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Wednesday, February 15, 2023

Ballons...

So, it seems that lots of people are getting very or have been getting very spun up about Chinese balloons and other balloons floating over American airspace.

Let's step back for a bit. 

First, let's talk about intelligence collection - aka spying. To begin with - every country in the world does this or tries to do this. Some have bigger budgets and capabilities then others. 

And I'm not going to get into the different types or means here. Let's keep it simple. Every country in the world seeks to gain information to enable their priorities. 

Also, if possible, to get that information without getting caught. Thats a bonus. And most countries will try and do that. 

As although everyone tries to spy on each other to gain a comparative advantage its better if you don't get caught. 

But caught sometimes you do. Sometimes by accident and sometimes by design.

In the case of the Chinese balloon let's talk about the shock lots of public figures are expressing. I liken it to Casablanca. In short that China reportedly was able to send a balloon over the United States has led to outrage. 

What I will call manufactured outrage. Why? Well, if we could do the same without getting caught -we would as well. For all I know we have.



The Chinese are spying on us!!!!. I'm shocked to find out this is happening. 

The real "outrage" here is the fact that China was able to do so for a period of time without getting caught. 

Or at least publicly getting caught. That is a key point. 

Only those in the know can say if this is the first time the United States actually detected a Chinese balloon. 

It is entirely possible that the U.S government has known about this for sometime. 

And for whatever reason chose to ignore or not publicize it. 

That would fall into the category of we know that they are doing intelligence collection operations - spying - using a balloon.

And since we know have taken steps to mitigate whatever intelligence that they can collect. 

It's a similar concept in old fashioned Human Intelligence.

 If you identify a person from a country who is collecting intelligence on you and is trying to do so in a covert manner. 

Let them do so.  A known spy is always better than an unknown one. 

Knowing who is doing it makes countering what they are doing easier. 

Vice not knowing who is trying to covertly collect intelligence. 

All sorts of fun things can be done to muck up your adversary if you are aware of the techniques tactics and procedures of someone spying on you. 

Thats when you get into the dark arts of really devious stuff. 

So, it's possible that for whatever reason the U.S decided to let this activity continue. And in effect collect counterintelligence on this activity. 

Another option is that China was able to get away with this activity for a period of time as they were using balloons that were smaller and less detectable. And then they figure out that the United States had become aware. 

In short, they knew that we knew. So, they decided to use a massive intelligence collection balloon that would in no way able to remain convert and would certainly be detected. 

Or there was a calculation that other operations with balloons had not been detected, and the decision was made to see how big they could go without being detected. 

In either case it would have presented an glorious opportunity to gauge what the U.S would do when it detects something in the NORAD/ US airspace. Also, to see what tactics techniques and procedures would be used to counter the intrusion. And the associated political impact that would have on U.S internal politics. 


Why, because as outrage mounted the U.S and NORAD would be forced to do something. Anything. As U.S politics would demand some action or another. All China has to do was make some popcorn and watch




If I had to guess - I'm guessing this is the case. After all, they are only losing an unmanned balloon with expendable equipment that has likely already collected what they want.

This would be a good bookend for them. 

Or they were able to conduct similar operations in the past without known detection and just pushed on. Something went wrong with the route planning, or the control of the balloon and China got caught with its hands in the cookie jar. 

In any case if the U.S was trying to pretend to not know about these operations that fiction went away when average citizens detected it and it went viral on news and social media.

So lets put this in context. We have already established that everyone spy's on everyone. 

Lets pretend rather than countries we talk about our houses. 

One day you come home to your house walk into your living room and there is a large television camera with a blinking red light aimed at your couch. 

You would freak out, probably call someone. 

And then you check your historical home security footage to figure out whom put a damn commercial camera in your living room.

Remember, most people don't really check home security footage until something goes wrong. Some do, just not most.

In any case you check your footage and see that the same Internet repair person has been entering your house every two weeks. 

What do you do. Search your house for other devices. And what do you find. 

A bunch of smaller ones that you did not see. You essentially sanitize your house. Maybe even call in a countersurveillance company. You also might change the settings on your security system to give you better alerts. 

Which is kind of what happened. Essentially there was something large detected we did not expect to be there and we cleaned house. 

And like anyone that detects a large camera in the living room we did so with a bunch of physical - likely manufactured - outrage. In our case in the form of several missiles.

But what did we really accomplish?

So if you make the assumption that China knew we knew, we just gave them an overt demonstration of NORAD air defense procedures. 

We also gave them some pretty good insight into the national security decision making process of the white house and the associated politics with such decisions on both the Democrat and Republican party as well as the nation as a whole.

Thats pretty good intelligence operations collection operation if you asked me. 

Thats like 5 birds with one stone.

So now lets pretend why, if indeed the United States did not know, how that possibly could have happened until the Chinese went big ( ie something eyeballs can see during the day).

To explore this we need to talk about radar.  And other things not radar. But for ease of discussion lets keep it to radar. And lets frame the discussion in terms of threats.

So, NORAD and U.S Air defenses are generally geared towards detecting metal or other things moving fast towards Canada and the US. 

Why? 

Well a metal and other things moving fast might be a real threat. 

A hijacked jetliner, a foreign fighter jet, a missile or an ICBM.

All those things are pretty real threats and need to be intercepted to protect the nations.

Something else about radar. 

Clutter.

What is clutter. Clutter is at its basics radar returns from the environment. 

Clutter can be rain, land sea interface, birds, trash, sand, clouds - lots of things

In general the more sensitive your radar the more clutter you have. Yes, this is an oversimplification. 

So, there is a trade off. You can make your radar more sensitive, but you might get more clutter. 

Which means for false positives/ alerts. 

So if you run a very sensitive radar you might have lots of false targets.

That means your fighter interceptors are going to be very busy to try and find sand, birds, trash ect. 

So, to help with that trade off, we do some basic logic.

Generally, things at really high altitude with a very low radar cross section, moving slow are not a threat and are not "real" they are clutter. So we set up our radars to filter them out.

Why waste resources tracking a weather balloon released by a bunch of scientists?

And I am just guessing here.

In order to maximize the efficiency of our systems we essentially told our radar to ignore things like the Chinese balloon. 

As something moving that slow at that altitude was generally determined not to be a threat. 

When we detected the balloon - a figurative camera in our living room -  I'm guessing we changed some settings. When that happened, we found a bunch of other things that had not been seen before.

We also essentially looked at our historical camera data and going back found a bunch of other times this happened. Remember, if there was not a reason, most people would don't review camera footage from a home security system. 

Generally, it's probably the same for U.S radar data. The amount of resources to sift through that on a daily basis is probably prohibitive.

As a postscript to all of this. I am guessing that we reduced our resources in terms of NORAD and U.S air defense since the end of the cold war. 

After all, do you really think the Taliban or ISIS is going to lob a missile at us. 

Not so much. So whom do we really worry about. Well Spy planes and fighter jets. 

