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Thursday, September 23, 2021

More Bad News on the Ew front

 Russia’s Military Boosts Electromagnetic Spectrum Capability - Jamestown


bad news for information and network dominance if true.









"An important feature of the new Divnomorye-U is its integration into automated C2, significantly increasing its speed and operational utility. By building this automated element into the design of the system, the EW complex detects and then analyzes the target signal and type, alongside its power and direction of radiation. The high-technology automated system undoubtedly harnesses artificial intelligence (AI) in its processes, then it develops a suppression plan and selects the most effective jamming methods. The Divnomorye-U is designed to emit high-powered radiation that neutralizes enemy radar, regardless of type. It is reportedly capable of jamming both ground-based radars and radars of aircraft such as E-8 JSTAR, E-3 AWACS, E-2 Hawkeye, as well as radar equipment aboard helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). Even satellite radar stations would lose sight in the Divnomorye-U coverage area, the Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer article claims. The new complex can transition to combat mode within several minutes, and it can be mounted on a single vehicle (Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer, August 24)."


from (Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer


Printable version 

War is invisible and effective

Modern electronic warfare systems are able to neutralize almost any enemy weapon
Orlov Vitaliy
Photo: google.com

The first information concerning such promising samples of electronic warfare (EW) equipment, which, of course, are considered to be "Divnomorye-U", "Palantin", "Tirada-2S" and "Mercury-BM", appeared at the end of 2017. And its source, which does not cause doubts about competence, was Yuri Borisov, who at that time held the post of Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. He reported on the significant superiority of new electronic warfare systems over existing foreign and domestic analogues. And that their nomenclature and the number of simultaneously determined and suppressed enemy electronic systems, the suppression range, the possibility of selective (targeted) use of interference and the most automated control should be regarded as innovative components of the technical potential that forms this superiority.

"Palantine" over the battlefield

A fundamentally new operational-tactical electronic warfare complex was developed by one of the divisions of Rostec - JSC Concern Sozvezdie. In terms of its functionality, "Palantin" is several times superior to similar complexes of previous generations. Thanks to the equipment with high-tech equipment, it is able to blind the enemy's technical means both in the ultra-short-wave and short-wave range, deprive units of effective management by organizing "intractable problems" with trunking and cellular communications.

The technical capabilities of the "Palantin" allow to ensure the active conduct of effective radio reconnaissance and the effective suppression of all known radio communication systems of a potential enemy. Including complexes formed on the basis of modern software-defined SDR platforms.

"Palantine" is able to neutralize existing and future means of radio communication of the enemy, creating interference of several types:

"Divnomorye-U" is able to equally successfully "hammer" interference and ground radar, and radar aircraft such as E-8 JSTAR, E-3 AWACS, E-2 Hawkeye, and radar equipment of helicopters and UAVs. In the area of action "Divnomorye" lose "vision" even satellite radar stations
  • strip-barrier;
  • discrete-barrier;
  • barrage in frequency.

The complex is characterized by a high degree of mobility, it is equipped with the minimum necessary amount of automotive equipment.

An equally important function of the operational-tactical complex "Palantin" is its ability to system formation, that is, the unification of several different electronic warfare systems into one network. This helps to monitor the current situation online and synchronize the use of complexes at different points of basing and at all levels of management.

The Department of Information and Mass Communications of the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation reported that the Tambov Interspecific Center for Training and Combat Use of Electronic Warfare is retraining servicemen for the operation of the Palantina. 98 servicemen of 24 OBREB ZVO took part in planned classes. It is in this part, as a result of the rearmament, outdated samples of special equipment are replaced by the latest developments equipped with "Palantin".

According to the press service of the Central Military District, promising electronic warfare complexes in 2019 entered service with the troops of the district. Employees of the press service noted that as a result of the re-equipment of military units and units of electronic warfare, the combat capabilities of this type of troops in performing complex and large-scale tasks have increased.

The first practical application of the "Palantin" took place at bilateral regimental exercises of the ZVO (Voronezh region). The key task of the fundamentally new electronic warfare complex was designated as covering the interspecific military group in the south-western direction. According to the plans of the district command, the operational-tactical complex should provide effective protection of the Russian side from missile and cannon weapons and high-precision weapons available to the enemy.

