Snake oil and bridges to sell the LCS saga

 Happened to be perusing my traps and lines this morning and came across this bit from CDR Salamander

CDR Salamander about the LCS 

Thursday, April 29, 2021

When You Fool Yourself, You are One

 He linked to the following report 

Littoral Combat Ship: Unplanned Work on Maintenance Contracts Creates Schedule Risk as Ships Begin Operations (gao.gov)

Rule of 3's

 I'm going to translate the above bureaucratic speak into plain English in a minute.

But before I do that I'm going into the rule of threes as far as surface ship operations go. One that tends to work and if you deviate from it you start reducing readiness and material condition.

The rule of threes is simple. Lets say you have 9 ships. Generally that means you really only have 3. Or maybe if you push it 4 or 5. But you can't push that envelop for long or things and people start breaking

So generally if you have 9 ships,  3 are in the yards (more on that later), 3 are operationally deployed or capable of such and 3 have exited the yards an in the work of phases. 

Its pretty simple and it works.  Yes you are only essentially getting 3 ships operational for the 9 you have under that model but those three ships are going to last a lot longer.

The problem is that the US Navy decided to get cute.

We have pushed the model to essentially wanting and having 6 ships operationally deployed, with 3 of those ships the ones that should be going into the yards and ready for what they called surge tasking. 

For those that don't know when ships come back from a 6-9 month deployment they are generally pretty beat up. This is especially s we don't make as many port visits, and that means thing like painting and other maintenance that can really only be done in port gets what they called deferred. Or in Simple English speak - it doesn't get done when it should have and is rescheduled. 

Paying the shop vice doing it yourself and delaying (deferring) the work

A good analogy would be changing the oil on your car. So rather than say every 3000 miles you decide to push it to 6000 miles and then 9000 miles. Well you can imagine what impact that would have on your cars engine. 

Have I done that occasionally because I was to busy, yes, but I try not to do it that much. Because my car's service life is going to be shorter and I'm going to have a buy a new car sooner.

So back to this 

Littoral Combat Ship: 

Unplanned Work 

on Maintenance Contracts 

Creates  Schedule Risk 

as Ships Begin Operations (gao.gov)

Unplanned work: This means you had no idea using the analogy above that when you finally went in for an oil change the mechanic noticed that you windshield wipers were shot, your tires bald, you had some coolant and oil leaks and your hoses needed to be replaced. Well remember you planned for a quick oil change, and so did your mechanic. But now instead of a 29.95 30 minute oil change you are looking at a 800 dollar several day overhaul job. 

Maintenance Contracts: Well way back in the day much of the basic stuff mentioned above, was taken care of by the crew of a ship. Think rather than taking your car to the shop you head over to auto zone pick up your parts jack up the car and do the work yourself. You save the 50 or more an hour labor because your doing it yourself and avoid the markup on the parts because you did it yourself. Downside is your Saturday is lost. Well now - especially for the LCS the crew is not capable of doing this themselves due to minimal manning so we have to book an appointment with the mechanic. So we call him and say hey I'm just coming in for an oil change but can you do a once over on the car to see if there is anything wrong. Mechanic say sure, why don't you come in around 10 and we will do the oil change and you will be on your way by 11 at the latest. So you go in drop your keys and sit in the waiting room reading an old sports illustrated or car mag. At 1030 the mechanic comes in pale faced and says your car is jacked up and its nor really safe to drive as the tires are bald and a bunch of other stuff is messed up. 

Uh oh what do we do now?

Creates Schedule Risk: The mechanic says says look, I've got 3 other cars coming in and this was not really what we discussed, this is going to take three days to fix with all my people. You say fine do what you have to. Well what does the mechanic say, well he looks at his appointment book and realizes he  needs to call Ms Jones, Mr Smith ..ect and tell them not to bring their cars in to execute their scheduled maintenance contracts because his lift is going to be full the next several days. Well Ms Jones and Mr Smith now have to reschedule their maintenance contracts  

Creates Schedule Risks part II. So while its up on the lift they find a bunch more stuff that is wrong that was not revealed by the once over, Your now looking at a couple weeks in the shop. So that road trip to the mid west you planned - that's out. And you also need to find another car to go to work with in the mean time. 

As ships begin operations:  Remember that 3/3/3 rule. 3 ships deployed, 3 ships in training and 3 ships getting ready to go. Well think of it like 9 cars in a big family who have to be able to have the capacity to have three cars on the road at all times. And after a set period of time they change out. Well now one of the cars that was supposed to change out is broken. So the intricate schedule you developed is out the window. 

So how did we get here throwing stones at glass houses

So a while back I had a chance to tour and talk with some LCS sailors. I felt like I had entered the twilight zone where normal rules of surface ship operations do not apply.

To begin with the ships were purposely not manned at sufficient levels to do basic or intermediate level maintenance. I'll call that changing the oil, changing tires, coolant flush and maybe some  belts plus coolant change.

They are totally reliant on contractors to fix stuff. 

So again its my shop analogy.

But it gets worse. And I'll use another car analogy. 

Sometimes you get a complex repair, like changing out the engine in your car, because you blew it up as you forgot to check the oil. 

Now that is a repair beyond the ability of most. However, in my extended family's I have some non mechanics whom if we got together we could probably change the engine. I happen to have a decent size shop who the previous owners used to service semis. 

So I buy a case a beer we run out get the parts, swing my 5 tone crane and start the work. Its going to take a bit as we don't change engines out routinely, but we will get er done. 

The above is what we used to call SIMA or Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activities and our tender fleets whom could pretty much fix anything. 

We to my knowledge essentially defunded these and outsources it. The equivalent of me selling my shop and crane and deciding to take any work to a professional mechanic with all the increased costs but hopefully increased efficiency. In short we use contractors 

And these contractors are not (I could be wrong about this) onboard. (From GAO report)

Currently, the Navy is paying “fly-away teams,” meaning U.S. basedcontractors who travel overseas to conduct routine and non-major LCS maintenance, a higher cost unique to the LCS program. For example, Navy officials stated that starting in late 2020, they began sending flyaway teams to Panama to support LCS operating in the region. The Navy will continue to use fly-away teams of contractors at least until the METs are implemented, which the Navy expects to take approximately 5 years. Navy officials stated that they are still determining the balance of contractors and METs for future LCS maintenance.