So I'm guessing this whole series of events has caused some serious re-assessment of monitoring U.S Airspace. 

That is if this was really a surprise.

Lastly everyone is wondering how the Chinese or others (for the smaller ones not confirmed to belong to China ) did this. 

Well, its simple. Really. Wind. Winds flow generally from west to east. And if you have a good handle of what direction the winds are blowing and how fast you can lob a slow-moving object like a balloon pretty much anywhere. Especially if it has some maneuverability.

Chek out this web site 





And realize this is what is available to the public. I would be willing to guess that governments have much better more accurate information.

 










Monday, November 7, 2022

China - Water scarcity a drop in industrial capacity and the impact on shipping and material deliveries to the Americas

Quick update again from GCaptain

So to do some quick and dirty analysis. For context this is a brand new ship. If you were to categorize this ship its a top of the line container ship. As in top tier. If this ship can't get enough cargo then you have to wonder about how the lower, older tier ships are doing. 

Again, perhaps a one off, but it would seem to indicate the level of demand destruction that shippers are seeing from the China export market. 

I think it's a trifecta. Covid issues - well the Chinese government policies are reducing the ability of industry to export. Water supply drought issues adding to that, onshoring and finding other places to produce things vice China. And to add a fourth a shift in spending from goods to services in the west as for the most part covid in in the rear view mirror and people are getting out. 

*****


So in this post I am going to get a bit outside my wheelhouse. I don't claim to be a subject mater expert. So its just opinion. Based on a bunch of information. Also I'm not considering the political angle on this. I am also not getting into the agricultural food security element of this. 

I've noticed some interesting news in the Maritime realm. What do I mean by maritime. I mean Civilian (for the most part) shipping.

See for most people out there they do not understand how much a barometer shipping is for the world wide economy. Simply put, generally shipping rates and routes are the canary in the coal mine for a number of good or not so good things. And lot depends on where you sit and where you stand.

I just saw this piece in GCaptain 


Let me put the headline in context. Boxship  = Container Ship. Blankings  = Canceled port visit on a normally scheduled route. Freight erosion = Reduced demand for Containers. East West sailings = Asia to the United States. Idle = excess capacity.


 It is important to remember that decreased demand for shipping of materials does not necessarily equate to decreased demand for those materials. Although generally that is the case. The situation that shipping finds itself in can generally fit into several categories. And these are oversimplifications. And to make it simpler we will just focus on the China to American market

1. American companies are sitting on too much inventory or have previously overstocked to avoid possible supply chain issues. In both cases these companies may have no urgent  need to replace inventory so are ordering less. Less orders from Chinese factories equals less demand to ship materials to America. 

This would be slightly unusual as for the last several decades most supply chains have been essentially just in time inventory. However, the last several years of supply chain issues may have prompted many companies to essentially hoard materials. This is not too worrisome, as eventually those material stocks will have to be replaced and shipping demand might come back to a pre-pandemic level of normal. 

Notice I said pre-pandemic. As there is already evidence that American consumers have shifted spending back to services rather than goods. In this scenario some ship owners/ operators are going to have a rough time of it. 

The glory days of getting 20,000$ USD for a 20 foot container (TEU) are probably over. I'm guessing it will settle back into the 1,500 to 2000$ range for a bit. This could go lower.  Especially if they purchased a number of ships expecting the increased demand for goods that occurred in the pandemic to be the new normal. 

This is probably the best possibility as it is just the cyclical nature of shipping. There will be winners and losers in the shipping market. But it is not a substantive shift in the model or the world economy.  

2. Another possibility is that demand for materials produced in China has cratered. Here there are basically two possibilities. One is that actual demand for materials produced in China has been reduced as the customers of American companies are either no longer buying at the same rate or are forecast to no buy these materials as the same rate 

This is probably the next best scenario. It would seem to indicate that there are adverse economic conditions in the Americas that are leading the end users of materials to have insufficient money to purchase these materials. 

In short, a recession. While not good, this would also be a cyclical issue. And not represent a fundamental change to supply chains. Again, this will hurt a numbers of ship owners/operators. But eventually the business will come back. 

3. There is the possibility that for whatever reason supply chains have fundamentally changed. American companies having been burned by supply chain issues and the massive shipping costs incurred to ship Chinese produced materials to America during the pandemic. And then to get these materials from ports in America to the last mile have changed that calculus.

In short, the cheap production costs in China are outweighed by the costs to ship and delays in shipping materials produced there to end customers in the Americas. If this is the case, it would be a fundamental and likely permanent shift in the China to Americas shipping market. It would also represent a economic blow to China which is still heavily reliant on manufacturing for employment of its people. 

This would have a significant impact on those shipping owners/operators whom are reliant on cargoes heading from China to the Americas. 

This might indicate that American companies will have onshored production in order to have materials quicker and with lower risk.  This is bad for China and good for the new material producers. 

How this impacts China long term will be interesting. And it is doubtful that all material production could be onshored. So, shipping would be impacted long term, but there would still be a East West shipping market but perhaps reduced. 

4. The most worrisome possibility is that China for some reason lacks the will or ability to produce materials for the American market although demand is still high. I've been known to make crying wolf predictions in the past and been proved wrong. 

Unfortunately, I think this 4th possibility is likely the most likely one. And the one we are starting to see now.

I think that a combination of factors in China has either temporarily or mid term reduced the ability of China to manufacture and deliver materials to ports to be shipped to the Americas. 

I am going to explore this 4th possibility below

And I think that the primary factor is water, or lack thereof currently in China. Many industrial processes require water. To start off with China does not have a lot of water, and what it has is in the wrong place. 

For whatever reason China located most of its industrial capacity in the North. Which already has adverse water supplies. And the north was already drought prone.  

While it has not made headlines in the west, China is in a severe drought. If you look you will find reports. Such as here. But with upcoming midterms and adverse ecconomic headwinds in the Americas, I just think its not really on the radar as much as it should be.




Water issues causes real problems for China as many of its industries rely on water for both material production, cooling and electrical production supporting both.  

Water scarcity has a couple major impacts for China. Like many industrializing countries, China built many factories by the water. Why? it's a cheap source of energy. The United States did the same in the northern states. 

Cities like Lowell, Massachusetts were able to harness the power of water to power huge looms that turned southern cotton and other materials into finished products. 

However, if there is no water to power the factories, that cheap source of energy is gone. Perhaps temporally. A lot depends on the weather patterns. 

But until the rain and water return essentially you have to figure out a way to power very expensive factories that are not really moveable. 

This means re-routing - if possible - energy from other sectors and locations that are deemed less important. In China's case this means the cities and its residents. There are already reports of skylines in China going dark to conserve electricity. And Chinese stuck in these high rises with no electricity or not enough.

Another option is to install or use generators for factories. This is an expensive band aid, as remember, if you used to use fairly not cost hydro-electric then now you have to pay for fuel. 

Solar and wind might be an option for long term. But again, that would require investment and is not going to solve the short term problem. And that investment is perhaps long term going to be cheaper than installing generators, but a lot more expensive then hydro.  