The battalion tactical group with the help of "Palantin" carried out the suppression of radio communication systems (electronic reconnaissance) of the conditional enemy in a strip up to 1000 kilometers wide.

Under the dome of "Mercury"

The Mercury-BM complex (code 1L262), which has another, alternative designation SPR-2M, is a self-propelled electronic warfare system mounted on a light multi-purpose tracked chassis MT-LBu. Several defense enterprises specializing in a certain segment take part in the serial production of the complex:

Plant "Muromteplowoz", which produces the basic chassis.

NPO "Kvant" in Nizhny Novgorod manufactures electronic equipment for SPR-2M.

Kazan Optical and Mechanical Plant, which performs the functions of an assembly site for Mercury-BM.

The purpose of the 1L262 is to effectively counter guided weapons and protect manpower and command posts from artillery fire with ammunition equipped with radio fuses. The principle of operation of the system is based on the detection of the munition, the determination of the carrier frequency of the radio fuse and the setting of the corresponding frequency and power of interference. The result of the action of the complex "Mercury-BM" is the elimination of the munition by detonation at a safe height or the shutdown of the radio fuse with subsequent destruction.

In addition, the range of functionality of the SPR-2M includes:

  • reconnaissance mode, not accompanied by interference radiation;
  • automatic prohibition of interference with interfering signals (in the appropriate frequency range for a certain time interval);
  • providing information about the frequency channels of the received signals.

War is invisible and effective
Photo: phototass1.cdnvideo.ru

Electronics 1L262, operating in automatic mode, a few fractions of a second is enough for accurate (up to several hundred Hz) determination of the frequency of the radio fuse and creating interference. The capabilities of Mercury-BM allow it to simultaneously suppress up to six radio communication channels, and the duration of continuous operation is at least six hours. To deploy the complex in a combat position, the trained crew needs 10 minutes. The dome of the SPR-2M reliably covers the troops stationed on an area of about 20-50 hectares.

Objects of protection 1L262 can be:

  • units and units of the first echelon;
  • launcher starting positions;
  • command posts;
  • areas of concentration of troops in the areas of crossings and transport hubs;
  • moving objects in need of cover.

"Tirada-2S" looks into space

"Tirada-2S" is a complex of electronic suppression of communication (REPS), capable of being on the surface of the planet, effectively neutralize the satellite communication channel with the subsequent disabling of the spacecraft.

The key striking element of this heavy-duty complex was a narrow beam, the purpose of which is the frequency of certain satellite communication channels. Naturally, any spacecraft, especially for military purposes, must have a high degree of noise immunity. However, the REPS "Tirada-2S" forms targeted barrage interference, maximally overlapping the possibility of transmitting the signal of the addressee. And the attempts of the satellite to overcome the electromagnetic veil set by the ground-based killer system lead to the fastest possible consumption of the spacecraft's energy resource.

It is worth noting that this REPS system is not an attempt to modernize existing systems or deep processing of equipment of previous generations. This is a completely new complex, created from scratch by Russian designers and scientists.

A brief history of the creation of this promising development is as follows. The first development work started back in 2001. The complex was created in two versions: stationary and mobile.

Sixteen years later, in November 2017, Oleg Achas, who at that time held the post of deputy head of the Federal StateBu of the 46th Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of Russia, said that as part of the implementation of the Armament Program, designed for the period 2018-2027, the development of two extremely promising projects was nearing completion. One of them was the mobile complex REPS "Tirada-2S".

The documentation of the contract for the supply of the Triad-2S in part of the Russian Defense Ministry took place in August 2018 on the sidelines of the annual international military-technical forum "ARMY". Serial production was entrusted to JSC "Vladimir plant "Elektropibor". According to some sources, the arrival of the first complexes in the troops of the Central Military District was to take place in 2019. However, it is not possible to verify the validity of such allegations in view of the high level of secrecy of the project.

Similar problems are observed in the compilation of a more or less reliable idea of the tactical and technical characteristics of the TIRADA-2S REPS. It is assumed that the functionality of the complex allows to neutralize the satellite communication channels of UAVs-scouts.