Now it looks like someone finally realized that the above model is a bit stupid, and maybe those transformationalists and business process cult navalists from the 2000's may have been just a  but misguided 

While the Navy is introducing Navy-led Maintenance Execution Teams (MET) to take over some routine maintenance duties typically conducted by contractors, contractors will continue to play a role in the maintenance of LCS. The Navy is developing METs, which will consist only of Navy personnel separate from the LCS crew, to reduce the Navy’s reliance on contractors for LCS maintenance. The Navy expects that the METs will increase the self-reliance and flexibility of the ships to meet operational schedules and shift routine maintenance responsibility onto the Navy. Nevertheless, Navy officials stated that contractors will continue to have a role in routine maintenance in the near and long term as the METs are being stood up and after they are in place

MET = SIMA  thats what it looks like. 

But we have other problems with the whole LCS  design which was stupid from the get go and only really serves to line contractors pockets..assuming we can get them to come onboard to fix things in the first place 

here are a few nuggets

-the Navy and other contractors do not consistently have access to technical information necessary to maintain many systems and therefore need OEM support

-vendors from foreign countries provide a number of LCS systems, and Navy maintenance officials said it can be especially difficult to bring in foreign OEMs to execute ship repairs when LCS work is performed overseas during deployments. Specifically, officials said it is challenging to arrange access for foreign OEM technician

-the LCS program planned to use contracted maintenance, and as a result, program officials stated that they did not purchase the technical documentation necessary to maintain the systems used on the ship.

-The shortage of OEM technicians for the number of LCS currently in operation may increase the risk of schedule delays in the future as more LCS become operational. For example, maintenance officials stated that a commercial system had a broken part that required repairs and the OEM did not have a procedure to fix it. As a result, the Navy had to take the part from another ship to fix the first ship and put the broken part in storage

Even for routine maintenance, LCS is experiencing numerous instances of unplanned maintenance work, called growth work, which puts the program at greater risk of cost growth and schedule delays. A senior Navy maintenance official stated that the amount of growth work for LCS is “unbelievable.” In our analysis of 18 delivery orders, including 16 for non-major and routine maintenance, we found 760 requests for contract changes across both variants, with 651 requests due to growth work. Of those changes for growth work, the most common category—341 (52 percent)—was work that the Navy determined could not have been planned prior to the availability such as work that required inspecting the ship after the availability started. Figure 4 shows the breakdown of these categories in our sample

By the way "Growth" is the mechanic realizing you got big problems

So I have complained about the problem. What is the solution?

To start, we need to take back our maintenance, and our systems. Dialing 1-800 CON TRAC is not a solution when your in harms way.

Lets have the appropriate technical navy org take ownership of these systems, develop documentation and manuals. Lets break these contracts in for the good of the service and start developing "A" and        "C" schools

So unfortunately the snake oil salesman sold their oil to the navy and we bought the bridge that wasn't really for sale and never will be built and even it was we won't own it.

Its time to admit we go scammed go to the doctor and take the bitter medicine that is proscribed, and admit we can't afford to keep sending out car out for service and re-learn how do do that work in house with our own sailors. And yes increase manning as required. Maybe a module or two onthe LCS needs to go for a 30 man berthing for E-3 and below. 

Nobody is perfect but really? The U.S Navy needs someone or something to check our appearances before we are seen in public

Russian 

                                                        Russian

                                                                     Greek

                                                             Russian

                                                           Spanish

 For those that have been through the straits of strait of Dardanelles is a pretty long transit, and your highly visible to the public.  I had the privilege back in 2016 on Mount Whitney.  

Its a real shame when we send a US Destroyer that looks like it belongs in an episode of mad max and the  thunder dome through in such a condition. 

There is a person who has a hobby it is to take pictures of ships passing through you can find it here

 https://turkishnavy.net

My basic question is why do our ships look so crappy when other nations ships seem to be able to maintain their appearances fine. 

Maybe we can ask the Russians, Greeks or Spanish what their surface maintenance procedures are? 

Something old Something new something blue make the old new

Sitting here and checking my daily traps and lines for Navy developments worldwide, and its as always a bit distressing. It seems like when I do check both reliable and somewhat reliable sources concerning Navy developments there is a renaissance in Navy operational concepts going on everywhere but in the U.S Navy.  We seem to have a leadership / vision problem.  Mixed up with some good idea fairyisms. 

To sum it up we seem stuck in a rut where our Carriers are the offensive punch and the Surface Warfare Community is the escort function. 

My major problem with that is that the legs of our aircraft are simply put to short. And  no longer are capable against peer or near peer OPFOR

Yes we can add unmanned refueling, but still I am guessing that it is a couple tanks, or diminished armament carrying (external tank means less bombs and missiles) to get to the  1000-1500 mile range that I have arbitrarily chosen as the range that seems to correspond to the threat we face from near peer competitors. if we want to execute a strategic strike mission. 

And remember, double that to 2000 - 3000 miles for a manned asset that has to come home and then add another bit of distance in case they actual have to fight their way in and or out. 

Over at Navy Matters (navy-matters.blogspot.com) they present an interesting scenario where essentially our tomahawk missiles become game for  OPFOR as they are too slow, and that essentially the carrier air wing has to escort the missiles in . 

Also scenario where we have to mass 4 flat tops to accomplish the objective. My basic question is where is the tanking capacity to support that.

And when would we on short notice have the ability to surge 4 flat tops (I'm using Flat Tops to incorporate platforms like the America) 

The real issue I have with the scenario is that we would have to get within a 1000 miles (and I'm being generous here) to make this work. 

Simply put without a long range fighter and strike aircraft I'm not sure our carrier based business model works anymore and neither does our subsonic tomahawk capability. 

(Full disclosure I am nor have I ever been an airdale/ aviation type so some of the above and below may be inaccurate and is derived from wiki  and other easy web resources so maybe not totally right )

Cold war Era and then some: 

A-6 Intruder: Combat Range 878 Nautical miles 

F-14 Tomcat: Combat Range 580 Nautical Miles 

EA-6B  Prowler: Combat Range 2,022 Nautical Miles / 2400 tanks dropped

Current

F-18 Hornet:. Combat Range  400 Nautical miles

EA-F-18 Growler. Combat range 400 Nautical miles

F-35 C                 .Combat range 670 Nautical miles ( I think its less for the Navy version)

And these are just range issues, don't forget the "legacy" aircraft were much more capable at their designated missions. 

