So, for the few that visit this blog, I have in the past been generous towards the Russian Military in terms of capabilities.
Looks like I have a bit of crow to swallow. Sort of.
So up until the invasion of Ukraine the Russian military and associated Russian organizations was largely able to accomplish its objectives.
What do I mean by that.
Well Russian was largely able to influence, if not control the situation in Syria. In short, in my opinion, they were able to successfully influence the security situation in Syria to the extent that the outcome is in the favor of Russia and the Syrian government.
At the 30,000 foot level, Russia was able to surge both Land, Sea and Air assets in an expeditionary and sustained manner to ensure that Asad and Company stayed in power.
They did so by using both long range strike assets from Naval and Air assets. Not just once but several times.
They also used land-based assets for the nasty slog on the ground in conjunction with associated security orgs to essentially hulk smash any sustained resistance to the Syrian regime.
To be clear, some of the tactics used in Syria would foreshadow the tactics the Russians would use in its Ukrainian adventure. Simply put hulk smash. Not pretty.
So, what was this expeditionary operation, at its core from the Russian perspective (not mine).
It was a counter terrorism operation (some truth to that). But what does that mean?
Well, it means that it allowed Russia to pick its best, most ready and best equipped units and send them into a conflict were for the most part the opposition could not shoot back. Also, to test out some weapon systems like Kaliber missiles.
In some ways, very similar to operations the United States and its allies conducted (and still do on a much more limited way) operations on the Counter Terrorism front from 2001 until present.
But remember that operations in Syria and other places undertaken by Russia or its proxies have generally been in places where the opposition was disorganized and not necessarily organizations that western governments were keen to be seen as supporting.
Not a Syrian expert, but from what little I have read regarding the Syrian opposition, they are not exactly groups who espouse religious freedom and western values. Lots of baggage.
In some cases, if we had met these Syrian groups in say Afghanistan or Iraq the United States and its allies would be on opposing sides. But the enemy of my enemy is my friend.
So, let's get back to how Russia could get B+/ A- in the Syrian conflict and (thus far) so utterly fail in its Ukrainian efforts. If I was assigning grades I would give them a C-/D+.
At the basics, they were two entirely different militaries. And two very different conflicts.
The one in Syria was able to employ more limited numbers. Essentially using the creme de la creme of the professional military forces in a concentrated manner.
In short probably mostly consisting of contract and professional soldiers with perhaps a few volunteer conscripts mixed in. This group would have had experience in previous conflicts. And as it was a smaller effort, logistics were much easier. Supply chain via water and air direct to ports adjacent to the conflict. Full air superiority (minus a few manpads)
Now to Ukraine. An oversimplification, but largely the Russian forces sent to fight in Ukraine was, and is, largely a conscript army backed up by a few specialized units.
Because of poor planning (among other things) many of those specialized units were torn up early. Oh, and while Syria has faded from the headlines....things are still hot there.
So how could it have gone so wrong. I've mentioned it before, but is comes down to incredibly flawed assumptions on behalf of those in Russian government at the highest levels.
I've also mentioned it before, but the Russian experience in Ukraine mirrors (but much much worse) ours in Iraq.
In both cases senior leaders in government had a set of unmovable pre-assumptions that did not fit the reality on the ground.
In the case of the United States government, it bought hook line and sinker claims of exiled resistance groups who claimed that they had a solid base of support and would be in position to rapidly stand up a "democratic" government.
We also had a pre-packaged (but false) claim for war in the form of Weapons of Mass destruction. Further, when that pre-packaged claim did not meet facts on the ground, alternative organizations within the intelligence community to selectively leverage intelligence to fit the narrative.
Then it turned out that neither the exiled resistance groups had nowhere near the base of support they claimed (they were happy to accept money though) and the intelligence narrative pushed turned out to be totally wrong.
However, by that point that the emperor had not clothes, was the least of the problems.
The United States was in Iraq, and tried to make the best of it. Hubris of the neo-cons at its worst (or best). The basic problem was that the assumptions by those in power derived from hubris dictated disastrous force employment and strategic planning decisions.
Those can be summed up in the concept that once Sadam was gone, we could turn over the keys and go home. Mission Accomplished.
Won't re-hash to much history here. But that might have worked had we co-opted instead of disbanding subordinate Iraqi security organizations. Rather than turning them into enemies and partisans opposed to United States policy goals.
So, onto the Russian Experience (thus far).
The highest levels of Russian national security appear to have hatched a pre-ordained narrative. One that if you disagreed with was likely to get you posted to a remote outpost in Siberia or worse.
Like the United States, senior Russian Officials (ie Putin and Co) seemed convinced that there was a large and established resistance base which could be quickly leveraged to enable a very quick incursion.
I suspect, but can not know, that these "resistance" groups also took some monetary compensation. And probably also sent reports up the chain that would fit the established narratives.
