Total Pageviews

Tuesday, January 25, 2022

Because I can - How Russia will manage the coming conflict

 This is my opinion. perhaps misguided but here goes.

Underline updated 1/26/


Russia is going to manage the perhaps upcoming conflict with the west by Exploiting our national security architecture and the seams that you could drive a truck through. So what would I do if I was in the Russian driver seat.

But first they have to generate a plausible, sellable reason for the Russian domestic audience to consume. And a plausible reason for propogandists to echo chamber and sell on the internet and even some U.S prime time talk tv channels. 

So what is that going to be. Well if you are able to keep the maskrova and false flag ops from inside Ukraine from happening, what is left on the table is repeating a falsehood over and over until its seems legitimate.

In this case the refusal of NATO and the U.S to shut the door to NATO expansion. And talks between the U.S and Russia - without the Ukrainians being at the table. Which is a very very bad optic. 

Last time we did that we essentially destabilized Afghanistan, as their own people saw the U.S negotiating without their own nations leadership there. 

So the U.S has now given its response. Which I am sure Russian propaganda will begin to amplify in social media. As well as media personalities  in the United States whom seem for some reason to have an affinity for Putin and company. And those whom also strongly believe the United States should pursue essentially Isolationist policies. To the first group, I think they are getting something. The second group seems to have legitimate (although in my opinion misplaced) core beliefs that I will none the less respect.  

"WASHINGTON (AP) — The U.S. has made no concessions to the main Russian demands over Ukraine and NATO in a long-awaited written response delivered to Russia on Wednesday in Moscow, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said."

....

Blinken said the U.S. response, delivered to the Russian Foreign Ministry by U.S. Ambassador to Russia John Sullivan, gave up no ground on “core principles” such as NATO’s open-door membership policy and the alliance’s military presence in Eastern Europe

......

“If the West continues its aggressive course, Moscow will take the necessary retaliatory measures,” Lavrov said.

But he indicated Russia wouldn’t wait forever. “We won’t allow our proposals to be drowned in endless discussions,” he said

https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-europe-russia-united-states-moscow-72856781c3b92640d03c5e954488ba90

1. Undermine the unity of any possible NATO response in Europe. Now, well now that it is pretty chilly out. Gas is a great weapon. Simply put make the implied threat to turn the spigots down or off. And make it clear that any support for a response to an intervention will have a literal chilling effect.

Well they have done that, as NATO can not seem to mount a singular response - good luck with that most days. Further, realize that even if Ukraine was a member of NATO or a NATO country was attacked by Russia.  Article 5 does not require countries have an armed response. Just a response. 

The EU. is currently also - lets just say out of sorts. The largest economy -Germany - has essentially decided to sit this one out. Content to send Helmets to Ukraine - and a mere 5000 at that.

Saw a great quote on twitter for Russia Television - Germany. I read such outlets to get an idea of what the Russians are selling informationally.

"Der Februar wird kalt und heiß zugleich, aber nicht ruhig" 

https://de.rt.com/meinung/130439-februar-wird-kalt-und-heiss/

The rough translation being that feburary will be cold and warm at the same time, but not peaceful. 

Which is a subtle or not so subtle way to inform German readers what could happen if Germany moves to the pro Ukraine camp. Warm in ukraine with explosions and war, and cold in your house as there is not gas to heat it or generate electricity to heat it as the Russians have turned off the spigots to save possibility of damage to pipelines - unless you turn on the North Stream :)


2. Be everywhere and nowhere. Especially at sea. I have posted this using publicly available information, but when you see a Russian corvette or larger, draw about an 800 mile circle around it. As those ships carry the Kaliber class missile which has a land attack variant that supposedly has around that range.

The Russian exercise's of the coast of Ireland most likely have a bunch of ships capable 

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10434583/EU-set-unity-Russia-invasion-fears-mount.html

Then you have what I will term the med squadron. Also likely capable 

If you go here there is a pretty good OSINT breakdown. 

https://russianfleetanalysis.blogspot.com/

Which right now has ships to the west of England, positioned to make any Eastbound transit of reinforcing forces hard. Lots of ships in the med to the south and more in the Black sea. 

** something I saw on Twitter that proposes a decent reason why the Russians decided to do their navy drills South West of Ireland***

https://twitter.com/MacSDavid/status/1484882882808233986/photo/1

Reminds me that not all Cyber is non Kinetic and Kinetic effects at the right place can be the same as a devastating zero day cyber event




In my opinion we would be hard pressed to locate track and isolate all these groups effectively. 

As they are not really concentrated. 

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/43965/russias-landing-ships-are-headed-to-the-mediterranean-to-join-a-growing-armada

3. Make trouble elsewhere. Send a message that perhaps its wise to stay out of any coming conflict

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/44005/russian-and-syrian-fighter-jets-execute-joint-patrol-along-syrias-border-with-israel

The message sent here is hey Israel you might want to consider sitting this one out. 

https://nationalpost.com/pmn/news-pmn/russia-china-hold-naval-drills-in-arabian-sea-report

4. Spread your forces globally and create ambiguity regarding intentions

https://nationalpost.com/pmn/news-pmn/russia-china-hold-naval-drills-in-arabian-sea-report

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/21/russia-to-flex-muscles-with-navy-drills-involving-all-its-fleets

https://www.timesofisrael.com/china-russia-and-iran-to-launch-joint-naval-drill-on-friday/

5. Then there is the whole "gap" in the U.S National Security Architecture - again mentioned in earlier posts. Exploit it.