Also there could be an effort to try and do massive desalination. But that is not going to fix rivers. 

Oh, one more thing. If you choose the generator fuel solution, you need to get the fuel to the generators. Like in many countries, the river systems are not just used for cheap energy, they are also vital transportation routes. 

When the rivers are low or almost dried up due to draught, using cheap barge and tow may no longer an be a viable option and now you need to truck it in. 

That is of course unless you have pipelines and associated distribution networks in place. From what I have read, China does not have any type of distribution networks configured for this. 

So they are stuck with inefficient transport via road if the rivers are not navigable.

I briefly mentioned rivers as transportation nodes. Well, even if you were to solve the electrical generation issues you still have a major transportation issue.

See those factories need inputs. As in raw material and goods to create finished materials or near finished materials. Without rivers, this becomes once again a problem. As you now have to truck in your raw materials to the factory, or use different, smaller marine transportation that is less efficient. 

Then you have the same problem with getting your finished materials out.

See many of these factories are not located near major ports. They are located on rivers far away from the ports where huge containerships can load them. It is essentially a hub and spoke maritime transportation model. Your hubs are the big ports. These big ports are fed by smaller regional harbors and ports that rely on smaller "feeder" ships and barges to deliver to the hubs. Yes there is some rail and truck. But feeder barges and ships are much more effecient. 

This means that these containerships are reliant on another mode of transportation to feed them. If the rivers are either not navigable or less capable this is going to drive up costs to get the finished materials to the port to be loaded on a containership

Then we have the covid issue. Not going to get into politics here. But China has decided on a zero covid policy. Well, what does that really mean? One case can lock down a whole city town or venue

They actually recently did this recently to Disneyland China and literally locked down the entire park after several people tested positive. Being stuck in a concert or a park is definitely not fun but it would not negatively impact your economy.




The problem comes when workers at factories test positive and these factories or regions containing the factories are shut down. No one or few people in or out. For a period of time. Again, lets keep it simple.  Suppose you are running a factory that runs three shifts of 10 people 24 hours a day. A member of one of those shifts' tests positive for Covid. 

The factory is now sealed for say 7 days until no one is positive anymore. The shift stuck in the factory can likely do some production, assuming they are not all sick. But for the most part production is going to halt. That means after say day 2 you lose 18 shifts worth of production. Also, when the lockdown is lifted its going to take a while to get everything back up and running. So back of the hand math says that one case at a factory sidelines that factory for 10 to 14 days.




And it gets worse if your workers leave. As getting them back in place is going to be difficult. 

And if you were scheduled to deliver something to a hub at a certain time to meet the schedule of a large boxship. Well thats not happening. So the ultimate end user now has to wait a minium of another 10 days to get materials in the Americas. And it just snowballs from there. Because that end user might require input materials to manufacture of build something in the Americas that relies on a China based input. 

So shutting down one facgtory is not that bad if we are talking one factory. But we are not. Covid is going to Covid. That means this type of event is likely happening all over China. And not just in factories. Also, among those loading ships, those unloading ships. You get the point.

If I was an American company reliant on Chinese production I would be very concerned right now. One the ongoing drought and the implications of reduced reliability of a supply chain based in China to deliver materials for me to sell of further manufacture based on water scarcity. Two, ongoing and random Covid lockdowns adding insult to injury. And the inevitable increasing costs of these materials. And then the delay in receiving materials.

So, if I was a company in the Americas, I think I would seriously reconsider basing my supply chains overseas or in China. While it might cost me a bit more to do it in the Americas at least material production (when possible) would be closer and more reliable.

Again, this is a guess, but it may be the case that demand has not cratered, nor has onshoring taken a bite. China simply put cannot build or transport materials to market.

Based on water. 

Now there is a bit of a silver lining for China. That silver lining is timing. In about a month or two many Chinese factories are going to shut down or go to limited operations due to Chinese holidays. So perhaps that might buy China some time to mitigate issues. 

The bad news is that the rainy season wasn't and temperatures are still above average as I am writting this. 

I think that there is a possibility that drought, combined with China zero Covid policy, has taken a significant chunk out of China's industrial capability. And also a signifigant portion out of its electric generation capacity. That bodes ill for China and anyone whom depends on it for its supply chain.

The political impact is a whole different story for someone else to write. But I would put it into the not good category.  

Which means the amount of material needing to be shipped has dropped and will continues to . Since there is less material to be shipped there is less demand for full containers to be shipped. 

Less demand for containers to be shipped equates directly to container rates and the rates of leasing container ships to ship said containers. This means less money for container ship owner/operators. That means losses as demand has dropped

One way to try and fight this is for a container ship owner / operator to reduce the number of ships that are actively carrying cargo. This is not really a good option as you still have maintenance costs, loans and if you stop sailing completely well someone else will take your business.  And when demand comes back well someone else may have stepped in. 

This is the rough equivalent of say a rock band reserving a large stadium, expecting a sell out. Then realizing lots less people are coming and reducing the number of seats and tickets for sale to ensure that ticket income is not drastically reduced. In short decrease supply. 

Another way to fight back is to reduce the number of stops on a planned route. In essence this turns the routing of a ship from a local train to an express train. Rather than making all the stops, you make some of the stops. In short if you were servicing several hubs you now service say one.  Here the hope is that yes some of the smaller stations (hubs) will not be serviced, but passengers (material/cargo) can still be routed on land to the larger stations (hubs). But this also upsets the supply flow. As now the smaller hubs have to adjust to ship to larger hubs. 

So only time will tell if reduction of rates and the reduction of material shipments is a result of decreased demand due to recession, supply chain changes, climate/drought or Covid.

But as the magic 8 ball sometimes says. If you're an American company reliant on China - Outlook not so good. 


Wednesday, September 21, 2022

Unmanned goes to Sea - again

So was checking traps and lines this morning and ran across these pictures on twitter

So I think Mr Suttonhttps://twitter.com/CovertShores  is probably one of the better authorities on this. But because I can I'm going to add my two cents.

First the unconfirmed backstory. Well unconfirmed as when your dealing with Russians or the Ukrainians you can never tell what might be an information operation. 

But based on the information available it appears that this Unmanned Surface Vehicle turned up close to the Russian naval base as Sevastopol. And it appears it was not invited and not expected. So probably not Russian. Also, it appears that the Russians decided to tow it out to sea and "explode" it. Which means they probably were of the opinion it was a bit of a threat. 





So, to begin with this is a well-constructed craft. 

It looks like this was done by a shipwright or someone who has been around boats and vessels for a while. 

In short it looks pretty professional when you compare it to other low-profile vessels and unmanned surface craft built by other groups such as the Tamil Tigers, Huthi's and some of the Columbian Narco Subs. 

No, whomever constructed this has access to machine shops, welders, marine engineers ect. Not a mom and pop shop or uncle in the backyard. Or a really really good mom and pop or unce.

