What is old is new

 found my old paper

In most western studies of war Military Deception is often perceived as notionally being practiced most effectively by the weaker military power against the stronger. In addition, the actual employment of integrated military deception has ebbed and flowed in Western military operations. At times its employment has been viewed as integral to the prosecution of western warfare, and at other times a mere afterthought to military operations and planning. In the Western, and in particular the United States Military, the employment of Military Deception is enjoying a resurgence. This resurgence is in part due to the inherent advantages of its employment that have become clear in recent conflicts.

This paper, however, will not delve into the value of Military Deception or its western applications. Rather, this paper will explore in the Soviet, and later Russian Federation, employment of maskirovka to accomplish Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic goals. This study of Russian maskirovka is extremely relevant as the tactics, techniques and procedures may be employed against both United States forces, and its allies, in both the ongoing conflicts - as well as future ones. 

To accomplish this objective this paper will first provide a short examination of maskirovka and its contrast to western Military Deception. Next the paper will delve into periods of time in which either the Soviet or successor Russian Federation employed maskirovka. Part of this examination will include the actions that forces opposing Russia undertook to employ or counter maskirovka.  In particular this paper will examine the consolidation of Soviet control over the Basmachi in Central Asia, World War II, The Cold War, Afghanistan and Chechnya. 

Maskirovka what it is and what it is not

Many individuals have attempted to translate Maskirovka directly into western military thought. Unfortunately, Maskirovka is a way of thinking that is applicable to military operations rather than a direct correlation to any western military definition of Military Deception. However:

The Soviet Military Encyclopedia defines Maskirovka as:

a form of security for the combat actions and daily activity of the forces; a complex of measures, directed at deceiving the enemy relative to the presence and location of forces(fleet), various combat objectives, their status, battle readiness, and also the plans of command 

The above definition has a doctrinal flavor with  “combat objectives” would seeming to imply an operational or tactical level of employment. However the Russian military has demonstrated a proclivity to employ Maskirovka  on Strategic, Operational and Tactical levels of war across the full range of military operations. The importance to Maskirovka  in Russian military thought is demonstrated by General Shtemenko whom noted the successful employment across Strategic Operational and Tactical levels of war against German forces in World War II :

This system of operational deceptive measures proved its worth. History has shown that the enemy was profoundly misled concerning our real intentions 

 While Maskirovka’s success against the German armies on the Eastern Front is not in doubt, General Shtemenko was not the first to employ it - nor did he invent it.

In the Russian military culture Maskirovka is embedded. While it may be tempting to ascribe the Russian proclivity to employ it to classical thinkers such as Sun Tzu or others, the reality is actually a little more complicated.  It is true that the influence of Eastern thought was branded into the Russian military culture. In particular with the experiences of waves of Mongol and Tartar invasions:

As centuries passed the nomadic Mongols settled and were assimilated into Russian society. However, their battlefield techniques continued to flourish.  

However, in addition to being exposed to Eastern military thought Russian military culture has the experience of having to face periodic invasions from nearly all quadrants of the compass.  In defending against this variety of threats the Russian military incorporated many influences from these traditional threats in order to implement suitable offensive and defensive measures.  In the realm of military deception,  Maskirovka is a unique adaptation that resulted from a diverse range of Strategic, Operational and Tactical experiences originating from multiple geographical directions. 

While Russian use of  Maskirovka seemingly first came into commonplace western military consciousness in World War II, the tendency of Russian military culture to employ  Maskirovka, and its relevance to current conflicts can be first seen Central Asia in years following World War I.

Post World War I Soviet Military Deception in Soviet Asia

In the aftermath of the Soviet exit from WWI, large portions of the former Russian Empire needed to be brought under the control of the newly formed Soviet Union. In many areas, the establishment of complete control over regions previously part of the recently dissolved Russian Empire was not easily accomplished. In the area of modern day Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan establishing such control proved especially challenging . 

To accomplish the objective, Soviet forces would have to overcome the “strong resistance”   of the Basmachi whom were Muslim and were resisting the alien Soviets as well at the associated alteration of their traditional structures .  To overcome the resistance of the Basmachi, Soviet authorities employed a variety of brutal tactics inclusive of the “scorched-ear campaigns and mass deportations of the local populations” .  However, one of perhaps more effective tactics the tactics employed was essentially perfidy. 