As information that deserves attention, but for a number of objective reasons is not credible, it is possible to accept the reports of the Ukrainian media about the detection by OSCE drones of the Tirada-2S complex on the territory of the LPR.

«Divnomorye-U» – veni, vidi, vici

The result of the breakthrough development of domestic science was the latest electronic warfare complex "Divnomorye-U", capable of an umbrella of generated interference to effectively protect from radar reconnaissance an area of several hundred square kilometers. Its functional purpose is to cover from enemy radar stations.

stationary and temporary command posts, air defense systems, military groups, important military-political and industrial centers.

Performance performance features of the latest promising complex are not disclosed, but even on the basis of stingy information leaking into open sources, we can conclude that Divnomorye-U is a unique representative of its class.

Combat use of the complex is carried out in automatic mode. Its equipment detects and instantly analyzes the target signal, as well as the type, power and direction of radiation. The high-tech automatic system independently develops a suppression plan and chooses its most effective type. As a result, the high-power interference radiation created by Divnomorye neutralizes the impact of the enemy's radar, regardless of type.

"Divnomorye-U" is able to equally successfully jamming and ground radar, and radar aircraft such as E-8 JSTAR, E-3 AWACS, E-2 Hawkeye, and radar equipment of helicopters and UAVs. In the area of action of the "Divnomorye" lose sight even satellite radar stations.

Deploying the complex into combat condition takes several minutes, making it difficult to be vulnerable to enemy strike. Promotion, work and withdrawal from the combat position placed on one car "Divnomorye" are carried out in the shortest possible time. That is, in the words of the great Roman emperor, he came, saw, won.

Russian expert circles believe that due to its unique combat capabilities, the Divnomorye-U electronic warfare complex is able to unconditionally replace three complexes in service: Krasukhu-4, Krasukhu-2 and Moscow-1.

According to military historian Dmitry Boltenkov, the creation of universal robotic systems is the main direction of modernization and development of electronic warfare troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

The creation of "Divnomorye" is the output of domestic electronic warfare systems to a fundamentally new technological level. The complex is able not only to suppress an impressive list of goals with minimal human participation, but also to act effectively offline.

It is obvious that the successful work of scientists, designers and testers, which led to the adoption by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation of a number of the latest models of electronic warfare systems, significantly increases the degree of protection of units and units of the Russian army in modern combat.

Published in Issue No. 32 (895), August 24, 2021




“There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!”

 A good video (biased as its from RT..but interesting to hear the other perspective)

Maritime Strategy









The loss of Queen Mary left Beatty stunned. He had engaged Hipper fully confident of his numerical superiority of six battlecruisers to the German five. Now within the space of three quarters of an hour he had lost two of them. No sooner had the report of Queen Mary’s destruction reached him than Princess Royal was engulfed in a torrent of shell splashes that completely hid her from view, and a signalman on Lion’s bridge reported in dismay, “Princess Royal blown up, sir!” Nonplussed, Beatty turned to Captain Chatfield and blurted out, “There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!” 


“There’s Something Wrong with Our Bloody Ships Today!” Part II | Weapons and Warfare


I hope one of our Operational Commanders never utters whatt Beatty said..but our stuff seems to be a lot worse then the competitions. 

Project 22800 Karakurt-Class Corvettes - Naval Technology (naval-technology.com)

Karakurt Class Corvette | Military-Today.com

Russian Karakurt class corvette Sovetsk test-fires Kalibr cruise missile (navyrecognition.com)

Russian corvette returns to home after cruise missile firings in the Arctic - Naval Post- Naval News and Information

Russian naval ship test-fires Kalibr cruise missile from Arctic sea – Navy Clippings


So once again the Russian are building (what appear to be capable) small surface combatants. Will likely have roughly 20 of these spread between black, baltic and north sea fleets within the next 2-4 years.

Which brings me to this basic question.

If I could choose a design I wanted to go into battle with stock option. Not with imaginary modules and the crew untrained for same. or what we might upgun  in the future . Which one do you choose? 

Choice number 1: Karak Class Corvete, Choice 2 LCS 1 or 2 class 




 

If I had to choose, based on the above criteria I take the the Karakurt on pretty much every occasion. Only real disadvantage is that no helo.  