Think of having a broadsword and a spear vice a utility knife.  I'll take the former two please

My solution, break out the old blueprints for these legacy platforms, upgrade the avionics and call it a day.  That might go a ways to hep. Yes re-start the F-14, A-6, S-3 and EA-6B lines upgrade the avionics and call it done. Not real trade studies needed. Retraining yes, as there would once again be strike, fighter and ASW types. 

Simply put the 1990's to present Carrier Air Wing Experiment was predicated on the thoughts the Soviets were gone and no one else was around to challenge us and it would be much cheaper and more effective to cut the types and number of airframes being flown. Sometimes old tech and conops are better than what they replace. 

Yo be clear I'm not proposing we turn the navy back into its 1970's and 80's version, but we could take the good of those and update them rather than forcing tech were it is not needed. The below encapsulates what I think has gone wrong with the navy acquisitions for the last 20 years. Yes I can create an electronic bridge note that works well on a laptop. but why would I. A piece of paper works fins. And yes I know this is a comic, but our integrated ships control are now touch screens which must do wonders for night vision. So we kind of already did this . Vice good old analog (lead) glow in the dark controls. 

So to conclude, I think our chances with our current assets - even with the (very vulnerable in my opinion ) net centric advances - our chances  are not good if we actually had to execute the mission outlined in the 

Navy Matters: Missile Escort (navy-matters.blogspot.com) scenario.

I'm doing some mental rough order of PH/PK plus survivability of manned assets against a defended target and its not looking so good for the visiting team (thats us by the way). 

The numbers would be so bad we might as well call it a Doolittle raid. 

Because there are going to be a lot of vacant seats in the ready room. 

And it is a lot harder to put replacements in those seats then circa WW2

I have to somewhat agree maybe its time to turn the way we have been fighting the last 75 years on its head. 

Perhaps the Flat Tops should protect the shooters. Assuming we actually have something to shoot besides old school tomahawks 

Remember we lost roughly 100 carrier based aircraft in the battle of midway. Or about 44 percent of the total embarked. That's an average of about 75 aircraft per deck on three carriers. 

Today our CVN's carry about 45 or so strike fighter/ ew aircraft. 

Vice carrying roughly 75 per CV in World War two. 

So in context if you are to apply the math the three carriers at midway carried roughly 225 total aircraft and lost roughly 100 or about 45 percent of the planes. 

4 Aircraft carriers suffering similar losses today would be carrying about 180 aircraft and would expect to loose roughly 80 aircraft.

Yes Midway was a fight between Aircraft Carriers not an denied access strike that we are likley to face. But really what is the difference. 

If we are going to be the away team say against China, they have less need for aircraft carriers as they have ready made island and mainland runways. 

We are just going to be going against an adversary that has larger force generation capabilities than we do. 

So if you make me the decision maker for the day and tell me I am likely going to loose 45 percent of my aircraft to take out a critically strategic target with conventional means as my Tomahawk and other surface to surface missiles are not op to the task, 

I might have to make that decision. 

Well I shouldn't have to make that decision. Cause we can do better. 

But more concerning is how are we going to fight our way into a roughly 1000 mile range. The OPFOR is not going to leave the door open. 

So what am I going to do to keep the U.S Navy and partners from getting close enough to launch. 

well mines (which we are um suboptimal at), subs (also suboptimal unless we are talking another sub doing it ) and missiles (give us a B- and getting worse).  

And small disposable fast attack craft that can get into my vulnerability circle and get out quick after launching a couple of Anti Ship cruise missiles. 

I mention the word disposable as OPFOR really doesn't care if they survive. 

If a crappy missile boat can hit one of out DDG's. Flatops or large decks it has probably paid back the investment in the entire class of those ships that OPFOR built. 

So while we have been flailing around with LCS, Navy's 'Cheap' Littoral Combat Ships Cost Nearly As Much To Run As Guided Missile Destroyers (thedrive.com)

Zumwalt and abortive attempts to build the next generation CG to replace those that have clearly ben rolled up hard and packed away wet Vella Gulf crew remains onboard while ship is stricken with more mechanical problems (navytimes.com). 

While at the same time trying to throw away capability that works US Navy Mark VI Patrol Boats Receive Reprieve - Naval News 

what have other countries been doing. 

well they are re-thinking how they fight. Like say putting ASCM's on an LPD. Nor strapping them on but actually integrating them. Makes sense right. Taiwan launches new naval vessel | NHK WORLD-JAPAN News

So lets go through a quick roundup of some what would appear successful acquisitions programs, these are in the last 6 months to a year by the way. 

China

China expects to launch its third aircraft carrier this year - Naval Post

China’s New Type 075 Amphibious Assault Ship starts the second round of sea trials - Naval Post

France:

[Video] Pierre Éric Pommellet's message on board the Alsace | Naval Group (naval-group.com)

French frigate Alsace - Wikipedia

Taiwan

Taiwan shipbuilder CSBC launches the 1st indigenous LPD - Naval Post

Taiwanese Navy launches first Tuo Chiang-class corvette - Naval Post

Japan:

 Mogami-class frigate - Wikipedia

Japan launches first ship of new frigate class (defensenews.com)

Japan launches, names new diesel-electric attack submarine - Naval Today

JS Taigei - Wikipedia

Spain

Navantia hosts launching ceremony for Spanish Navy's 1st S-80 submarine - Naval Today

S-80 Plus-class submarine - Wikipedia

UK

BAE Systems rolls out forward section of Royal Navy's new Type 26 frigate - Naval Today

Type 26 frigate - Wikipedia

Qatar

Fincantieri launches one, lays keel for another Al Zubarah-class corvette (navaltoday.com)

QENS Al Zubarah (F101) - Wikipedia

Fincantieri | Al Zubarah Class

Philippines

Philippine Navy's new frigate to be delivered ahead of schedule - Naval Today

Jose Rizal-class frigate - Wikipedia

HHI to deliver 2nd missile frigate to the Philippine Navy - Naval Post

Egypt

Egyptian Navy takes delivery of 1st locally built warship - Naval Today

Gowind® 2500 Corvette - Naval Technology (naval-technology.com)