 In essence Soviet security forces undertook to organized soldiers whom “masqueraded as basmachi in order to intercept weapons and rebels crossing Soviet borders, and to ambush real basmachi rebels”  .  In the current western military environment it might be possible to avoid the label of perfidy given the non-state status of the basmachi. However, in practice, the employment of security or military forces clothed and equipped and attempting to be perceived as insurgent groups would likely give a commander and his legal staff substantial concerns regarding the legality of this activity. 

Regardless, on a practical front, the Soviet use of this deceptive action likely led to an ambiguity increasing problem for ‘legitimate’ basmachi forces. By introducing a degree of uncertainty into an already fractured group, Soviet security forces were likely able to open up seems that could be later exploited by both intelligence and military operations. In many ways this summarizes the goal of full scope Maskirovka which is to utilize all aspects of military capabilities to weaken the adversary.

Furthermore, the possibility of engineering basmachi on basmachi  violence via deceptive messaging becomes more viable. According to Eviskov, the basmachi ‘s were finally brought under control by “brutal terror, effective intelligence operations and indigenous forces” . However, the use of military deception likely served as a powerful tool to enable these lines of operation by creating uncertainty on the tactical and operational levels for the basmachi forces. While, employment of Maskirovka both prior to World War I and in the interwar years by the Soviet state is not perhaps well known, the use of Maskirovka  during World War II is well documented.

The Soviet- German deception battle on the Eastern Front WW II

The Soviet military continued to utilize deception or maskirovka  across the full Range of Military Operations to impact the Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic spectrums.  In fact the Soviet military became more and more competent in its use. The ultimate defeat of the Germans on the Eastern front during World War II had more to do with maskirovka then anything else. In short, the Soviets were able to decrease the ambiguity of the German forces. These German forces believed that they had superior capabilities based on strategic misperceptions of the German Field Armies Ost (FHO) . This was accomplished by basic Military Deception as well as innovative counter-intelligence operations which enabled more complex military deception operations

The Soviet Army demonstrated an “outstanding aptitude”  for “camouflage and concealment at the tactical, operational and strategic levels” .  By 1944 this success was extremely apparent when German Intelligence “routinely underestimated Soviet offensive strengths by 50 percent” . A direct result of this intelligence failure was that: “ three Germans Armies ceased to exist” .  However, the epic defeats suffered by the German military in 1944 had their roots in the extremely well thought out Soviet maskirovka  efforts in the preceding years. 

Time, combined with a lack of German airborne ISR platforms meant that the German Military on the eastern front had little to no effective ability to obtain valuable intelligence from the air . Furthermore the effective operational security measures undertaken by the Soviet military crated significant gaps in the German Intelligence Picture at the Strategic and Operational levels as: “everything behind the front line was a “blur” . With the inability to collect effective intelligence via aerial means or Signals Intelligence  beyond the tactical level the German military was at a significant disadvantage.  In an attempt to remedy this gap German Military forces attempted to form Human Intelligence networks.

For Germany the concept was seemingly an elegant solution to a complex problem: simply capture a Soviet prisoner and turn them to your side. This activity was an outgrowth of the German “aussenkommando”    that had been designed to gain intelligence from captured Soviet prisoners as well as to use the same to develop espionage and sabotage networks on the eastern front . As Perry Biddiscombe relates in his work Unternehmen Zeppelin: The Deployment of SS Saboteurs and Spies in the Soviet Union 1941-1945; German military units specialized in identifying captured Soviet soldiers whom might be vulnerable to being ‘turned’. Once these individuals had been identified training, sometimes significant in nature, would be provided. Once this training was complete these individuals would be inserted in an attempt to develop intelligence assets behind Soviet lines. 

Some of the attempts to insert these agents were extremely elegant. In one case a captured Soviet Company Commander underwent plastic surgery in order to imitate battle injuries and was air dropped in with his wife  in an attempt to establish a network.  However, the security of the operation was penetrated by a Soviet agent, a tailor, whom was preparing his authentic uniforms  . 

To compound the German operational security failure, the actual insertion failed as well. The former Company Commander and his wife were captured shortly after insertion - in part due to incorrect uniform wear . To add insult to injury to the German efforts, the newly captured former company commander as quickly re-turned and used to lure in follow on operatives.   Unfortunately, many of the agents whom were inserted met the same fate as the company commander. These compromised networks were then expertly utilized as part of the wider Maskirovka  activities to spread disinformation back to German intelligence. 