Also top speed is only 30 knots or so, but hey most ships don't really need to go 44- 47 knots nor can they due to sea-states and fuel burn. Also they have space for enough people to ensure properly manned for damage control

So im wondering, cvan we get our hands on the Karakurt class plans and drop them on BWI HSI doorstep and maybe ask them to build a few?

To be clear I'm not a fan of the Russian Navy, but I have to admire thier platforms. 


Wednesday, September 22, 2021

We are really doing this? Saving short term money at high cost. Another fail by someone who, wants to achieve efficiencies and got a EP an a promotion

 






Navy Will Cut 500 Civilian East Coast Jobs in ‘Drastic Action’ to Cut $66M - USNI News


Talk about boilerplate. I think I have seen variations of the following over the last 25 years

“ XXX staff completed a comprehensive review of our products and services to develop a plan to manage and execute shore services with our $XXM (XX percent reduction) budgetary shortfall to our facilities programs with the goal of minimizing negative impacts to the Fleet, Fighters, and Families we support

 And it is never good and it is never well though out.  But it looks like they took a cut of about 66 million out of about 400 plus million. 

I'm sure the powerpoint looked good and someone gets an EP and maybe a star out of it. 

For Commander Navy Region Mid Atlantic The actual X numbers are 66 million (16 Percent) reduction 

But lets unpack this First off, what is - or what comprises CNRMA 

Did a bit of googling as I had always thought it was a region where you knew which uniform to wear. But as often I misremembered

Welcome to Navy Region Mid-Atlantic

Commander, Navy Region Mid-Atlantic (CNRMA) is the regional coordinator for all shore-based naval personnel and shore activities in the Mid-Atlantic region, which encompasses 20 states, 14 installations, and 50 Naval Operational Support Centers (NOSCs).

As the naval shore installation management headquarters for the Mid-Atlantic region, CNRMA provides coordination of base operating support functions for operating forces throughout the region in support of the Fleet, Fighter and Family.

  • Fleet represents the operating forces of the Navy. CNRMA ensures all installation requirements necessary to train and operate the Fleet (Ports, Airfields, Training Ranges, etc.) are maintained and ready.
  • Fighter represents the men and women in the operating forces. CNRMA ensures each installation's ability to facilitate the manning, training and equipping of the Navy's fighting force.
  • Family represents the men and women of the armed forces and their families. To ensure our fighting forces are supported on all fronts, CNRMA Family and Community Services, Housing and Safety provide the quality of life, support and services that allow the fighting forces to focus on mission accomplishment.

But then I read the article some more and the stupidity of this command and how we are now organized hit me

"The reductions also include limiting ship departures to reduce overtime for necessary dockworkers and harbor pilots needed to get ships underway and back to the pier"

So our Fleet commanders now have to alter schedules to save money....um Ok. 

"Commands needing ships to leave outside the port hours need to reimburse CMRA and NAVFAC for the extra cost. While not a new policy, it has not been enforced, officials told USNI News"

 um What? So now one navy unit is going to have to cut another navy unit a check. You know this is going to happen a lot. Think Hurricane season. Or CASREP's or training events. Oh and this is going to be a lot of new paperwork and well we might need additional HQ personnel to do this .  My guess is requiring this is going to costs about as much as it saves. And this hinders operational flexibility. All the bas guys need to know is our working hours 

then is got worse. 

"reduction in morale, welfare and recreation facilities, cutting back on janitorial services and groundskeeping spending and canceling cable television for ships and submarines that are pier side."

 So you are going to take MWR and cable away from sailors that go to sea. On top of that Seaman Timmy's wife used to work at MWR because her teaching degree did not transfer to Norfolk...oh and does this include childcare.

And then there was the typical excuse. That the services that most sailors and operational commanders view as important arn't because well Great Power Competition 

"“With limited budgets, a necessary focus on warfighting and Great Power Competition is required and past business and funding practices are no longer affordable and sustainable; drastic action is required."

Here is an Idea, what would be the cost of disbanding Commander Navy Region Mid Atlantic its staff and having those things report to an operational commander. 

"20 states, 14 installations, and 50 Naval Operational Support Centers (NOSCs)"


So the installations ..I think those should be under the respective fleet. Probably in the case of Navy bases that have things that are operational - they should be under 2nd fleet in this case. Training commands have them fall under Naval Education and Training Command. 