Thats not surprising in itself as Ukraine is a seagoing nation and has many shipyards. So this is by no means beyond their capacity

Next lets talk about what I think are the major design features of this craft 

It looks like they took about a 20 foot aluminum or steel small outboard boat. They then cut out everything but the hull and stripped it to the bones 

Next they configured a cradle to sit in the boat to accommodate the warhead from some type of missile.

After that they fitted what looks like jet ski engines to the stern. As well as gas tanks and batteries to balance out the weight of the warhead which is located in the stern.

Then they installed the Communications system. I think this likely is some type of SATCOM antenna, maybe a combination UHF for LOS. This appears to be located in the stern area. 

Then they mounted the Warhead into the internal cradle. Then they installed the warhead. Almost certainly in a safe mode. Welded everything back together. The three external semi circles are likely bracing to hold the boat together and keep the warhead in place. They may also have the effect of increasing shrapnel when and if this had gone off.  They did leave an access port on the bow. This is likely where they armed it,

Next they drilled a small hole amidships and placed the Electro optical / Infared gps integrated device to enable a remote operator to "see" any possible target and likely take final arming instructions

I am guessing that the one thing that they forgot to do was to install an inertial navigation system INS. And instead relied on GPS enabled navigation. With perhaps manual operator steering. Why would an INS or something similar be important? Well in the event you can't get a gps signal or use SATCOM the INS would enable the craft to stay fairly on course. Why is that important. Well the Russians are (perhaps used to be) pretty good a jamming things. So counting on GPS or SATCOM would be questionable - especially when near a Russian Navy port. But with INS you could stay on course -ish. At least until you could get another fix. Realize these systems are not cheap. And the Ukrainians may have opted for positive control at all times to avoid damaging friendly or civilian ships. So it may have been an intentional omission. 

Then they took that harness and hooked it up to the battery and comms package via the access port on the starboard side. 

So how fast could this thing go...well rough estimate would be probably between 20 and 30 knots in a calm sea. However, I am guessing that actual transit speed might be 5-15 knots. Likely on the slower end. Remember, this craft is low profile for a reason. Stealth. At 20 to 20 knots, you are likely leaving a very very detectable wake even at night.

Remember the stealth aspect is a big part of the design of this craft. Many of you may never have stood watch at zero dark 30 on a ship. But even in perfect weather with no wind or waves and max illumination, this craft might look like a dolphin, piece of wood or some other marine animal.

Also, due to its low profile your Radar is not going to much good. Also EO/IR may not be all that great depending on how much insulation was used around the engine. Which appears to be a jet ski engine that does not run as hot as others. 

I would guess that even with a super alert watch whom has been caffeinated and full of nicotine, its going to be hard to see this. 

And remember the target appears to be ships in homeport. Tied up to the pier. Probably not going to have a bunch of people staring at the water.  Well perhaps now... 

For the warhead, guessing a missile warhead, maybe 100-150 pounds. Anymore and the boat won't handle it. I say warhead, as it is probably much easier to jury rig a warhead then to go and create your own explosive package and really improvise it. Safer probably to.  If I had my choice would choose and Anti Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) Warhead as well its engineer

So here is my vignette on how this was employed after probably some basic trials.

Following completion of basic sea trials and testing this craft was delivered to some section of the Ukrainian Navy. Once judged combat ready the Ukrainian Naval Staff developed targets that would be suitable for this craft. High on this list was likely Russian Navy ships in the port of Sevastopol. A successful attack would put more stress on an already nervous Russian Navy following attacks on Airbases and the HQ in previous weeks. An unsuccessful but detected craft would do the same minus the damage.

When the timing was right (Wind Weather targeting) a mothership/boat likely towed the craft some ways out to sea in the direction of the attack. This probably happened at dusk or night. Final preparations were made, checks undertaken, comms established, and initial arming of the warhead undertaken. When everything was green or mostly, so the Ukrainians activated the quick disconnect and let the craft head in its planed direction likely at a fairly slow rate of speed - say 5-15 knots. 

From there it proceeded to target...until it didn't a number of things could have happened. My guess is a loss of comms, Perhaps the linkage between SATCOM / GPS and the control boards failed. Engine failure, battery failure...or just running out of gas due to unexpected sea state.

So it would appear that this was a failure. But not really. 

Now there is an additional capability that the Russians have to guard against. And guarding against this capability is going to be difficult. 

The Russians will have to either increases resources towards guarding naval assets in port, put them to sea or move them. 

All upset the operational and tactical plans that the Russians might have.

Finally, you can bet somewhere there are a bunch of Staff officers and Engineers in the Ukrainian Navy pouring over whatever data they have. Developing solutions to issues and preparing to try again, 






Tuesday, September 13, 2022

A bright flash or a one way trip to the woodshed

A little over 6 months ago I was asked what I thought the outcome of the Russian invasion of Ukraine would be if an invasion happened. 

My thoughts at the time were that if the Russians were able to run over Ukraine quickly the outcome might be temporally good for Russia, but that long term the outlook was not so good. 

Why, well Ukraine of 2022 is not the Ukraine of the 2010's. In particular their military is much more westernized but with all the sneakiness of Russian strategic thought. 

In short, Ukraine military has a little bit of the best of both schools. In my mind's eye, even if the Russians had had a three-day success, they would have faced a situation similar but much worse than what U.S forces faced in Iraq. 

Counter insurgency, but with a population determined to fight back and whom had not been under sanctions and led by a dictator.

That led me to what happens when the Russians face a CI slog. I had honestly not considered that the war would remain, with some interesting exceptions a conventional war for over 200 days. 

In short, my assumptions were wrong in terms of how the nature of the conflict would flesh out.

However, I never thought that the Russian Army with the limited number of forces it chose to employ would be successful. 

Which led me to think what happens when things start going sideways for the Russians.

In talking to a co-worker I simplified it to a bumper sticker. Which I generally refrain from as it tries to make very complex situations simple. But here it is.

"This ends in a bright flash of light or Putin and co taking a one way trip to the woodshed or sanatorium"

Let me unpack the above statement with caveats ect. Putin maintains his control of the Russian government by allowing the Oligarchs and members of the Government, Military and Security services to grift and steal. 

A certain amount is ok, more and it's not ok. He also has on payroll huge portions of the Russian population, who essentially earn their paychecks either directly from the Russian Federation or from those employed by the Russian Federation. And going against the party line is not encouraged. It means jail at the low level - and Russian jails are not nice places or death by poison or other mysterious way at the high level.


Russia's huge resource wealth funds this. And not just oil. So that is one part. And the oligarchs don't mind this arrangement as it keeps them wealthy. The government employees don't mind as it keeps the paycheck coming and gives them some status

So, what about the "regular" Russians. 

In my opinion there are really not that many regular Russians. Pretty much most Russians are tied to the above income streams somehow. Maybe by 2 or 3 degrees of separation. And they for the most part get by. 

Russians in general have been fed a steady stream of misinformation. 