Egyptian Navy's final Type 209/1400 submarine named, launched in Germany - Naval Today

SSK Manthatisi Class (Type 209/1400) Attack Submarine - Naval Technology (naval-technology.com)

Egypt’s navy modernization, The growth of new power in the Middle east - Naval Post

ENS Bernees 1003 joins Egyptian Navy - Naval Post

South Korea

Republic of Korea Navy commissions 2nd Daegu-class frigate - Naval Today

Daegu-class frigate - Wikipedia

South Korea's light aircraft carrier program officially begins - Naval Post

Daewoo launches 2nd KSS-III submarine for the ROK Navy - Naval Post

Ukraine

Ukraine ordered four ADA-class corvettes from Turkey - Naval Post

Russia

Lead Gremyashchy-class corvette joins Russian Navy fleet - Naval Today

Gremyashchiy-class corvette - Wikipedia

Russian Navy's Project 23900 LHDs Taking Shape in Kerch - Naval Post

A New Class of Ship by Russia, UMK Varan - Naval Post

Russia to commission 4th Project Buyan-M class corvette at the end of January - Naval Post

Saudi Arabia

Navantia splashes 2nd corvette for Saudi Navy - Naval Today

Navantia launches 3rd Avante-2200 class corvette, Hail 832, for the Royal Saudi Naval Forces - Naval Post

Israel

German shipbuilder delivers new corvette to Israel - Naval Today

INS Magen - Wikipedia

TKMS hands over 2nd Sa'ar 6 corvette to the Israeli Navy - Naval Post

Thyssenkrupp delivers first Saar 6 class corvette to Israeli Navy - Naval Post

India

First Visakhapatnam Class Destroyer Completes Basin Trials (defencexp.com)

Visakhapatnam-class destroyer - Wikipedia

Indian Navy expects to take delivery of INS Vikrant aircraft carrier by end of 2021 - Naval Post

India commissions VC11184 Ballistic Missile Tracking Ship - Naval Post

Indian shipbuilder GRSE lays keel of 3rd Project 17A Frigate - Naval Post

India launches 2nd Project 17A frigate "Himgiri" - Naval Post

Iran

Quad carrying C-802 catamaran

H I Sutton - Covert Shores

Iran’s Revolutionary Guard launches multipurpose carrier ship - Naval Post

Italy

Fincantieri | Multipurpose Offshore Patrol Vessel (PPA)

Fincantieri launches the 3rd PPA "Raimando Montecuccoli" - Naval Post

Indonesia

Indonesian North Sea Boats launches first X18 Tank Boat - Naval Post

Turkey

Turkish companies announce ASW variant of ULAQ USCV - Naval Post

Turkey launches first indigenous frigate - Naval Post

Royal Navy

Royal Navy commissions Madfox Unmanned Surface Vessel - Naval Post

Brazil

Brazilian Navy reclassifies Atlantico amphibious ship as aircraft carrier - Naval Post

I'm not even mad, that's impressive hiding the readiness salami

So I happened to see this over at USNI.

Navy's Infamous INSURV Reports Set to End This Year Unless Congress Acts - USNI News

Somewhere a Navy legislative affairs officer (I am  not sure what their official title is) is groaning. 

About what you say? this little thing called INSURV. 

For those not familiar this is the drill Sergeant white glove inspection for surface ships. 

While you might pass it, you never get a perfect score  and failure is a real and terrifying option. 

Failure often but not always gets skippers fired.  Just depends on how bad big navy made readiness availabilities. 

If your ship was skipped for like 10 years you might get a pass

In any case what INSURV does do it give everybody whom can read it a (theoretically ) clear snapshot of the material readiness of a grey hull bought and paid for by the taxpayers. 

It also can show you the results of delayed maintenance availabilities and extended deployments 

And it is really embarrassing for the navy to have many of its premier assets fail or not perform well.

So a little history (and I am going to date myself a bit here) of INSUV well back in my day driving grey hulls we had some degree of advance warning that we would have an insurv..I think it was about 6 months to a year.  And it was something that generated real fear. 

As  young Ensign hearing a LCDR XO talk about it was like hearing about the boogey monster and the apocalypse all rolled into one. And it was. 

The objective was to survive - although you knew they would find lots of things wrong and make you look fairly dumb. 

After all the inspectors at INSURV new their stuff well and all the tricks you as a grey hull would try to use to make you look better. They were back in my day terminal O-5's and above whom gave no thought of delivering devastating reports. Because it a ship was jacked up then sailors might die because systems either did not work or sailors did not know how to operate them. 

I would love to read the INSURV reports for McCain and Fitzgerald prior to their respective collisions.

Broadside cartoon below says its all.

In any case the old advance notice gave us all the time in the world to essentially game the inspection. In fact if you did fail, you had very little excuse. This is not to say it would be pretty.

The games that were played...missing something - go borrow it from another ship and return it the day after inspection. Don't have someone whom can do x y or z ditto.

At some point in time they reduced the advance warning from months to weeks. Which makes it a lot harder to game the system, and the inspection as well as produce more accurate realistic assessment of the material condition and readiness of a grey hull. 

In short I am all for it.

But for big navy (Washington DC Navy) this is not good.

Which means in rough terms if our grey hulls were getting say A and B grades under the old system, they are now getting Cs D's and F's. 

The reports have long been a headache for the Navy because they often paint an unfavorable picture of the fleet’s readiness. The assessment for FY 2020 – unveiled last week – found that ship readiness decreased in the last three years. A string of negative INSURV reports prompted the Navy to classify the assessments in 2008, but the service later began producing unclassified versions of the reports.

In short the report card being generated is not very good. So what do you do when your report card sucks, well lets just eliminate the  report card. That way mom and dad (in these case Congress) won't know you failed and take away the car keys and your Xbox.

That they classified it, i am on the fence about that one. I am not sure what we are protecting when our ships go out looking like this. I think its pretty clear that there is likely alot of things broken on this ship. 

So it looks like (no clue whom did it) some legislative affairs staffer snuck a provision into the 2019 that 

While INSURV has existed for 139 years for the purpose of examining the service’s ships, Congress included a provision in the Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act stipulating that a report would no longer be required after Oct. 1, 2021 

I am guessing that enterprising staff officer go an EP out of that. However, and thankfully it looks like the gig is up as another enterprising member of some congressional staff discovered the shenanigans and plans to make sure mom and dad get their report card. 