Navy Operational Support Centers (Disclaimer I', biased bit to the reserves) these should be under the full control of the Navy Reserves. In fact we should in my opinion not have Active Duty manning these facilities as they really don't understand the reserves. Since when dos a DC1/BM2 or QM3 have any idea of how the reserves work. 

Taken in general this is a real management failure, which is compounded by a leadership failure to greenlight this plan. 

Reminds me of the fleet response plan, getting rid of SWOS, getting rid of SIMA and and deferring maintenance for short sighted decisions.

I am guessing you could achieve 66 million in saving by getting rid of Commander Navy Region Mid Atlantic its staff as well as all the regions and making sure they fit under operational control of the fleets. 

Friday, June 25, 2021

“The sea is selective, slow at recognition of effort and aptitude but fast in the sinking of the unfit.” — Felix Riesenberg

  



Was reading through this article and in my opinion it states the obvious. Or perhaps the obvious to those whom lived the wonderful years circa 1998 - late 2000's when transformationalism, minimal manning, and business speak wrecked established and functional systems to supposedly bring us to the next level. 

GAO: Navy Struggling to Retain Surface Warfare Officers; SWOs Want More Training, Specialization - USNI News

To begin with glad that USNI reported on it, but this time they did not link to the orginal report

so here it is

GAO-21-168, NAVY READINESS: Actions Needed to Evaluate and Improve Surface Warfare Officer Career Path (documentcloud.org)


Lets break this out into two different lines of thought. 

1. Navy struggling to retain surface warfare officer

2. SWO's want more training

3. Specialized Career fields

I think that these are actually not tied together but are separate issues. Lets tackle the first one first though. 

“U.S. Navy officials stated that SWO retention to the department head milestone is low and requires them to commission nearly double the number of SWOs every year than needed, to ensure they have enough department heads eight years later.”

This retention issue, and the company (U.S Navy) solution to this, is over 2 decades old. But let me divide into pre-2000 and post 2000. No not pre-911 and post 911. As the issues we are now facing with SWO's are a direct result of policies of Rumsfeld, his staff and his Admirals.

Pre-2000, I remember showing up to my first ship ( A wooden hulled minesweeper ) in the late 90's and we were rated for 6 officers but had 7.  Two of us were Ensigns with one LTJG,  Three LT's and one LCDR. With that configuration we all had multiple jobs. We were actually plus one officer, so we actually had a DCA and an Auxo. But with that few officers we all had real and full time primary duties, plus lots of collateral duties, and we had multiple watches to stand and roles to fill. 

For my first 18 months aboard my primary job  was the Deck Department Head (owned guns and deck) followed by being the the Gunno Divo, MWR officer, mess treasurer, Ammo Admin, Force Protection Officer, Ship Store officer...ect. Plus I think I stood every watch possible given our manning.

Post 2000. A couple years later circa 2000 ish I ended up on a brand new destroyer that I think was rated for about 20 officers but had about 28. 

Of those I think 10 were Ensigns. We all noticed this bumper crop of Ensigns. So many in fact that we had to make jobs up for them, and a few got stashed in Chief overflow berthing 

These first tour Divo's had what I used to consider a collateral duty as a primary job. Yes there were ensigns who's primary job was Mess Treasurer, Ships Store Officer.  Those are not real primary duties or real jobs

This obviously was a change from USS first ship. Where I got more stick time on the bridge in my forst 6 months then I did my entire time on my second ship. 

In addition there were so many Ensigns, that given the number it was difficult to get them stick time on the bridge. 

 "The USS Mustin (DDG-89) averaged 18 SWO trainees aboard the ship against a requirement for six. • The USS Monterey (CG-61) averaged 21 SWO trainees aboard the ship against a requirement for eight."


You can only have so many officers on the bridge. I think that lack of stick time really really hurt the generation of officers whom would have started taking command circa 2016 time frame.

