Another leadership flail by the surface Navy

 ‘People are scared’: COVID-19 outbreak rattles crew of the warship Chafee (navytimes.com)

Reading through this , it once again shows how we don't see, to know how to do basic leadership. 

Third Fleet spokesman Robertson told Navy Times Thursday that “there is no plan to test the entire crew at this time.”

What? 

If you have ever been on a ship, if one person gets sick then pretty much every one does. Everything is cramped. especially berthing spaces

“We have asked for more (N95 masks), but they don’t have enough,” the petty officer said. “When we kick back, we are either told to wear the dirty mask or face (non-judicial punishment).”

really? It seems like the Navy has not learned from the TR

“These O-5s work for an O-6 who never come on these boats, who makes policies and makes the O-5 carry them out,” the petty officer said. “The O-5 don’t have the balls to stand up to the O-6 and say what’s going on because he’s afraid he will get fired.”

This. This is probably the most accurate statement about the state of the Navy I have read in a while. 

“The ship remains able to meet its mission,” Cmdr. Sean Robertson said in an email Wednesday. “No Chafee sailors have been hospitalized and all positives are in isolation.”

I highly doubt this. My  guess, the higher ups are going to eventually realize that when the cooks get sick everyone does .

"Eleven of those listed sailors are culinary specialists"

This just shows the Navy has not learned from the TR. 

The below in my opinion sums up my reaction to this

 A little Schadenfreude here. from the Bulgarians....and sadly very correct..English is a little broken (as is mine at times:) , but it is a fairly good synopsis of the dearth of capability brought by the LCS and the processes or lack thereof that got us here

American warships of one class turn into a metal scrub (bulgarianmilitary.com)

https://bulgarianmilitary.com/2021/01/13/american-warships-of-one-class-turn-into-a-metal-scrub/

"At the turn of the 90s and 2000s, even before 9/11, euphoria reigned in the American top military-political leadership abyss. Great America was the only superpower. Half-dead Russia begged for loans from the IMF and tried not to lose the war to several thousand bandits in the Caucasus. China was already the world’s factory, but this factory did not have anything to threaten American rule. America could unleash wars, attack other countries, declare good for evil and vice versa, and indeed do absolutely anything.

On the one hand, the euphoria of omnipotence led to the abandonment of investments in such things as hypersonic weapons. On the other hand, it gave rise to a whole class of weapons and military equipment, much more suitable for punitive police operations in ruined underdeveloped countries than for real war with a strong opponent."

"Everything would be fine, but the concept began to grow into details – precisely as it was shown in the old comedy “The Pentagon Wars.” They decided to make this ship modular. They assumed that the modules’ replacement would quickly and inexpensively change the boat’s purpose – from anti-submarine to the landing base. All these were the disaster of the project. The modules required internal volumes; the volumes increased the body; the enormous body needed a more powerful power plant.

Still, it did not fit into it, the body had to be increased further, and again a new, even more, the mighty power plant was required. Plus, these modules were not some then products and complex weapons and equipment, including a helicopter. And where the helicopter is, there are a hangar for it, a control room, and fuel reserves, which are again volumes and, as a result, contours.

What happened next is called the “death spiral” in English. This “spiral” is when any step forces the player to circle the death ending and then still meet him. These spirals were spinning with the LCS project and eventually turned it into something completely meaningless."

 Gowind 2500 corvette

Egyptian Navy takes delivery of 1st locally built warship - Naval Today

Gowind-class design - Wikipedia

Another LCS done right....even has VLS

While I am sure that there are two sides to the story, at first glance this appears to be a massive failure of  one U.S Navy chain of command. It seems leadership afloat still doesn't get it 

US Navy punishes suicidal sailor who sought mental health treatment | Renton Reporter

"In mid-October, Michael Gregg checked himself into Portsmouth Naval hospital where he was diagnosed with adjustment disorder, severe anxiety and severe depression, deeming his suitability for continued service as “highly doubtful,” according to doctors’ notes provided to the Mirror.

The following day, Michael Gregg saw the ship’s psychologist and explained his suicidal thoughts. The lieutenant allegedly told him to come back for breathing exercises the next Thursday — 10 days away

Michael Gregg said he was presented with three options, including taking medication, which was discouraged due to his religion; a six-day therapy session; or voluntary commitment on the ship."

Each option had Michael Gregg returning to the USS Eisenhower, and doctors had determined the ship was a trigger point for his suicidal thoughts.

“I’ve never heard of somebody going back the third time in two days after being rejected to still be rejected,” Farrah Gregg said of her son’s multiple attempts to seek professional help.

The alleged lack of help sent Michael into a depressive state where he could not leave his bed and would not eat for several days. At this point, Farrah Gregg said, Michael’s lieutenant sent a note to Michael that said he has an unauthorized absence (UA), and if he didn’t return to the ship by Oct. 26, his pay would be cut.

I wish this was the only instance.  But it is not.  It appears leadership afloat still hasn't gotten the message that those needing help need to get it. 

I get it, perhaps ASAN  (Aviation Support Equipment Technician ) Seaman Gregg may have had other issues not reported here. And perhaps there were good reasons for the command to do what it did. 

Looking at this from a human capital aspect :

https://www.navycs.com/navy-jobs/aviation-support-equipment.html

The Aviation Support Equipment Technician rating was established in October 1965.

The Navy's computerized personnel system associates the rating name with an alphanumeric Navy Occupational Specialty (NOS) code. For AS, the NOS is A430.