Which they don't really seem to mind, as long as it does not impact the paycheck. 

And whatever Putin does makes Russia Great Again or close to great again or perceived as almost great again

The Russian Military doesn't really care much either as long as they have their status, grift and paycheck. Remember it's a conscript army at the low levels. Majors and above with a few NCO's are the professionals. Below that its conscripts whom are generally from poor areas whom could not get out of being conscripted (think Northerners avoiding draft in the U.S Civil War or university deferments in Vietnam). To steal a PC term I rather despise, the average Russian Soldier has no agency. In short no one cares about him.  Literally meat for the grinder and replaceable. No so for the Majors and above. 

Here is the problem.

 It boils down to resource flows into Russia, degraded oil outflows, legitimacy loss and prestige loss

Senator John McCain once said Russia is not a country it's a gas station with nuclear weapons - or something to that effect. 

I think he was partially incorrect. More correctly Russia is an amalgamation of oils derrick's with nuclear weapons. 

What's the difference between those. An oil derrick does not have storage, a Gas station does. 

Simply put, Russia must pump its oil as it has very little storage. This means when people stop buying oil there is no place to put it. Except on ships. And there are not enough of those afloat to handle Russian export volumes. And it will take years, billions of dollars and external expertise to built pipelines to the east vice west. 

Further, the oil industry is very capital and tech intensive. 

Like airplanes, replacement parts and knowledge are needed to keep it operational. 

Access to both has been largely cut off or has dwindled. This means because of the decisions of Putin the resource wealth that funds many Russians is slowly being cut off. 

So, the difficulties that the Russian Army has been having have been so far easy to paper over. 

Remember, no one cries much over the death of a Russian Conscript from the poor far easter provinces. This is not by accident it is by design. You don't see many troops from Moscow or the Cities in Ukraine. Ever wonder why?

Maybe his mother and family, but even then, the death benefit paid softens that blow. And its a good bit of money for a poor family in Siberia. 

That along with the knowledge the soldier died " protecting mother Russia and ethnic Russians against Fascism " THIS IS FALSE...but unfortunately what many Russian have been force fed. 






That appears to be not the case anymore. Bits and pieces of the reality of the Russian situation in Ukraine are reaching the Russian population. In some ways it reminds me of the Iraqi minister of foreign affairs 

In essence the prestige and legitimacy of one the major institutions in Russia - the Armed services - has been or will be severely damaged. by what is happening in Ukraine. That bell will be very hard to un ring. 

I could argue the failure - so far - of the Russian military was not so bad. Until about a week ago. When the Russians got snookered and hit hard. Well planned by the Ukrainians by the way. Fun to see Maskrova used against the Russians!

The full-on retreat right now makes things very very dangerous.  

Why? The Russian military and security services are essentially the guarantor of the Russian regime. They are the savior of mother Russia going back to Napoleonic times. 

Feared but respected. It is a key block of the Russian regime. Its failure is not an option. 

If the Russian Army is totally defeated there might be a temptation by either Putin or his advisors to do something really stupid to salvage its position. 

"That is the this will end in a bright flash". The flash being a tactical nuclear weapon going off somewhere in Ukraine - probably the east. 





To send a very stern and convincing message that games stop now. 

You have had your fun Ukraine, but nothing further. 

While doing this would further make Russia a pariah. 

From the Putin and regime point of view it is probably a better option that not being in control. 

And it would send a firm message that the Russian Army is to be feared and respected.

"Or a Putin and co taking a one way trip to the woodshed or sanatorium" In this situation, the oligarchs and others senior in power essentially decide to execute a coup de tat on Putin and his close associates. 





Or perhaps Putin is sent to hospital while his inner circle and security officials mysteriously disappear, fall out of windows, are put on trial or killed

So, I think that Ukraine and the west should be careful how hard of a corner that Russia is pushed into. 

This is not to say I do not enjoy reading of Russian retreats and Russia becoming the largest arms exporter to Ukraine. 

Just to be careful when cornering a rabid animal with sharp claws.

It would be wise in short to have an exit strategy. 

Because I do not believe that anyone wants to see a bright flash of the easter horizon of Ukraine.

I also do not think that the Putin and his regime can survive as currently structured. 

The disinformation cap that the Russian government has had on Russia appears to be failing. 

Even on state supported channels. 

While it is likely that the true losses are being concealed it is impossible to conceal them all. Especially as Generals and Colonels have been dying and being captured. 

When the band aid of disinformation is ripped off, its is going to shock many Russians.

Full disclosure here I happen to have at one time been married into a ethnic Russian family. Divorced thankfully :) It's a bit interesting observing their behavior. As for most of the time I have known them (last 20 years) they identified as Russians from Ukraine. It has been interesting to see a change to Ukrainians who speak Russian since about February. 

They are shocked, shocked that the Russian people have allowed this attack on Ukraine to continue. 

Its then I remind them that Russians don't really have a choice. Because they have implicitly handed the keys of Russia to Putin for better or worse. In return for prosperity, security, and respect. 

And that I am not shocked by the Russian behavior at all. After all I had to deal with it during my divorce

What will happen when those people find out that devil's bargain is not being honored. 

And how fearful the Russian regime is of that fact being revealed. 

More importantly if there are enough well placed Oligarchs, security services and Military to remove Putin and his circle from the equation take the L in Ukraine and begin to mend things. 

Well that will determine if :


"This ends in a bright flash of light or Putin taking a one way trip the woodshed or sanatorium"


Monday, August 15, 2022

Russian Armed Force Competency - re-assessment

So, for the few that visit this blog, I have in the past been generous towards the Russian Military in terms of capabilities. 

Looks like I have a bit of crow to swallow. Sort of.

So up until the invasion of Ukraine the Russian military and associated Russian organizations was largely able to accomplish its objectives. 

What do I mean by that. 

Well Russian was largely able to influence, if not control the situation in Syria. In short, in my opinion, they were able to successfully influence the security situation in Syria to the extent that the outcome is in the favor of Russia and the Syrian government. 

At the 30,000 foot level, Russia was able to surge both Land, Sea and Air assets in an expeditionary and sustained manner to ensure that Asad and Company stayed in power. 

They did so by using both long range strike assets from Naval and Air assets. Not just once but several times. 

They also used land-based assets for the nasty slog on the ground in conjunction with associated security orgs to essentially hulk smash any sustained resistance to the Syrian regime. 

To be clear, some of the tactics used in Syria would foreshadow the tactics the Russians would use in its Ukrainian adventure. Simply put hulk smash.  Not pretty. 

So, what was this expeditionary operation, at its core from the Russian perspective (not mine).

It was a counter terrorism operation (some truth to that). But what does that mean?

Well, it means that it allowed Russia to pick its best, most ready and best equipped units and send them into a conflict were for the most part the opposition could not shoot back. Also, to test out some weapon systems like Kaliber missiles. 

In some ways, very similar to operations the United States and its allies conducted (and still do on a much more limited way) operations on the Counter Terrorism front from 2001 until present. 