This has second and third order implications down the road

"In group discussions we held as part of our review of SWO training in 2019, SWOs identified challenges that Division Officers face in obtaining opportunities to build experience in ship-driving skills.46 According to SWOs in seven of 24 group discussions with Department Heads and Division Officers, too many Division Officers were on board ships for each to get sufficient time to qualify as a SWO in a timely manner, or fully develop and maintain ship-driving proficiency. In one particular ship group discussion, 20 Division Officers participated, and according to these SWOs, too many SWOs were competing for the bridge time needed to become proficient at ship-driving. Four Department Heads from the same ship reported similar sentiments. The U.S. Navy’s two internal reviews reported similar findings; specifically, the U.S. Navy’s Strategic Readiness Review noted that the long-term practice of over-commissioning junior SWOs has directly contributed to declining SWO readiness, while the U.S. Navy’s Comprehensive Review noted that the U.S. Navy’s practices of over-commissioning SWOs makes it challenging to build proficiency and experience in ship-driving"


From the report

"The U.S. Navy commissions nearly double the number of SWOs needed to meet junior officer personnel needs, which can limit training opportunities aboard ships. The U.S. Navy also commissions junior officers expected to transfer to other U.S. Navy communities; and nuclear-trained SWOs who spend half as much time at sea on surface ships than their peers. We found that the U.S. Navy has not evaluated the effect its commissioning practices for SWOs have on training opportunities aboard ships."

So in short we know somethings wrong...

When I asked if this was just CRU/DES normalcy, the answer was that SWO retention sucked, and rather than fix the conditions causing this crappy retention BUPERS was going to flood the zone with new Ensigns. 

So in short if retention went from 70 percent to 50 they would just make 30 percent more Ensigns and in four years  (that's when the first wave of SWO's leave) problem solved.  

" U.S. Navy officials stated that SWO retention to the Department Head milestone is low and requires them to commission nearly double the number of SWOs every year than needed, to ensure they have enough Department Heads 8 years later."

That way it would not matter what retention numbers were. Also it removed the need to root cause the issues causing retention. Because after all there might be some uncomfortable things discovered. And hey ships are not like colliding and running aground that often. And when they do no one is dying. 

Fix SWO conditions. Why would we do that?  

I myself ended up leaving the SWO community at about the 7 year mark in 2005 when I transferred to another community. One that at the time was not that much better, but better than the madness that was the SWO community mid 2000's. 

From the GAO report: 

"We found that from fiscal year 2004 through March 2020, SWOs separated from their community earlier and at higher rates than officers in similar U.S. Navy communities"

So I was one of  the trend..In fact had I not transferred I would have left the Navy. To be clear I loved driving ships, but it was the brutal lifestyle of how I saw my Department heads and XO's. The number of divorces, and  how ragged they had been run. 

So why? Well this is when  Navy leadership bought into all these business ideas about how to achieve efficiencies of scale and maximize force generation to support GWOT. 

What did that mean to the deckplate sailors (Officer and Enlisted). More work, less training, less resources, fewer availabilities, longer times at sea away from home. All bads. So you think SWO retention suffered...yup. 

But did the Navy do a deep dive to see why retention was so bad. 

Again the GAO report is revealing

"However, we found that the Commander, Naval Surface Forces, has not yet used available information gathered about SWO separation rates to develop a plan with clearly defined goals; performance measures that identify specific retention rates or determine if initiatives to improve retention are working as planned; and timelines to improve SWO retention rates. U.S. Navy officials stated that they are aware of the high separation rates for SWOs who have completed their mandatory service requirement, and that they would like to improve SWO retention. The U.S. Navy collects and analyzes data on SWO separation rates and they have an initiative underway to change the structure of retention bonuses, but they have not targeted or determined specific retention rates, according to U.S. Navy officials. While these activities could be elements of a larger plan to improve SWO retention, by themselves they do not represent a comprehensive approach to the situation."

Absolutely not. They already new the answer. CAPT Obvious. 

As a cursory review would have revealed the same transformationalist, business driven policies that got CAPT Achmed Jones Smuckateli promoted to Admiral were the same ones causing the problem in the first place. 

Back then circa 2000's, rather than addressing SWO culture they did not even bother to sweep the issue under the carpet they carpeted this issue with new ensigns.

Circa 2021 they are not going to fix the underlying issues, but  rather going to resort to the tried and true.

Bribery and more Ensigns.