So I guess its 

Readiness Issues anyone...

 2020-INSURV-ANNUAL-REPORT.PDF (defense.gov)

Laugh or Cry part 2

 Really don't know what to think of this:

With the submarine threat on the rise, the US Navy looks to autonomous water sensor drones (defensenews.com)

"The drone would need to be able to operate for 90 days at a time, dive to depths of up to 200 meters – or 657 feet – and take a sample every 2 seconds, according to documents posted to Naval Information Warfare Systems Command’s website"

"The Navy wants the drone to be able to loiter at depth or on the bottom, be able to transmit data when it surfaces via iridium satellite or a line-of-site datalink and be recoverable by either a survey ship or a vessel of opportunity"

 These specs are like 2000's era specs. In short orgs like Woods Hole and MBARI (Monterey) and Scripts have been using slocum gliders since about that time .

I mean I did an open marker survey while attached to a foreign navy back in 2003-2005 and you would think that people at Naval Information Warfare Systems Command would do the same before putting this out. 

There is literally no need to develop this. It was developed something like 20 years ago and operational 15 years ago 

See this article from 2008..so we seem to be issuing an RFP for tech this is over 15 years old and can be purchased of the shelf picture below is from 2012 when we lost one near Bermuda

Unidentified Floating Object In Bermuda's Waters - Bernews

Xconomy: Bluefin Sells Sub to Horizon Marine, Competes with iRobot for Big Navy Contract

"Bluefin, a 1997 spinoff of the AUV Laboratory at MIT’s Sea Grant College Program, licenses the technology behind the Spray Glider from the Scripps Institute of Oceanography "

"in the course of a single mission, the Spray Glider can dive and ascend 800 times, going as deep as 1,500 meters and covering a total distance of 4,000 kilometers. Every time the vehicle surfaces, it uses GPS to get a fix on its position, and sends the data it’s collected back to controllers via an Iridium satellite phone connection. (The Seaglider and the Slocum Glider function much the same way; all three vehicles were developed in response to an Office of Naval Research challenge to the scientific community about 10 years ago to build an “autonomous ocean sampling network.”)

"Bluefin has been manufacturing the Spray Glider for oceanographic research organizations and military agencies since 2004. But the Horizon deal marks the first time that Bluefin has supplied the craft to a commercial client. “The contract is important to us in that it’s really the first time that the oil and gas industry has come to look at this platform,” says Jeff Smith, Bluefin’s director of programs. “Traditionally this has been an academic research vehicle. The Navy has recently looked at using it for data collection to give advantage to the warfighter, and now with this Horizon Marine contract we’re seeing it in real-time applications for commercial oil and gas exploration.”

Smith couldn’t divulge the size of the contract, but he says that each Spray Glider vehicle costs about $100,000 when fully equipped with conductivity, temperature, and depth sensors. (Which isn’t much when you compare it to the $30,000 per day it can cost to send out manned oceanographic survey ships.)"

Naval Information Warfare Systems Command, if you want I think I still have my market survey on an old thumb drive...happy to give it to you as a starting point:) 

or ask purdue university:

Agile underwater glider could quietly survey the seas - Purdue University News

Place-trading AUVs designed for longer oceanographic missions (newatlas.com)

looks like l-3/harris is going to get a contract soon :) The requirements seem tailor made  

L3Harris’ IVER AUV: Multi-Mission Capability (defensenews.com)

A scenario that upends conventional wisdom

 

Could this happen....This piece was put together back in 2012. The technology has only improved since then. While this is an alternative analysis of possibilities in the PACOM area. this article brought my memories back

But before that some recent articles....

 China’s underwater drones seized in Indonesia expose tech, routes and potential submarine plans | South China Morning Post (scmp.com)

and this

China Enters the UUV Fray – The Diplomat

"HSU001 is a Large Displacement UUV (LDUUV), roughly analogous to the U.S. Navy’s own LDUUV, “Snakehead,” which is designed for missions such as intelligence preparation of the environment (IPOE) and anti-submarine warfare (ASW). At approximately 7 meters long, it is less than half the size of “Orca,” the U.S. Navy’s Extra Large UUV (XLUUV) which will be pier launched and is designed for complex, long-distance missions, including the delivery of specialized payloads such as mines, seabed sensors, and small UUVs. While HSU001 lacks the capacity for such large-scale payload integration, it may be capable of deploying micro UUVs or other sensors, or carrying payloads via external hardpoints. While it lacks adequate energy stores to transit thousands of nautical miles like Orca, it will likely be capable of long-endurance missions lasting several weeks to several months"

The Great Underwater Wall Of Robots: Chinese Exhibit Shows Off Sea Drones | Popular Science (popsci.com)

And the below is the fictionalized story that preceded a research paper on AUV/UUV's.

written about a decade ago...and yes It could happen

The Stennis Carrier Strike Group (CSG) had been tasked to deploy to the South China Sea in order to demonstrate the U.S resolve regarding Taiwan. The new leadership in Taiwan had recently begun the political maneuverings necessary to put a vote of independence towards the Taiwanese electorate. The result was that the People Republic of China had issued veiled threats. 

This had resulted in the Stennis CSG deployment. By December 2022 such deployments had 50 years of history and had become routine. 

As the CSG approached the South China Sea it was steaming at condition III. In this state roughly thirty percent of the crew would be on watch. From this condition it would be possible to rapidly transition to either condition II, a variant of General Quarters or to General Quarters itself.

During the extensive work ups to prepare for deployment the officers and crews of the Stennis CSG had focused primarily on the Air Warfare. In particular, the CSG trained extensively to the Air threat posed from the Shi Lang 1 (formerly the Russian Varyag). 

However, the CSG also trained extensively against the threat posed by China's long range Anti-Ship missiles.

The first threat, the Shi Lang had recently left homeport and commenced flight operations in the South China Sea. For the later threat, PACOM commanders had been wringing their hands since these missiles had first reached initial operational capability in late 2012 . There would be three more  carriers either operational or in the water by 2021. While the CSG commander was prepared for both - he had a nagging worry. The training and workups had been so Air Warfare centric threats that Undersea Warfare training had suffered

Several hours before sunrise an order was transmitted via a recently launched Chinese commercial satellite that ostensibly beamed Chinese language programming to Chinese viewers on mainland China. The signal reached a communications buoy that surfaced every three hours

From there, the order was relayed to the vast undersea network before ultimately reaching a swarm of Unmanned Underwater Vehicles. 