As mentioned previously, the lack of Airborne ISR assets forced the Germans into dabbling in HUMINT networks. Both of these intelligence activities were fairly unsuccessful in delivering the much needed intelligence for the German military in order to conduct effective operations. Perhaps the only modestly effective German intelligence gathering enterprise was the German SIGINT effort.  However, again then this enterprise delivered only an effective tactical product  for German Military. Ironically, these: 

tactical indicators that contradicted the strategic indicators of enemy intentions upon which the FHO had already based it assumptions  .  

Worse, much of the strategic indicators received were, unfortunately exactly what the Soviet Army wanted the German military to have via compromised HUMINT networks .

In conclusion, the integrated Soviet maskirovka had the effect of seriously degrading the capability of the German intelligence apparatus. This degradation was achieved by employing disinformation through ‘turned’ captured German intelligence assets, as well as employing:

The full Soviet armoury (sic) included camouflage and concealment, imitation, simulation, demonstration manoeuvers (sic), and radio deception” .  

However, the key component to these tactical and operational measures was that they were part of a broader strategic plan. This strategic plan incorporated an accurate understanding of the German military decision process and its default perceptions. Finally, the Soviet military implicitly understood at the highest levels that Maskirovka  could serve as a vital force multiplier  to defeat its most recent invader.  

Prior to World War II most Soviet Military maskirovka had been on establishing Soviet state influence within the traditional borders of the Russian Empire. During World War II initial Maskirovka  focused on regaining control of territory from invaders. However, in the closing days of World War II the Soviet military would for the first time utilize its now highly capable maskirovka skills for offensive operations.

The Soviet deception against Japan in World War II. 

Towards the end of World War II, the Soviet military employed skills learned from the eastern front against Japanese forces in the Manchurian Theater of operations. Major Butts relates in great detail the exact means employed by the Soviet Armies in this theatre . However, the salient point of his account is that the Soviet military employed maskirovka on the Strategic, Operational and Tactical levels in order to achieve complete surprise over Japanese forces. While it cannot be conclusively proven, it could be argued that the successful employment may have had some degree of impact on the decision of the United States to employ nuclear weapons over two Japanese cities when it did. Had the war not ended when it did, it is highly likely that the Soviet military may have made significant territorial gains. In the post war environment, the Soviet Union would increasingly employ maskirovka to achieve its ends. 

Czechoslovakia – Afghanistan 1.0. 

The reasons for the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia are interesting but not particularly relevant to this paper. How it was accomplished, however, is an intriguing case study in the Strategic employment of maskirovka. In this case maskirovka was employed to diminish perceived threats to Soviet Diplomatic and Military interests outside the borders of the Soviet Union. While it was likely clear to the Czechoslovakian government that the Soviet Union was not pleased with the direction Czechoslovakia was taking, the Soviet military nonetheless managed to obtain complete surprise. Using classic Soviet maskirovka  the Soviet military:

lowered fuel and ammunition stocks of the Czechoslovakian army by transferring these to East Germany supposedly as part of an “exercise”  . 

The Soviets were then able to further decrease the perception of Czechoslovakia of any armed intervention by scheduling an “unexpected military exercise”  , which in fact would serve as the vehicle for the actual invasion. The result was that the Soviets were able to effectively achieve strategic level surprise against Czechoslovakia using many of the same maskirovka techniques employed successfully against German and Japanese forces in World War II. 

The repeated successes of maskirovka first against the Germans, later against the Japanese and then effectively against Czechoslovakia likely emboldened the Soviet power structure. This gave the power structure the confidence that such operations could be successfully undertaken outside the proper boarders of the Soviet Union in support of  Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic goals. As Valenta says; “the Story of Czechoslovakia in 1968 repeated itself in 1979 on a lesser scale, but in even a more daring and bold fashion” . On this occasion the target of Soviet goals would be Afghanistan.

The Soviet deception in Afghanistan 

Afghanistan was in many ways Czechoslovakia 2.0. The same ambiguity decreasing methods were employed. However in Afghanistan the Soviet Military employed the full range of experiences it had accumulated since the involvement in with the Basmachi in the post-World War I years. 

From the basmachi experiences the Soviets slightly altered the fake rebel band concept. For the initial Afghanistan invasion, the Soviet military employed Soviet Special forces soldiers from its Central Asian republics that looked and spoke as locals .  While first employed in the basmachi  experience, the Soviet Military had previously employed similar tactics in Polish front in the 1920’s when a Soviet “diversionary”  :

Calvary brigade for “special assignments”  with a strength of more than two thousand cavalryman…..all dressed in Polish Uniform. Much later these diversionary units received the name Spetsnaz, now given to all special forces of the GRU .