I was once told by a senior officer at BUPERS that junior officers are fungible. Which means interchangeable not requiring special care. In short if you don't like it leave...we will just make more.

Very Amizonian in the way we were treated 20 years ago.

So back then we were fungible until retention dropped below I think 40 or 50 percent at the 4 year mark and that's when the panic set in and the bribery (I mean retention bonus's) kicked in 


And on to the training issue. Which is a big issue. 

SWOS in a box and the follow implications of training and readiness 

Proceedings – January 2009 Vol. 135/1/1,271 : Leading Surface Warfare Officers Straight-to-the-Fleet (mydigitalpublication.com)

One of those transformationalist policies was getting rid of Surface Warfare Officer School for brand new ensigns ( I think circa 2003) and sending Ensigns out with a Surface Warfare Officer School in a box (of DVD's). 

Maybe today’s Navy is just not very good at driving ships (navytimes.com)

"Yet many current and former officers say the problem dates back to 2003, when the Navy made severe cuts to SWO’s initial training under the belief the young officers would just learn their trade at sea.

At the same time, the Navy’s growing reliance on technology has eroded basic seamanship skills, former officers say.

Another factor is the timing of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, when the surface warfare community was hit hard by the demand for individual augmentees to support those ground operations, further robbing these officers of shipboard training and experience.

“There is a growing suspicion among a small circle of current and former COs that chickens may be coming home to roost,” retired Capt. Kevin Eyer, who commanded three Aegis cruisers, wrote in Proceedings Magazine online after the McCain collision.

The growing problem has festered in a SWO culture that many believe is notoriously toxic. Competition and careerism make officers afraid to voice concerns and create an “everyone for themselves” mentality.

“Most department heads I had were afraid to go to the captain with anything that might look bad for them — they did everything they did to protect their own reputations and wanted nothing to hamper them from eventually getting in the CO seat themselves,” said former Lt. Jonathan Parin, who served onboard the destroyer James E. Williams


Ship Collisions: Address the Underlying Causes, Including Culture | Proceedings - August 2017 Vol. 143/8/1,374 (usni.org)

"The Navy is unique in other ways. It is a warfighting force, and training and maintenance are the bedrocks that sustain its operations.  As OpTempo per ship increased over the past 20 years, officer and enlisted training was sacrificed to save money.  I was part of the first “SWOS in a box” class that was sent directly to a ship after commissioning—instead of getting intense surface warfare training at Surface Warfare Officer School."


If you think that might not have worked out so well - your right. In fact if you think about it the skippers of both the McCain nd Fitzgerald were likely some of the first to matriculate into the SWO community not having attended SWOS. 

So any officer that matriculated to being an officer between 2003 - and 2013 essentially had a rushed training in my opinion. And guess what (I realize below is old)




So Officer that became SWO's in 2003 are now assuming command of Destroyers. 


And the postmodem comprehensive report reveals what they caused (in my opinion)

CNO USS Fitzgerald and USS John S McCain Response.pdf (navy.mil)

So since Admiral Achemed Smuckateli  and company long since retired by the late 2010's we came up with a very original thought bring back Surface Warfare Officer School, oh and all that training we cut or was lost because it was in sub opitimal to funding streams...lets bring it back.

Want to caveat my next statement, as I am very much on the outside looking in when it comes to SWO stuff, the last time I was at sea is now over 5 years ago (2016) and it was for a very short period of time and I was basically a professional passenger onboard a command ship. 

Yes I stood a watch, but it was not on the bridge or in CIC and had zero to do with ships operations

The last time I had a conversation with a SWO was likewise about 5 years ago (2016) . 

But from those conversations little had changed since the mid 2000's. Realize that this was as WTI's were being introduced. This was also prior to the collisions that ripped the cover off serous institutional Surface Navy issues. 

So maybe it has gotten better.... but I doubt it. Why?

Well the GAO. For the government accountability office to get involved it means something is not right .  So this time the Navy may actually have to confront the issue as the GAO has given recommendations. Which to no surprise the Navy has concurred with.  As to implementing them....