But remember that operations in Syria and other places undertaken by Russia or its proxies have generally been in places where the opposition was disorganized and not necessarily organizations that western governments were keen to be seen as supporting.  

Not a Syrian expert, but from what little I have read regarding the Syrian opposition, they are not exactly groups who espouse religious freedom and western values. Lots of baggage. 

In some cases, if we had met these Syrian groups in say Afghanistan or Iraq the United States and its allies would be on opposing sides. But the enemy of my enemy is my friend. 

So, let's get back to how Russia could get B+/ A- in the Syrian conflict and (thus far) so utterly fail in its Ukrainian efforts. If I was assigning grades I would give them a C-/D+. 

At the basics, they were two entirely different militaries. And two very different conflicts. 

The one in Syria was able to employ more limited numbers. Essentially using the creme de la creme of the professional military forces in a concentrated manner. 

In short probably mostly consisting of contract and professional soldiers with perhaps a few volunteer conscripts mixed in. This group would have had experience in previous conflicts. And as it was a smaller effort, logistics were much easier. Supply chain via water and air direct to ports adjacent to the conflict. Full air superiority (minus a few manpads)

Now to Ukraine. An oversimplification, but largely the Russian forces sent to fight in Ukraine was, and is, largely a conscript army backed up by a few specialized units. 

Because of poor planning (among other things) many of those specialized units were torn up early. Oh, and while Syria has faded from the headlines....things are still hot there.

So how could it have gone so wrong. I've mentioned it before, but is comes down to incredibly flawed assumptions on behalf of those in Russian government at the highest levels. 

I've also mentioned it before, but the Russian experience in Ukraine mirrors (but much much worse) ours in Iraq. 

In both cases senior leaders in government had a set of unmovable pre-assumptions that did not fit the reality on the ground.

In the case of the United States government, it bought hook line and sinker claims of exiled resistance groups who claimed that they had a solid base of support and would be in position to rapidly stand up a "democratic" government. 

We also had a pre-packaged (but false) claim for war in the form of Weapons of Mass destruction. Further, when that pre-packaged claim did not meet facts on the ground, alternative organizations within the intelligence community to selectively leverage intelligence to fit the narrative. 

Then it turned out that neither the exiled resistance groups had nowhere near the base of support they claimed (they were happy to accept money though) and the intelligence narrative pushed turned out to be totally wrong. 

However, by that point that the emperor had not clothes, was the least of the problems. 

The United States was in Iraq, and tried to make the best of it. Hubris of the neo-cons at its worst (or best). The basic problem was that the assumptions by those in power derived from hubris dictated disastrous force employment and strategic planning decisions. 

Those can be summed up in the concept that once Sadam was gone, we could turn over the keys and go home. Mission Accomplished. 

Won't re-hash to much history here. But that might have worked had we co-opted instead of disbanding subordinate Iraqi security organizations. Rather than turning them into enemies and partisans opposed to United States policy goals.

So, onto the Russian Experience (thus far).

The highest levels of Russian national security appear to have hatched a pre-ordained narrative. One that if you disagreed with was likely to get you posted to a remote outpost in Siberia or worse.

 Like the United States, senior Russian Officials (ie Putin and Co) seemed convinced that there was a large and established resistance base which could be quickly leveraged to enable a very quick incursion.

I suspect, but can not know, that these "resistance" groups also took some monetary compensation. And probably also sent reports up the chain that would fit the established narratives.

In this case it wasn't weapons of mass destruction but Nazi organizations. And the idea that vast swaths of the Russian speaking population in Ukraine wanted to be Russian and not Ukrainian.

Let's continue the analogy. Remember how I said that the United States made disastrous force employment decisions based on hubris. 

In fact, General Franks consulted war planners (not politicians) whom originally planned to invade Iraq with somewhere around half a million soldiers and support. 

I think the number of ground troops was originally around 300-400k not including Air Force and Navy support. 

Instead, the number that actually invaded was about 160k again not including Air Force and Navy support. Also, the idea was to get in, take Sadam out, establish a new government and get out...all in 90 -120 days. 

We all know how that worked out. The reason it did not work out was that Unites States elected officials and senior leaders had a pre-ordained view of how things were going to work out. 

They did not want to listen to any negative or non-conformational views. Probably sounds familiar to Russian generals trying to fight the current conflict. 

Back to Ukraine. As best I can discern from mining different coverage of the initial days of the Ukraine Russia war the Russians had a very similar plan (generically) as the U.S had in its Iraq invasion.

I think it was supposed to be a coordinated three-pronged lightening attack by forces operating independently of each other with a total of about 180,000 soldiers from the North, the East and the South. 

These bulk of these forces were essentially hulk smash conscript mechanized infantry forces supported by Armor. With the preponderance of the Armor being older and manned by a mix on conscript, contract and professionals. Supporting Electronic warfare would have been better trained. Then you add in Air Force and Navy assets.  

The real important part of the plan was Airborne and special forces taking control of key infrastructure, possibly some type of decapitation of Ukrainian government using the same. 

I suspect that the good old exile resistance groups were supposed to take part as well providing an augmentation to special forces. 

In short. Quickly remove the existing government using special forces, light the fuse on a popular uprising then have the hammer of hulk smash come in and establish control of a cowed population. 

Then establish new political areas carved up that would be nominally autonomous but directly under Moscow control. Hold some "elections" neutering Ukraine and its western aspirations. 

Specialized air assault to take over key infrastructure.  The idea was to present facts on the ground as the new reality. 

And of course, the Russian would be welcomed with open arms as the Russian speaking Ukrainians threw off the Ukrainian yoke and rid themselves of the "Nazi" organizations that were suppressing them and oppressing Russian culture (or vice versa). 

Both the Russian efforts and the United States efforts both suffered from hubris, bad assumptions and badly executed intelligence.

In the Russian case there were a number of glaring assumptions. 

The biggest is that Ukraine was no longer unprepared as it had been in say 2014. 

I'm not saying they were ready, but they were more ready than they had been in 2014. Despite serious warnings, many in Ukraine believed a full-scale invasion was never going to happen. There was even push back on those countries and orgs warning it was going to happen. However, there was enough planning for the possibility that Ukraine was not entirely flat footed. Take by surprise. A bit.  

The Ukrainian military had already been moving away from the Soviet doctrine and towards a mish mash of NATO and local doctrine suited to Ukraine. This makes Ukrainian soldiers essentially better than their Russian counterparts for the type of war they would be fighting. Plus, they had home field advantage. This was no longer going to be a quick effort for the Russians had they actually done an honest assessment of Ukraine,

The second largest was the assumption that all Russian speaking Ukrainians would want to rejoin Mother Russia. Another big, failed assumption. 

Remember these Russian speakers could see what happened to areas of Ukraine that had fallen under Russian control. It's not pretty there. That is no secret. Also, Ukraine politics circa 2022 is far different then 2014.  Better to be fairly free (not saying by any stretch its perfect) under Ukrainian government looking west then under the iron fist control of corrupt insular Moscow appointed officials.

