancies around deployments. When can our female officers plan to have babies? In short under this FRP I'm not sure. Thats some high level math.
3. Use logbook data to better understand limited training opportunities for junior officers. I thin this is bass ackwards. We should be identifying what training is required for junior officers by billet and experience level and then make this happen. The old 9 week plus availability used to be a great time for school. Again get rid of the dumb fleet response plan and go back to the old cycle and you can actually plan this stuff out for both officers and enlisted.
4. Better understand training requirements of junior officers who may not remain SWOs. I'm not sure I understand this one. No good Junior Officer SWO is generally going to tell anyone that they are leaving until about 6 months out. As they know they are going to get the shit jobs and no training opportunities. I guess I needed to read the report. I guess now we are commissioning SWO's with the explicit deal that they can exercise an option to transfer to another community after 3 years. What crazy manpower person invented this. I would not waste any training on them. In fact I would make all of these officer crappy little jobs officers.
I made my decision to leave SWO after qualifying and doing an exchange tour. I did not make it before I showed up to my first ship.
Instead, if you give good training to everyone, then people are less likely to leave
5. Reevaluate the need for nuclear-trained SWOs. Honestly, I am not sure why we have this requirement. We no longer have anything smaller than an Aircraft Carrier that runs on Nuc, and those are captained by Aviators. Convince me I am wrong
6. Continually review SWO career paths to include evaluating specialized career paths.
So this is the third issue: specialize career paths
Danger on this one. This requires a lot of thought. And it comes down to this. Ducks pick Ducks
(307) Quiz Meisters - Duck Derby! - YouTube
In this case The ducks picking Ducks are the senior officers whom sit on boards. Unless that culture is changed specialization = no promotion or non due course O-5. Non Due course being code for terminal or stuck at present paygrade with no chances of advancement.
The ducks also pick ducks with a similar career path and generalization.
However the specialization debate is complicated.
I served in the German Navy for a bit as an exchange officer while I was Surface Warfare Officer. They have a different construct.
It sort of amounts to choose your rate and ship and choose your fate.
First in the German Navy your are specialized by ship class and then by specialty. So if you go to a destroyer as an CIC type you will stay on destroyers for your entire career as an CIC type until you can get into the command pipeline.
If your an engineer on a destroyer you stay and engineer and will likely never have command.
If you go to a minesweeper your staying.
There are plus's and minus's of this. One you have a corps of Surface Warfare types that are experts at thier chosen platform. That is also the disadvantage.
A Mine Warfare officer is going to be very unfamiliar with Air Warfare and vice versa.
This becomes more problematic for post command types who need to go to a COCOM or fleet staff. When they do not have the generalize knowledge of multiple warfare areas.
There is another component that is different in many other Navy's. There is no up or out.
There is simply put at a certain point a recognition that you will not go any higher than 0-3.
And that you can stay or leave the Navy but that is the highest you go.
This means in some Navy's you might see a 50 year old O-3 whom loved thier job and is an expert whom knows he or she is never going to get command or be an O-4. and they seemed to be generally ok with that.
Remember Ducks pick Ducks. And unless we change our stay in policies, the ducks are going to pick the generalized duck and we are going to loose that officer at roughly 10 years service and all the effort that went into training
7. Implement workforce strategies and pilot programs to consider potential changes.Im not sure what that means...but ok.