Likewise for the invasion of Afghanistan the forces were Spetsnaz but dressed in Afghan Army uniforms . This enabled this force to obtain the element of surprise and successfully breach presidential security and execute the leader of Afghanistan .  While there were a variety of other elements of Maskirovka involved in the highly successful and surprise operation, the employment of Soviet Special forces in Afghan uniforms was a key component.

However, the employment of Soviet security services in misleading attire was not limited to the initial invasion. In fact, the Soviets drew similarities between the earlier Basmachi struggle and “thought it appropriate to carry over to Afghanistan the methods and tactics the Cheka had used against the basmachi”  .  These units:

The KGB ‘Cascade’ units operated in parallel throughout the country. They were given broad powers. As well as terrorist actions, sabotage and recruitment of agents, they were active among the tribes in disrupting the activities of the Mujahedin, and in the setting-up of self-defense units.   

However, the Soviet Forces did not limit themselves to simply using fake mujahedeen to combat real mujahedeen. In Afghanistan they employed an integrated information operations campaign designed to create or exploit gaps between the mujahedeen. 

Ironically, the information campaign employed as part of maskirovka efforts by the Soviet’s may have been slightly too effective. It is clear that the deceptive information operations targeting mujahedeen were successful in engineering mujahedeen on mujahedeen violence.   However, the information operations success:

“contributed to an atmosphere of mutual distrust and suspicion within the mujahedeen that outlasted the Soviet occupation and led to a bloody civil war in the 1990’s”  . 

Afghanistan demonstrated that he Soviet military and leadership retained the ability to exercise maskirovka in order to achieve strategic surprise and to obtain tactical effects. However, at the same time the Soviet military had lost the ability to integrate these at the operational level and on the tactical level within its non-specialized conventional forces. Books such as the “Bear Went over the Mountain” and “The other side of the Mountain” offer great detail on how Soviet conventional forces were seemingly no longer able to effectively employ Maskirovka in Afghanistan. 

The Relevance of  maskirovka to Modern conflicts

From the case studies above that cover post-World War I until the Afghanistan occupation, Soviet military doctrine demonstrated a remarkable ability to maskirovka across the Strategic, Operational and Tactical levels. This integration permitted the Soviet forces to gain advantages - and victory - that might not have been otherwise possible. From the  Czechoslovakian intervention up until the recent Georgians Russian War these skills were to attrite to the point where the Soviet military was essentially defeated or failed to perform. This poor performance was a result of the failure to employ maskirovka in an integrated fashion - on Strategic, Operational and Tactical levels to achieve Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic goals. However, the recent Georgian – Russian war seems to indicate that Russian government and its military may have re-learned the capability to successfully employ maskirovka .

Prior to these somewhat recent developments the Russian military experience in  Chechnya reveals some worrisome implications for the spread of effective maskirovka among non-state actors. It is key to understand that in the dissolution of the Soviet Union, many of the non-ethnic Soviet Spetznaz likely returned to their home regions within the Caucus’s and the Central Asia republics. The tactics employed by the resistance groups in Chechnya clearly show their linage with Soviet era maskirovka. 

Some of these examples include “Chechen fighters routinely dressed in Russian uniforms” ,  claims to possess “Nuclear Weapons” , the use of “provocative fake radio messages that were intended to be intercepted” , use of a “Radio jamming system to limit the influence that Russian mass media might have” . Furthermore, Chechens were able to successfully project power in attacks in Budennovsk (1995) , Kizlyar (1996) , at Sea on the Black Sea Ferry Eurasia (1996) , and in the air by hijacking a Cypriot Airlines flight (1996) . 

While these events in themselves may have a parallel with the activities of other terrorist groups there is a unfortunate possibility that non-state actors may also be learning the lessons of maskirovka and be attempting to integrate across strategic, operational and tactical levels to obtain Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic goals. 

Conclusion 

In an era, where tactics among non state actors quickly can spread via a networked and globalized system it will become increasingly important to understand some future enemies may be influenced by the Soviet and later Russian Federation culture of maskirovka. Furthermore, the Soviet ‘school’ of maskirovka was widely spread among client states during the Cold War. It will be vitally important for future military operations to implicitly understand that some of these states and actors will not ascribe to western definitions of Military Deception. These states and actors can - and likely will - instead use more integrated maskirovka  or maskirovka derived means that are not often in accordance with the western way of war. This will require that western military planners seeking to employ integrated Military Deception as part of resurgent importance understand that the opposing force – state or non-state – may be doing exactly the same. However, the other side may be playing an entirely different game with very different rules.