Finally, the number and type of troops required. I am by no means an Army military planner. 

Going back to Iraq , the population of Iraq in about 2003 was about 40 million. Further Iraq had at that point been fairly declawed military wise after roughly 20 years of war and sanctions. The population of Ukraine was about 40 million in 2022. However, not declawed. 

So, if qualified United States war planners (prior to political intervention) estimated that roughly 500,000 would be required for a successful invasion of Iraq in 2003, my back of the hand math says at least that number would be required to successfully invade Ukraine. Actually, probably add another 100,000 to that number. Given respective military readiness of the two countries. The Russians probably invaded with a force of about 200,000. Or roughly 1/2 to 1/3 of the number that likely would have been required. 

As of right now according to most public information the Russians are stalled or in retrograde in most areas. Some estimates indicate that of the roughly 200,000 that entered about 40-50,000k are dead. With another 40-50,000 combat ineffective, injured, captured or deserted. 

In my mind the real question is why, when to invasion faltered, did the Russians just not send more soldiers in. Well, that is the crux of the whole issue.

So here is some back of the hand math.. 

Russia probably has about 1.3 - 1.5 military personnel total. About 900,000 are active, another 250,000 are reserve, and another 250,000 are paramilitary.  

Realize that of the estimated 900,000 ish only about 250,000 to say 300,00 are active-duty ground forces. 

Yes, the Russians have a substantial reserve. 

On paper about 2 million reservists. But these are not western reservists. These are former conscripts who may not have worn a uniform in decades and are of questionable use. 

The reservists who are likely wartime reserve ready are probably a fraction of that. 

Again, pure guesswork here. But let's call it 200,000 at best. 

And remember these reservists are not with their equipment or units. They are at home and would need to be recalled, retrained ect. Then integrated with the larger force. So not an overnight fix

So, let's do some more math. 

So, we have at the high end 300,000 active-duty ground forces. And another 200,00 wartime reserves. Thats the starting point.

I am guessing that the Russian invasion force was likely 60 percent reserves and 40 percent active duty.
From twitter, and other reports it looks like the majority of the ground pounders were not what we will call the A team. More like the B or C team but with some exercises under thier belt

 I'm guess the active-duty element was the supervision. In short the officers and senior enlisted as well as higher headquarters, and leadership. 

So that would mean about 40,000 of the active-duty force of 300,000 were part of the invasion. 

That leaves 260,000 active forces for the whole of Russia and Syria. 

Let's estimate another 10,000 in Syria with a 1/3 relationship for training deployment and refit. 

So that's 30,000 devoted to Syria. 

That leaves 230,000 for the defense of all of Russia. And they live in a bad neighborhood. And there is always the need to keep the best close to Moscow - because regime security. 

Russia is a big country. I am guessing the active-duty Russian ground forces are pretty much stretched right now.

So why not take some of that 200,000 wartime reserves. Well, it's complicated. Even Putin can't do that without some serious consequences

First, if Russian leadership has effectively created an echo chamber in terms of news that reached the average populace. 

To draw a very loose analogy, after 9/11 citizens of the United States were told essentially to go shopping. As the military had events under control. 

And for nearly two decades, a small number of Americans routinely rotated in and out of war zones. And with minor exceptions the Unite States only accessed its active reserve component. 

Understand that the United States has an active reserve (operational reserve) component that is essentially held to the same standard as the active force. These forces are generally organized into cohesive units and are generally aligned with active units. Are they as ready as active. not always. But they are generally ready. Then there is what I will call the inactive reserve (wartime reserve). Consisting of former active members who have recently completed active duty and retirees. 

Yes, during the height of Iraq and Afghanistan some U.S forces were called back from inactive reserve status. But by and large it was active reserves. Russia does not have an equivalent of active reserves

Going back to the Russian echo chamber, right now the Russian population by and large believes he special military operation is generally going to plan. 

Remember that the Russian military does not really have an equivalent active reserve (operational reserve) . Also realize that certain things have to happen for Russia to activate its wartime reserve. Mainly they have to be at war.

The United States never declared war on Afghanistan or Iraq.

 Instead, the United States undertook these actions under the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF)  passed just after the 9/11 attacks. 

And all sorts of convoluted policies enabling things with the AUMF the next 20 years took place. It was badly stretched 7 degrees of kevin bacon to make things work

Russia likewise is not a war. It is undertaking a special military operation. Kind of the Russian version of an authorization of military force

So, in order for Russia to activate its wartime reserves, it would essentially have to declare that its special military operation is not working. 

That might punch a hole in the echo chamber. Especially as its kind of hard to hide 50 or 60 thousand soldiers being recalled to active duty to go serve in a war which was supposed to be won. And it might have consequences for Putin and company.

So as a result, Russia has instead decided to recruit. They are offering lots of money in impoverished communities to sign a contract and go fight. 

Also, some rumors that prisoners are being offered an out to go to the front lines 

The problem is these new recruits are not necessarily of the same quality or any quality as former conscripts. They are going to be the D+ / C- squad. Assuming they are given more training then being handed a weapon and armored personnel vehicle 

The question, however, is how long Russia can sustain combat losses and replace them with the largely unqualified replacements. 

I short, again using the Iraq war. 

How long until Russia decides a "surge" is required. If it comes to that, Ukraine may have a bad time of it. 

As the resources that Russia is currently leaving on the shelf will become fully accessible. And remember quantity has a quality all of its own.

Or will the Russian government decide to make its own version of Mission Accomplished and sell its people another message in the echo chamber.

Time will tell. 

But I almost promise you this. The Russian General Military staff is probably already planning changes to its structure so this never happens again. 

As the Russian military has a bloody nose. 

And all the "good" attention its armed forces and its equipment got (from their perspective) in the last decade or so ....and the associated arms sales.. have been negated to a point. 

So If I had to give a grade for Russia right now I would do it as follows

Small scale expeditionary conflict in permissive environments against non-peers = B+
Large scale conflict against near peer in semi non permissive environments = D / D+













Friday, August 12, 2022

Military Housing




So, I have been thinking of Navy housing issues. Well military housing in general. And once again we are currently victim of privatization that was created in the 2000's. 

What do I mean by privatization, I mean a bunch of for-profit companies essentially got the military to sign over ownership and management of all military housing. 

This is what was quote intended: 


Military Housing Privatization


Congress established the Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) in 1996 as a tool to help the military improve the quality of life for its service members by improving the condition of their housing. The MHPI was designed and developed to attract private sector financing, expertise and innovation to provide necessary housing faster and more efficiently than traditional Military Construction processes would allow. The Office of the Secretary of Defense has delegated to the Military Services the MHPI and they are authorized to enter into agreements with private developers selected in a competitive process to own, maintain and operate family housing via a fifty-year lease

The idea, like many "wonderful" business transformationalist ideas was that providing housing to soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines was not a core business practice. As such we could outsource it. 