These vehicles had been deployed by the air  a week ago using a means similar to the Snowflake Air Deployment Systems developed at the United States Naval Post Graduate School in the late 2000’s. 

Since that time they had been positioning themselves in the path of the CSG by relying on cueing from the distributed remote sensing, mobile underwater networks and more conventional sensing networks employed by China. Much in the same way German U boat packs were able to position themselves in the way of Allied convoys based on intelligence and Airborne sightings in WW II

The swarm began to close on the CSG undetected by the CSG's equipment. They were just too quiet.

Just before sunrise, the AEGIS class Guided Missile Destroyer USS Preble suffered catastrophic damage at frame amidships. Ten minutes later, despite the best damage control efforts, she rolled over and sunk. 

Nearly simultaneously her sisters USS Decatur and USS Howard were similarly damaged. 

The two remaining destroyers and their much vaunted AEGIS weapons systems were off line or effectively destroyed. 

The result was catastrophic for the CSG. The Aircraft Carrier Stennis, was now essentially defenseless from a coordinated air attack with her AEGIS escorts offline and fighting to stay afloat

The scene above was witnessed, fathoms underwater, by one of the many tethered listening devices. It evaluated the reduced signature to noise ratio and the sound of the USS Preble breaking up. Its primitive logic commanded it to surface and transmit a brief message to PRC Naval HQ. 

This message confirmed to PRC leadership that USS Stennis was now deprived of its Air Defense Umbrella. 

With the escorts intact the probability of hit - and kill – by Anti Ship Cruise Missiles had been evaluated as marginal. 

With the escorts removed from the equation the Carrier that equation was drastically changed and the CSG was far more vulnerable to attack from surface and land launched Anti-Ship Missiles.

Approximately thirty minutes later the first land based Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles homed in on the USS Stennis. 

The distributed underwater surveillance system, and associated systems provided Over the Horizon Targeting. 

This attack resulted in the USS Stennis suffering what would be termed catastrophic mission kill. 

Her flight deck was holed; aircraft on fire and vital communications systems were off line. While the carrier would stay afloat the damages would take months in a dedicated repair yard.

However, she would not get that chance. As she steamed slowly east she and her remaining escorts, were struck by a group of Houbei Fast Attack Craft (FAC) 4 . 

Each of these craft fired an initial shoot shoot look salvo of 4 YJ-83 Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles from standoff range at the now defenseless carrier. 

Minutes later the same ships fired their remaining 4 missiles and quickly turned changed course at high speed to return to their homeport

This day in December 2022 would be the worst loss the U.S. Navy had experienced in decades. Deprived of the protection of the U.S CSG Taiwan was unable to repel combined Air and Sea attack by the PRC two days later.  And the US was unable to surge assets to support

The PRC quickly gained full control of that country and the promise of U.S. protection was severely tarnished the world over. 

More importantly, China had always been viewed as a land power however China had now demonstrated the capacity to deny the much vaunted U.S Military access to most of the PACOM area of operations and established herself as the de-facto maritime power in the South China Sea.

from MBARI 

from 

The Great Underwater Wall Of Robots: Chinese Exhibit Shows Off Sea Drones | Popular Science (popsci.com)

Below is the research that backed the paper up...wont bore you with the actual paper as it would probably need a bunch of updating given the advances in battery and communications tech in the last decade

WWW.StrategyPage.com. Shi Lang Gets Flight Deck Traffic. http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htnavai/articles/20120308.aspxAccessed March 8th 2012

 Aviation Week. China Details Anti-Ship Missile Plans. Published July 19 2011. Accessed 21 March 2011. http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/genericstory/story_genersic.jsp?channel=awst&id=news/awst/2011/07/18/AW_0 7_18_2011_p24-347899.xm

Tyree, Michael G. Initial design and Concept of operations for a clandestine data relay UUV to circumvent jungle canopy effects on satellite communications. Thesis . Naval Post Graduate School. September 2011. Pg 23 1 www.sinodefense.com. Type 022 (Houbei Class) Fast Attack Missile Craft. http://www.sinodefence.com/navy/littoral/type022.asp. Last updated March 2009. Retrieved 04 April 2012

Hickly, Mathew. The uninvited guest: Chinese sub pops up in middle of U.S. Navy exercise, leaving military chiefs red-faced. Mail Online. Published Nov 2007. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-492804/The-uninvitedguest-Chinese-sub-pops-middle-U-S-Navy-exercise-leaving-military-chiefs-red-faced.html Accessed 04 April 2012

Eshel, David . Hanit Suffers Iranian Missile Attack. Defense Update. http://defense-update.com/2006/07/inshanit-suffers-iranian-missile.html. July 2006. Retrieved 09 April 2012.

Lynam, Joe. 'North Korean torpedo' sank South's navy ship – report. BBC News Online. 20 May 2010. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10129703. Retrieved 09 April 2012

 Associated Press. Pakistani officials: Drone strike kills 12. Published March 9th, 2012. Retrieved from http://www.nwherald.com/2012/03/09/pakistani-officials-drone-strike-kills-12/a6kqazy. 11 March 2012

Al-Rodaini, Fatik. US drone strikes kill 25 militants in Yemen. Biykamasar. Published 10 March 2012. Retrieved from. http://bikyamasr.com/61259/us-drone-strikes-kill-25-militants-in-yemen.11 March 2012

Shoalwater, Stephanie. Commentary: The Legal Status of Autonomous Underwater Vehicles. Marine Technology Society Journal. Spring 2004. PG 80.