So without further delay here they are: 


  • 1. Evaluate why SWOs separate to improve retention.
  • 2. Develop a plan to increase the retention of female SWOs.
  • 3. Use logbook data to better understand limited training opportunities for junior officers.
  • 4. Better understand training requirements of junior officers who may not remain SWOs.
  • 5. Reevaluate the need for nuclear-trained SWOs.
  • 6. Continually review SWO career paths to include evaluating specialized career paths.
  • 7. Implement workforce strategies and pilot programs to consider potential changes
1. I think we all know the answer to number 1 and it is going to take getting away from this do that and perhaps getting back to the old way.  

If you want to retain the SWO's you have to give them some sense of normalcy as well as give them time to fix things. And paint them:)





The monstrosity of the Fleet Response Plan does  neither. It runs our ships ragged  and our people to. Time to tell the COCOM's sorry no joy. 




2. Lets due some reproductive math here. If you want to keep more females you go to stop with this fleet response plan non sense. I remember when sailors would plan pregnancies around deployments.  When can our female officers plan to have babies? In short under this FRP I'm not sure. Thats some high level math.


3. Use logbook data to better understand limited training opportunities for junior officers.  I thin this is bass ackwards. We should be identifying what training is required for junior officers by billet and experience level and then make this happen. The old  9 week plus availability used to be a great time for school. Again get rid of the dumb fleet response plan and go back to the old cycle and you can actually plan this stuff out for both officers and enlisted. 


4. Better understand training requirements of junior officers who may not remain SWOs.  I'm not sure I understand this one. No good Junior Officer SWO is generally going to tell anyone that they are leaving until about 6 months out. As they know they are going to get the shit jobs and no training opportunities.      I guess I needed to read the report. I guess now we are commissioning SWO's with the explicit deal that they can exercise an option to transfer to another community after 3 years. What crazy manpower person invented this. I would not waste any training on them. In fact I would make all of these officer crappy little jobs officers. 

I made my decision to leave SWO after qualifying and doing an exchange tour. I did not make it before I showed up to my first ship. 

Instead, if you give good training to everyone, then people are less likely to leave 

5. Reevaluate the need for nuclear-trained SWOs. Honestly,  I am not sure why we have this requirement. We no longer have anything smaller than an Aircraft Carrier that runs on Nuc, and those are captained by Aviators. Convince me I am wrong

6. Continually review SWO career paths to include evaluating specialized career paths. 


So this is the third issue: specialize career paths 


Danger on this one. This requires a lot of thought. And it comes down to this. Ducks pick Ducks

(307) Quiz Meisters - Duck Derby! - YouTube



In this case The ducks picking Ducks are the senior officers whom sit on boards. Unless that culture is changed specialization = no promotion or non due course O-5. Non Due course being code for terminal or stuck at present paygrade with no chances of advancement.

The ducks also pick ducks with a similar career path and generalization.

However the specialization debate is complicated. 

I served in the German Navy for a bit as an exchange officer while I was Surface Warfare Officer. They have a different construct. 

It sort of amounts to choose your rate and ship and choose your fate. 

First in the German Navy your are specialized by ship class and then by specialty.  So if you go to a destroyer as an CIC type you will stay on destroyers for your entire career as an CIC type until you can get into the command pipeline. 

If your an engineer on a destroyer you stay and engineer and will likely never have command. 

If you go to a minesweeper your staying. 

There are plus's and minus's of this. One you have a corps of Surface Warfare types that are experts at thier chosen platform. That is also the disadvantage. 

A Mine Warfare officer is going to be very unfamiliar with Air Warfare and vice versa.

This becomes more problematic for post command types who need to go to a COCOM or fleet staff. When they do not have the generalize knowledge of multiple warfare areas. 

There is another component that is different in many other Navy's. There is no up or out. 

There is simply put at a certain point a recognition that you will not go any higher than 0-3. 

And that you can stay or leave the Navy but that is the highest you go. 

This means in some Navy's you might see a 50 year old O-3 whom loved thier job and is an expert whom knows he or she is never going to get command or be an O-4. and they seemed to be generally ok with that. 

Remember Ducks pick Ducks. And unless we change our stay in policies, the ducks are going to pick the generalized duck and we are going to loose that officer at roughly 10 years service and all the effort that went into training

7.  Implement workforce strategies and pilot programs to consider potential changes. 

Im not sure what that means...but ok.