And save lots of money that could be used for things like littoral combat ships and F-35's.  Yes these wonderful platforms were in concept mode in the late 90's. A by wonderful, there is a bit of sarcasm there.

To be clear, this is not a party problem. This was signed under a Bill Clinton. But has been allowed to fester presidents of both parties. 

So essentially the military handed off responsibility and accountability to several of civilian corporations. Below list may not be up to date but there are apparently 19 different "landlords" running military housing.

Balfour Beatty Communities 
Liberty Military Housing  
Hunt Military Communities 
Lendlease
Corvias

Again, the idea being that these civilian companies would be more agile, more responsive and more cost effective than if the miliary kept management of these assets in house. 

 this really didn't really take stewardship well  







And this is just from a cursory web search, from what I have heard and seen, these are the ones where it got really bad.


So, the concept was to provide better admin, upgrades to existing military housing. And these companies hit a gold mine. Why would a company decide to take over aging military housing. Well in some ways it is the same reason that dealerships outside the front gate are willing to sell cars to E-1's. They are going to get paid. So my take on the why:

1. They had a guaranteed customer base. Whom always got paid. Oh, and the military essentially directly pays the company. So, the company never really has to collect any money, because it is guaranteed. And remember it is the servicemembers entire allowance for housing..more on why that is problematic later. So, let's pretend that a Sailor collects 3000.00 a month for all housing allowances. If that sailor goes out in town he or she might be able to find an apartment for say 2,500. Then the sailor gets ton use the remaining 500 for electric, water, trash and maybe Internet. However, if that same sailor goes to base housing then the whole 3000.00 goes to the "landlord".  That means that the Sailor is out of pocket for electric (unless included), water, (unless included) and Internet. And in most cases electric, water and internet are not included. So essentially any sailor has a built in incentive to try and find somewhere else to live.

2. Two, there is little to no ability of a local base commander to hold these companies to account when things are not maintained. This was not a bug it is a feature. Can't have a U.S Navy Captain or Army Colonel ore senior enlisted getting involved in substandard conditions. Nope that is a big DOD as in Pentagon SECDEF issue. Not even services. Again, housing was not perceived as a core function of the military in those days. Might be offensive here, but there is no reason that providing housing to the Camp Followers (dependents) is important. Remember they would have been " issued with thgem with a seabag" if important. And I am guessing that some Senior Officers may have been happy to have this off their plate. Servicemembers could complain but it was no longer in unit or base leadership hands




As they could legitimately say that it's a "not my monkeys, not my football" issue. And with command tours only 2 years or so these landlords can wait them out.  

3. Three, in many cases military members may not have many options in terms of housing that is affordable to them as many bases are in high-cost areas. So, call it a captive audience. Especially these days. I can almost promise that in most major metro areas, and many areas, if housing availability does exist it probably exceeds the housing allowance...again if available.  

4. If occupancy falls below a certain rate the "landlords" can actually rent to civilians who may have little to no connection with the miliary or the base...more on why that is problematic. To be cynical, servicemembers know the quality of housing is bad or subpar, and that (see number 1) they are going to be out of pocket. Then if they can they are going out in town. So why is that important. Well remember the housing allowances for service members are capped at a certain amount. So again, use the 3,000.00 number. The "landlord" can't charge more than 3,000.00 to a servicemember in that situation. But they can charge above that to a civilian

 
The bottom line, like many "initiatives" between the mid 90's and 2010's is that there were many flawed assumptions baked into these concepts. The biggest one is that a corporation, as it was servicing military members would somehow be altruistic and always do the right thing. 

I am a big fan of capitalism. But remember, the point of a corporation in capitalism is to make money for its shareholders. Thats it. People do not provide corporations capital out of the goodness of their hearts to support the military. They invest and thereby provide capital to these companies expecting a nice return on their investment.

To put this in a general context, imagine for a minute if the Navy was to decide that patrolling the sea-lanes was no longer a core function of the U.S Navy and that a corporation could do it better cheaper and faster. The same company in return might be able to say charge port entry fees or collect tolls at sea for protection. Meanwhile the U.S Navy might be free to just conduct strike operations. To undertake this outsourced mission the U.S Navy kindly provided a bunch of leased old Spruance Class Destroyers and Oliver Hazzard perry class Frigates (properly demilitarized). Hulls with decades of service. And also provided for funds to privately crew these ships. 

Do you think there might be problems. Say for instance there might be a cost benefit calculation to say intercepting refugees or providing maritime security. Say perhaps an incident is reported 200 nautical miles away and it's going to cost X dollars in steaming costs but the reward is only going to be 1/2X. 

In addition to keep manning costs down, salaries might be capped. Further, since the corporation is only leasing these old hulls, there is little incentive to maintain them, As in part of the agreement, if the old hulls fail, the company can build new ones with government backing at minimum costs. And when the new hulls come online they will maximize profits. 

Perhaps a better analogy would be a sport team tanking (losing games on purpose or not trying) in order to get better draft picks.

 To be clear, both the companies and DOD are complicit in the situation that developed. 

Much like the analogy above the DOD and services offloaded a bunch of very old and not well-maintained housing stock to private companies. Even the DOD had not been good at husbanding the housing stock...much dating to the 60's and some the 20's. And to be clear, the respective services were much more interested in funding new tanks, ships and airplanes than keeping up or maintaining housing stocks.

The real problem was the built-in lack of oversight at the local level. As well as the willing blindness of congress (would love to see the lobbying history of these landlords to congress). 




It was only when things got super bad in recent years that congress and DOD could no longer turn a blind eye. As servicemembers and their families got sick and had to go out of pocket to find new places to live. While some of these companies falsified repair records, or just slow rolled the servicemembers. Because remember, most military move every 2-3 years. So, they could wait them out like the  Commanders. An some of the supervisors - or the companies - of these landlords got to collect bonuses. 

I have outline the problem...So what is the solution.  




The solution is not going to be cheap or quick. But it boils down to clawing back military housing. Placing accountability in the hands of the commander who's servicemembers live in housing. 

In theory a company might be able to do a better job. But in reality, corporate self interest in money making is not going to deliver the quality of service required. 

Conversely, when a Commander knows he or she is accountable for the conditions that their men and women and families live in that commander is going to take an interest. As his or her professional future will depend on it. In addition, if the Commander has the ability to influence repairs ect then he or she will likely do it When a commander has not accountability or responsibility and no means to influence and issue that is legally out of their hair nothing tends to get done until someone dies or its on 60 minutes or the local news. 

So, I said it's going to be expensive. It will be. But it is an investment. In times when it is hard to get and retain people to serve in the military, do you think substandard housing is going to be large draw.

Do you think that the perspective spouse or current one is going to want their spouse/ partner to re-enlist or to extend knowing how their children will be raised? 

The private military housing initiative has failed. It's not repairable. And like the littoral combat ships whose design, manning, maintenance and operations were predicated on transformational business ideas and outsourcing. It's time to decommission private military housing..