In this case it wasn't weapons of mass destruction but Nazi organizations. And the idea that vast swaths of the Russian speaking population in Ukraine wanted to be Russian and not Ukrainian.
Let's continue the analogy. Remember how I said that the United States made disastrous force employment decisions based on hubris.
In fact, General Franks consulted war planners (not politicians) whom originally planned to invade Iraq with somewhere around half a million soldiers and support.
I think the number of ground troops was originally around 300-400k not including Air Force and Navy support.
Instead, the number that actually invaded was about 160k again not including Air Force and Navy support. Also, the idea was to get in, take Sadam out, establish a new government and get out...all in 90 -120 days.
We all know how that worked out. The reason it did not work out was that Unites States elected officials and senior leaders had a pre-ordained view of how things were going to work out.
They did not want to listen to any negative or non-conformational views. Probably sounds familiar to Russian generals trying to fight the current conflict.
Back to Ukraine. As best I can discern from mining different coverage of the initial days of the Ukraine Russia war the Russians had a very similar plan (generically) as the U.S had in its Iraq invasion.
I think it was supposed to be a coordinated three-pronged lightening attack by forces operating independently of each other with a total of about 180,000 soldiers from the North, the East and the South.
These bulk of these forces were essentially hulk smash conscript mechanized infantry forces supported by Armor. With the preponderance of the Armor being older and manned by a mix on conscript, contract and professionals. Supporting Electronic warfare would have been better trained. Then you add in Air Force and Navy assets.
The real important part of the plan was Airborne and special forces taking control of key infrastructure, possibly some type of decapitation of Ukrainian government using the same.
I suspect that the good old exile resistance groups were supposed to take part as well providing an augmentation to special forces.
In short. Quickly remove the existing government using special forces, light the fuse on a popular uprising then have the hammer of hulk smash come in and establish control of a cowed population.
Then establish new political areas carved up that would be nominally autonomous but directly under Moscow control. Hold some "elections" neutering Ukraine and its western aspirations.
Specialized air assault to take over key infrastructure. The idea was to present facts on the ground as the new reality.
And of course, the Russian would be welcomed with open arms as the Russian speaking Ukrainians threw off the Ukrainian yoke and rid themselves of the "Nazi" organizations that were suppressing them and oppressing Russian culture (or vice versa).
Both the Russian efforts and the United States efforts both suffered from hubris, bad assumptions and badly executed intelligence.
In the Russian case there were a number of glaring assumptions.
The biggest is that Ukraine was no longer unprepared as it had been in say 2014.
I'm not saying they were ready, but they were more ready than they had been in 2014. Despite serious warnings, many in Ukraine believed a full-scale invasion was never going to happen. There was even push back on those countries and orgs warning it was going to happen. However, there was enough planning for the possibility that Ukraine was not entirely flat footed. Take by surprise. A bit.
The Ukrainian military had already been moving away from the Soviet doctrine and towards a mish mash of NATO and local doctrine suited to Ukraine. This makes Ukrainian soldiers essentially better than their Russian counterparts for the type of war they would be fighting. Plus, they had home field advantage. This was no longer going to be a quick effort for the Russians had they actually done an honest assessment of Ukraine,
The second largest was the assumption that all Russian speaking Ukrainians would want to rejoin Mother Russia. Another big, failed assumption.
Remember these Russian speakers could see what happened to areas of Ukraine that had fallen under Russian control. It's not pretty there. That is no secret. Also, Ukraine politics circa 2022 is far different then 2014. Better to be fairly free (not saying by any stretch its perfect) under Ukrainian government looking west then under the iron fist control of corrupt insular Moscow appointed officials.
Finally, the number and type of troops required. I am by no means an Army military planner.
Going back to Iraq , the population of Iraq in about 2003 was about 40 million. Further Iraq had at that point been fairly declawed military wise after roughly 20 years of war and sanctions. The population of Ukraine was about 40 million in 2022. However, not declawed.
So, if qualified United States war planners (prior to political intervention) estimated that roughly 500,000 would be required for a successful invasion of Iraq in 2003, my back of the hand math says at least that number would be required to successfully invade Ukraine. Actually, probably add another 100,000 to that number. Given respective military readiness of the two countries. The Russians probably invaded with a force of about 200,000. Or roughly 1/2 to 1/3 of the number that likely would have been required.
As of right now according to most public information the Russians are stalled or in retrograde in most areas. Some estimates indicate that of the roughly 200,000 that entered about 40-50,000k are dead. With another 40-50,000 combat ineffective, injured, captured or deserted.
In my mind the real question is why, when to invasion faltered, did the Russians just not send more soldiers in. Well, that is the crux of the whole issue.
So here is some back of the hand math..