 Yan, Hai; Wan, Lei; Zhou Shengli; Shi, Zhijie; Cui, Jun-Hong, Huang, Jie and Zhou, Hao. DSP based receiver implementation for OFDM acoustic modems. Physical Communication. 09 September 2011. Available at www.elsevier.com/locate/phycom

Cui, Rongzin; Ge Sam Shuzhi; How, Bernard Voon; Choo, Yoo Sang. Leader-Follower formation control of underactuated autonomous underwater vehicles. Ocean Engineering. 21 July 2010. Available at at www.elsevier.com/locate/oceaneng

Li, Deyang; Li, Zheng; Ma, Wenkai; Chen, Hong; and Chen, Wenping. Constrained surface -level placement for underwater acoustic wireless sensor networks. Theoretical Computer Science. 10 September 2009. Available at at www.elsevier.com/locate/oceaneng

Li, Changlong; Xicheng, Feng; Li, Yiping and Liu, Kaizhou. Toward and Generalized Architecture for Unmanned Underwater Vehicles. 2011 IEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation. Shanghai International Conference Center. Shanghai, China. May 9- 13, 2011. Shanghai China

Tang, Minqiang; Zhang, Zhiqiang and Xing, Yuqing. Analysis of New Developments and Key Technologies of Autonomous Underwater Vehicle in Marine Survey. Procedia Environmental Sciences. October 2011. Available at www.sciencedirect.com

Yan, Hai; Wan, Lei; Zhou Shengli; Shi, Zhijie; Cui, Jun-Hong, Huang, Jie and Zhou, Hao. DSP based receiver implementation for OFDM acoustic modems. Physical Communication. 09 September 2011. Available at www.elsevier.com/locate/phycom

Che, Xianhui; Wells, Ian, Dickers, Gorden and Kear, Paul. TDMA frame design for a prototype underwater RF communication network. Ad Hoc Networks. 02 July 2011. available at : www.elsevier.com/locate/adhoc

Nicholson, J.W. CAPT USN and Healy, A.J. The Present State of Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (AUV) Applications and Technologies. Marine Technology Society Journal. Spring 2009. PG 44.

MBARI.org. Powerpoint Titled. Components of UPS. http://www.mbari.org/MB2006/UPS/mb2006-ups-links.htm retrieved 04 April 2012

Akyildiz, Ian ; Pompili, Dario and Melodia, Tommaso. Challenges for Efficient Communication in Underwater Accoustic Sensor Networks. Georgia Institute of Technology. School of Electrical and Computer Engineering. Page 4

Che, Xianhui; Wells, Ian and Kear, Paul. TDMA frame design for a prototype underwater RF communication network. AD HOC Networks. July 2011. Available at www.elsevier.com/locate/adhoc, Page 3

Guerra, Federico ; Casari Paolo; Berni, Alessandro and Potter, John. Performance Evaluation of Random and Handshake based Channel Access in Collaborative Underwater Networks. NATO Undersea Research Center and University of Padova. Italy

Sarisaray-Boluk, P ; Gungor, VC; Baydere S. and Harmanci, AE. Quality aware image transmission over Underwater Multimedia Sensor Networks. Ad Hoc Networks. 2011. www.elsevier.com/locate/adhoc

Li, Deying; Li, Zheng; Ma, Wenkai; Chen, Hong and Chen, Wenping. Constrained surface-level gateway placement for underwater acoustic wireless networks. Theoretical Computer Science . 2011. www.elsevier.com/locate/tcs

 Yan, Hai; Wan, Lei; Zhou, Shengli; Shi, Zhijie; Cui, Jun-Hong; Huang, Jie and Zhou, Hao. DSP (Digital Signal Processing) based receiver implementation for ODFM (orthongal frequency division multiplexing) acoustic modems. Physical Communication. 2011. www.elsevier.com/locate/phycom

Marani, Giacomo; Choi, Song K and Yuh, Junku. Underwater Autonomous manipulation for intervention missions AUV. Ocean Engineering. 17 August 2008. Available at www.elsevier.com/locate/oceaneng.

Park, Jin-Yeong; Jun, Bong-huan; Lee, Pan-mook and Oh, Junho. Experiments on vision guided docking of an autonomous underwater vehicle using one camera. Ocean Engineering. 29 October 2009. Available at www.elsevier.com/locate/oceaneng. PG 4

Yakimenko, Oleg A; Horner, Douglas P. and Pratt, Douglas. AUV Rendevous Trajectories for Underwater Recovery. Congress Center. Ajaccio France. 2005. Pg 1194

Wilmath, Kim. USF underwater robot takes to Twitter. Tampa Bay Times. March 29 2012

Carvalhosa, Sergio Alexandre Carraca. Cooperative Motion Control of Multiple Autonomous Robotic Vehicles. Collision Avoidance in Dynamic Environments. Thesis for Masters in Electrical Engineering. University of Lisbon. Instituto Superior Techico. October 2009. Pg 3 and 44.

Brown, Hunter; Jenkins, Liza; Meadows, Guy and Schuchman, Robert. Bathyboat: An Autonomous Surface Vessel for Stand Alone Survey and Underwater Vehicle Network Supervision. Marine Technology Society Journal. July 2010 1 Freeman, D.K. Remote Delivery of Unmanned Systems Technologies. Naval Surface Warfare Center Panama City

Loberg, Jon-Erik. Planar Docking Algorithms for Underactuated Marine Vehicles. Masters Thesis. Norwegian University of Science and Technology. June 2010.

Brown, Hunter; Jenkins, Liza; Meadows, Guy and Schuchman, Robert. Bathyboat: An Autonomous Surface Vessel for Stand Alone Survey and Underwater Vehicle Network Supervision. Marine Technology Society Journal. July 2010

Chapple, Philip. Unsupervised Detection of Mine Like Objects in Seabed Imagery from Autonomous Underwater Vehicles. Defense Science and Technology Organization. Sydney, Austrialia. P 1

 Frenzel, James; Fazzari, Kyle and Edwards, Dean. Sharing Clearance Data between Multiple Autonomous Platforms. Center For Intelligent Systems Research . University of Idaho

Chitre, Mandar. Teamwork among AUV’s. AUV Sensors and Systems Workshop. November 2010.