Aviation Support Equipment Technicians operate, maintain, repair and test automotive electrical systems in ground equipment, gasoline and diesel systems, and associated automotive, hydraulic and pneumatic systems. They also maintain gas turbine compressor units, ground air-conditioning units, perform metal fabrication, repair and painting of tow tractors and other aircraft servicing units.

Aviation Support Equipment Technician class "A" school is approximately 20 weeks long, and it is located in Pensacola, Florida.

So doing the rough math here, the navy spent time and money to recruit him lets assume 6 months delayed entry. 

He enlisted in March 2018. Then he then spent the regular 90 or say days in boot camp graduating in June / July 2018 .

With then another 20 weeks  (5 months) in his "A" School leaves him graduating around December 2018. 

With probably some leave which means he likely arrived at perhaps  notional a "C" school sometime in February 2019 . Not knowing what his NEC is but lets just add another 2 months for a "C" school for good measure notional graduation in  March/April 2019.

Then lets assume he spent 90 days cranking (on the mess decks) on arrival (not sure how it works on CVN's) but we get him to his workcenter about Jun 2019. 

So essentially, it took about 13 months from the time he enlisted, to get him to his first ship. Not sure how much money that is, but it is an investment. Which had this been handled differently might not have been lost. 

Again, no idea if he had previous disciplinary issues. But lets assume for the sake of argument he did not. 

Based on the Eisenhower's schedule looks like they deployed in February 2020 returned to home port in August 2020. So he made it through deployment. 

USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69) left Naval Station Norfolk on Jan. 17 to begin its final exercise ahead of its deployment. Completing certification on Feb. 20, the carrier headed to the Middle East to relieve Truman. The carrier stayed on station with no port calls for seven months.

Eisenhower stayed in 5th Fleet until the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group deployed from the West Coast in late July.

Eisenhower and cruiser USS San Jacinto (CG-56) pulled into Naval Station Norfolk on Aug. 9. Cruiser USS Vella Gulf (CG-72) and destroyers USS James E. Williams (DDG-95) and USS Truxtun (DDG-103) followed shortly thereafter.

USNI News 2020 Fleet and Marine Review - USNI News

Again guessing a 30 day leave period following deployment so he probably took some leave and came back to the ship late Sept.

Again from a human capital management perspective you have a technical sailor, whom has 13 months of training and deployment under his belt 

Getting him treatment, and right, taking 2-3 months to do that, and do it right may have saved that investment. 

Instead it looks like the Navy and his chain of command spent those 3 months on the disciplinary process 

When it comes to suicide my training says if someone iterates or says they are going to do something bad to themselves you take it very seriously. 

While the above situation is bad imagine if ASAN Gregg had committed suicide. 

“The actions of the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower Command and its failure to acknowledge Seaman Michael Gregg’s risk of suicide aboard the ship are unacceptable,” Palomares said. “This is the latest example of leadership lapses by Commanders charged with the care of our sons and daughters entrusted to the U.S. military.”

I Sincerely hope that Mr Gregg gets the help he needs in the civilian world.

"Michael was officially separated from the US Navy on Dec. 23 with general discharge under honorable conditions. Farrah Gregg says the family is going to fight for a status change to medical disability discharge in the coming months."

If this was a one off I would feel better...

Shades of USS Shilo

‘I now hate my ship’: Surveys reveal disastrous morale on cruiser Shiloh (navytimes.com)

https://www.facebook.com/WINR1/photos/regarding-the-uss-shiloh-incidentweve-had-the-opportunity-to-talk-to-several-for/1939777369639562/

and another

https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/06/08/his-suicide-note-was-message-navy-way-he-died-was-exclamation-point.html

 

 I am very interested in how the incoming administration will tackle the Navy's various woes. Of some of the candidates mentioned I think I'm in  favor of Elaine Goodman Luria. 

Her experience as as a nuke SWO would be extremely valuable as it is our surface force that has declined the most with essentially over a decade of lost capability as we dithered with transformational methodologies vice building stuff that works. 

As I mentioned in an earlier post the Russians have been building smaller cheaper and capable surface units in quantity. Ditto for the Chinese.

It is also an indictment on our senior navy leadership past (mostly) that we have abdicated the ability to design and build functional ships. That our new constellation class is essentially designed by an Italian and French military syndicate vice here in the United States says a lot. 

FREMM multipurpose frigate - Wikipedia

FREMM European multipurpose frigate (naval-technology.com)

Now I am all for not re-inventing wheels it says a lot that we can't seem to design and build from the keel up a homegrown warship that actually has capability.

Yes I know we are going to throw our systems onboard vice what the the French and Italians have onboard. So in many ways we are just going to by the hull and fit our systems.

Might also not be a bad idea to borrow the Otomat Mk2 (supersonic ish) 100 nm Anti Ship Cruise Missile while we are at it. Unless we have some demonstrated, tested and integrated missile of our own that is ready for prime time, 

So bringing it back to the subject of the post, we are desperately in need of someone whom can call BS on Admirals and industry whom seem to be like cats chancing a laser pointer dot when evaluating Surface ships for purchase. 

And someone whom will mandate a back to the basics mentality that recognizes you can can't do it better, cheaper and faster. You have to pick one, and maybe two. 

In addition, it would be useful to have someone to call a spade a spade, and advise President Biden to restrain the COCOMS for unrealistic force requirements that simply put can not be met with the number of ships we have in inventory

Will be interesting to see who ends up in the chair.