Russia probably has about 1.3 - 1.5 military personnel total. About 900,000 are active, another 250,000 are reserve, and another 250,000 are paramilitary.
Realize that of the estimated 900,000 ish only about 250,000 to say 300,00 are active-duty ground forces.
Yes, the Russians have a substantial reserve.
On paper about 2 million reservists. But these are not western reservists. These are former conscripts who may not have worn a uniform in decades and are of questionable use.
The reservists who are likely wartime reserve ready are probably a fraction of that.
Again, pure guesswork here. But let's call it 200,000 at best.
And remember these reservists are not with their equipment or units. They are at home and would need to be recalled, retrained ect. Then integrated with the larger force. So not an overnight fix
So, let's do some more math.
So, we have at the high end 300,000 active-duty ground forces. And another 200,00 wartime reserves. Thats the starting point.
I am guessing that the Russian invasion force was likely 60 percent reserves and 40 percent active duty.
From twitter, and other reports it looks like the majority of the ground pounders were not what we will call the A team. More like the B or C team but with some exercises under thier belt
I'm guess the active-duty element was the supervision. In short the officers and senior enlisted as well as higher headquarters, and leadership.
So that would mean about 40,000 of the active-duty force of 300,000 were part of the invasion.
That leaves 260,000 active forces for the whole of Russia and Syria.
Let's estimate another 10,000 in Syria with a 1/3 relationship for training deployment and refit.
So that's 30,000 devoted to Syria.
That leaves 230,000 for the defense of all of Russia. And they live in a bad neighborhood. And there is always the need to keep the best close to Moscow - because regime security.
Russia is a big country. I am guessing the active-duty Russian ground forces are pretty much stretched right now.
So why not take some of that 200,000 wartime reserves. Well, it's complicated. Even Putin can't do that without some serious consequences
First, if Russian leadership has effectively created an echo chamber in terms of news that reached the average populace.
To draw a very loose analogy, after 9/11 citizens of the United States were told essentially to go shopping. As the military had events under control.
And for nearly two decades, a small number of Americans routinely rotated in and out of war zones. And with minor exceptions the Unite States only accessed its active reserve component.
Understand that the United States has an active reserve (operational reserve) component that is essentially held to the same standard as the active force. These forces are generally organized into cohesive units and are generally aligned with active units. Are they as ready as active. not always. But they are generally ready. Then there is what I will call the inactive reserve (wartime reserve). Consisting of former active members who have recently completed active duty and retirees.
Yes, during the height of Iraq and Afghanistan some U.S forces were called back from inactive reserve status. But by and large it was active reserves. Russia does not have an equivalent of active reserves
Going back to the Russian echo chamber, right now the Russian population by and large believes he special military operation is generally going to plan.
Remember that the Russian military does not really have an equivalent active reserve (operational reserve) . Also realize that certain things have to happen for Russia to activate its wartime reserve. Mainly they have to be at war.
The United States never declared war on Afghanistan or Iraq.
Instead, the United States undertook these actions under the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) passed just after the 9/11 attacks.
And all sorts of convoluted policies enabling things with the AUMF the next 20 years took place. It was badly stretched 7 degrees of kevin bacon to make things work
Russia likewise is not a war. It is undertaking a special military operation. Kind of the Russian version of an authorization of military force
So, in order for Russia to activate its wartime reserves, it would essentially have to declare that its special military operation is not working.
That might punch a hole in the echo chamber. Especially as its kind of hard to hide 50 or 60 thousand soldiers being recalled to active duty to go serve in a war which was supposed to be won. And it might have consequences for Putin and company.
So as a result, Russia has instead decided to recruit. They are offering lots of money in impoverished communities to sign a contract and go fight.
Also, some rumors that prisoners are being offered an out to go to the front lines
The problem is these new recruits are not necessarily of the same quality or any quality as former conscripts. They are going to be the D+ / C- squad. Assuming they are given more training then being handed a weapon and armored personnel vehicle
The question, however, is how long Russia can sustain combat losses and replace them with the largely unqualified replacements.
I short, again using the Iraq war.
How long until Russia decides a "surge" is required. If it comes to that, Ukraine may have a bad time of it.
As the resources that Russia is currently leaving on the shelf will become fully accessible. And remember quantity has a quality all of its own.
Or will the Russian government decide to make its own version of Mission Accomplished and sell its people another message in the echo chamber.
Time will tell.
But I almost promise you this. The Russian General Military staff is probably already planning changes to its structure so this never happens again.
As the Russian military has a bloody nose.
And all the "good" attention its armed forces and its equipment got (from their perspective) in the last decade or so ....and the associated arms sales.. have been negated to a point.
So If I had to give a grade for Russia right now I would do it as follows
Small scale expeditionary conflict in permissive environments against non-peers = B+
Large scale conflict against near peer in semi non permissive environments = D / D+