Kemp, Mathieu; Bertozzi, Andrea and Merthaler, Daniel. Multi-UUV Perimeter Surveillance. Army Research Office. July 2004

Akkaya, Kemal and Newell, Andrew. Self Deployment of Sensors for Maximized coverage in underwater acoustic sensor networks. University of Southern Illinois Carbondale. April 2009. Available at www.elsevier/com/locate/comcom

Incze, Michael. Optimized Deployment of autonomous underwater vehicles for charachterization of coastal waters. Journal of Marine Systems. 28 Feb 2009. Available at www.elsevier.com/locate/jmarsys. Pg S416

Hasvold, Oistein; Lian, Torleif; Haakaas, Erik; Storkersen, Nils; Perelman, Olivier and Cordier, Stephane. CLIPPER: A long range, Autonomous underwater vehicle using magnesium fuel and oxygen from the sea. Journal of Power Surces. 2004. Available at www.sciencedirect.com

 Hasvold, Oistein; Lian, Torleif; Storkersen, Nils and Forseth, Sissel. Power Sources for aoutnomous underwater vehicles. Journal of Power Sources. 2006. Available at www.sciencedirect.com

Back to the future .....modern cargo carrying clipper ships?

 Well this is a bit interesting

Michelin Commits to Shipping Product Transatlantic on Sail Cargo Ship (maritime-executive.com)

""NEOLINE's plan calls for the construction of two 446-foot long vessels that will get their main power from 4200 m2 of sails. Relying on wind as the main propulsion for its cargo ships, NEOLINE is promoting its services to shippers offering a 90 percent reduction in CO2 emissions related to transatlantic maritime freight transport"

Did some quick research as 4200 m2 of sails sounds like a lot. 

"Star Clippers claims that she is the largest "true sailing ship" built since Preussen. She is listed in Guinness World Records as the largest square-rigged ship in service, with 5,202 square metres (55,990 sq ft) of sail. Her sails can be handled with a crew as small as twenty using powered controls.^[2]"

came from the design of the Preussen built in 1902. 

"Five-Masted Full Rigger

These were the most impressive of all the clipper ships and were very impressive. In 1902, Preussen graced the seas as the largest sailing ship ever to be built and served the purpose of serving the nitrate trade from Chile to Germany. They were built with five masts and square sails on each of them – providing a total sail area of 6,800 square metres. The Royal Clipper was inspired by Preussen and, upon completion in 2000, became the largest clipper ship ever "

Length:

482 ft (147 m) (overall) 439.6 ft (134.0 m) (hull) 400.3 ft (122.0 m) (btw. perpendiculars

"The sturdily built ship could weather nearly any storm and even tack in force 9 winds. In such conditions eight men had to hold the 6 1⁄2-foot-tall double steering wheel. She was successfully used in the saltpeter trade between Germany and Chile, setting speed records in the process. Under good conditions, the ship could reach a speed of 20 knots (37 km/h). Her best 24-hour runs were 392 nm in 1908 on her voyage to Japan and 426 nm in 1904 in the South Pacific. Due to her appearance, uniqueness, and excellent sailing characteristics sailors called her the “Queen of the Queens of the Seas”. In early 1903, she sailed an unequalled record voyage from Lizard Point to Iquique in 57 days.

In 1910, just 8 years after her launch, she sunk in the English Channel due to damage from a collision with a small cross-channel steamer, ‘Brighton‘. Contrary to regulations, Brighton had tried to cross her bows, underestimating her high speed of 16 knots. Legend has it the skipper said: “a sailboat can’t go that fast” – after which the two collided. The Master of Brighton was found to be responsible for the accident and lost his licence as a result."

Will be interesting to see how this works out for NEOLINE and the Michelin Group 

Can we walk and chew bubblegum at the same time?

 

Regretfully, I have to agree with the general assessment of this piece 

"The Navy’s performance in developing new surface combatants is at a low ebb. The Navy began the century by unveiling three new classes of surface combatants. All three programs went awry, producing almost no gain in warfighting capability"

Four Reasons The Navy’s Bold Plans For Its Surface Fleet Are Doomed In The Biden Era (forbes.com)

There is a bit of good news. James F. “Hondo” Geurts is "PTDO (performing the duties of) under secretary of the Navy.

New PTDO Under Secretary of the Navy Designated - Seapower (seapowermagazine.org)

Why is this good?

"Geurts previously served as the acquisition executive, U.S. Special Operations Command, at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, where he was responsible for all special operations forces acquisition, technology and logistics"

For those that don't know, while Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is a Combatant Command (COCOM) they also have the ability and authority to buy stuff. 

There is a pretty well established and functional Requirements to Capability Cycle there. 

And pretty quick flash to bang. Talking Urgent Needs Statement from an O-3 validated by an O-6 in the field to a delivered capability in a year sometimes less. 

And that organization also still does things like utilizing the Department of Defense Architectural Framework  (DODAF) to ensure that there is traceability from the requirements document to actual capability delivery. 

Yes DODAF can be painful and slow, if you don't have the warfighter, requirements developer and Architects in the same room. 

Sometimes the warfighter wants things that are not possible. I would love to design a Ray gun for the warfighter, but that is probably not technologically feasible s the Technology Readiness level is just not there. 

This cartoon pretty much encapsulates what happens when the people whom are going to use something have little input into design. And those designing it have little understanding of those whom are going to use it. See cartoon below. 

 

But if you do have the warfighter, requirements developer and Architects in the same room through the entire process it can go pretty quick, as in months vice years. 

Its been a while since I was doing Navy Centric DODAF stuff but back then in the 2010's we didn't do it as well as we could. As it was to hard and required to much effort

Had the Navy stuck with that process rather than gutting the DODAF shop and going all transformational in the 2000's and 2010's we might have avoided the LCS nonsense and the issues the Ford is having.

Since the slice of the pie is going to get smaller perhaps Mr Geurts will be able to determine which projects really need to be thrown out as they are not tied to any CONOPS.

Time will tell...

That being said, back in the 2010's I was working as a contractor on a Navy centric project. 

Although the project had been defunded their was still funding mechanisms for that project. The output of the work was pretty much identical to a new project. So we did the work and re-purposed it. 

It was a little intellectually dishonest. But we were able to use much of the old work to advance the new work.

Somewhere we have a lot of ROC/POE  Required Operational Capabilities/ Projected Operational Environment  documents sitting in file cabinets and a fair degree of preliminary work done on lots of things we are interested in doing now.

Lets leverage that rather than re-inventing wheels

Ooh the old project CG(X) 

CG(X) - Wikipedia

the new one Flight 3 DDG. 

Arleigh Burke-Class Destroyer Flight III Progressing on Schedule > United States Navy > display-pressreleases

 With luck perhaps Mr Geurts will take the something old something new and rationalize acquisitions