Boils down to this. The U.S National Security architecture is designed around artificial global areas. Europe, Middle East, Pacific ect. Each of these areas has a Headquarters whom has its own culture and staff process and command and control procedures that are not exactly interoperable.  And each of these compete with each other for resources. Long gone are the days that a war was run out of the pentagon with centralized planning. 

So why is that a problem. Simple. If the other side(s) decide to spread the defense, we make it easier. As we have these things called geographical Combatant Commanders who are all trying to deal with issues in their respective back yards. 

And the force allocation sometimes boils down to whom makes the best staff argument on whom gets what. 

So if things happen in all the areas at the same time its a perfect storm.

https://www.newsweek.com/russia-ukraine-drills-navy-iran-china-blinken-1671470


Thought I would add to this post with something I saw on  Twitter this morning





Phoney war redux 2022 - are the Russians going to come?

 Well, looks like my 96 hour estimate has come and gone. 

So I am not going to venture forth any guesses on timeframe when events in Ukraine or the surrounding area will or not kick off. 

However, in general I think the situation is much like a bowman how has loaded and arrow and started to draw the string. I'm not sure how long that bowman can stand with a drawn bow before letting loose the arrow.  

It reminds me, historically of the phoney war in WWII. A situation that everyone knew - or was pretty sure would explode - but simmered for about 8 months or so until it exploded. 

I am sure there are plenty of much smarter people with better and classified information streams that are drinking lots of coffee and red bull pouring over estimates and reading tea leaves as best they can 

Now, don't tell the Ukrainians that things are not already hot on their eastern border. Its a daily low / high intensity conflict in a localized area. 

There is also much room for a strategic private, or maybe lower grade officer to make a mistake or take to much initiative. In short its is getting dangerous out there.



The west in general has, in my opinion, few options to resolve this quickly. While there has been mention of imposing crushing sanctions on Russia, those sanctions won't have any immediate effect. So even if that arrow is let go, it is going to take some time for it to reach its intended target. 

That leaves essentially military force / deterrence across all spectrums. Which in reading the global news seems like is being pursued.  The problem is a time space issue.

The U.S and its allies have to get there from here. That means either via Air or Land (Sea is pretty much out of the question)  and over or through Germany (more on that later). I rule out the Sea option as essentially you have either the Baltic (pretty much a denied environment on a good day) the Black Sea (ditto plus getting through the Dardanelles with treaty restrictions) or maybe someplace in Southern Europe and then overland. But maybe I am missing an option.

Perhaps if only to increase the costs to the Russians in any invasion. 

But the situation is not pretty. Especially politically. Angela is gone, and here replacement in Germany is much less on solid footing. 

And it looks like Germany has essentially foreclosed on any direct support militarily to Ukraine. Actually more than that Germany has prohibited Baltic states that use its weaponry from transferring any of those to Ukraine. 

The million dollar question is as to if Germany will allow U.S and other more supportive allies to transverse Germany and use it basing. They key part of that being the Atlantic ports. 

To go a bit cold war here, The U.S and NATO spent multiple billions with a B to design infrastructure to support transfer large amounts of war material into German. As in re-engineering bridges to support our main battle tanks. Not so much in eastern Europe, and the infrastructure built back then may not be in place. It might not be possible to easily get main battle tanks and other heavy equipment even into Poland. 

Notice that I mentioned surrounding area. Our good friend Putin has made it clear that he views restoration of the geopolitical security situation the Soviet Union had as his priority. Remember, this means not just Ukraine, but the Baltics as well. 

He could just as easily decide to turn north and go after the Baltic states as well as Ukraine. 

So where does that leave Ukraine, and what would I do if I was a decision maker advising the West and Ukraine.

Well, first construct a good speed bump. That speed bump should only be designed to slow down any Soviet advance. Second disperse forces into small but potent groups that do not require positive command and control. Third, insurgency. But this time cause it not fight it. 

Provide enough deadly portable weapons to the dispersed Ukraine forces to make it really painful for Russia. Expect that most large scale Ukrainian formations will be toast within 72 hours. 

Essentially distributed lethality ashore. Take the composite warfare commander concept from the U.S Navy and implement it with whatever forces Ukraine an allies can muster. Have a set of preplanned responses, rally points and stores. 

Assume your Command and Control will fall apart, 

Don't make your forces a target, make the Russians focus everywhere. That's at the tactical level in the Ukraine area of operations. 

At the operational level assume pretty much from the East Coast of the United States to the Suez canal and to the Russian border is your area of operations. If this goes high and right it will not in my opinion be contained to Ukraine. It will span the area mentioned above.

It as mentioned in earlier posts may spread to other areas. Especially in Asia. No telling what the Chinese might do if we suddenly start moving ISR and other assets to support Ukraine and that area of operations. Ditto for the Russians

In fact based on the the re-organization of the Russian military in the past 20 years we should expect problems in Asia from the Russians. 

The Chinese, may depending on their own calculus utilize the situation to advance their own goals (think Taiwan) independent of the Russians, with tacit interoperability.

The nightmare of having to deal with two low/high intensity conflicts a world apart will likely strain  Western resources on a good day. 

And if that nightmare does happen, the post mortem on the events that transpired will likely cause some serious reflection on the organization and structure of the United States Military and it allies.

I can only hope the Russian take the arrow out of the bow, stand down and claim victory. Perhaps there is some way we can give them a way to save face.  

Sunday, January 16, 2022

What is old is new

 found my old paper



In most western studies of war Military Deception is often perceived as notionally being practiced most effectively by the weaker military power against the stronger. In addition, the actual employment of integrated military deception has ebbed and flowed in Western military operations. At times its employment has been viewed as integral to the prosecution of western warfare, and at other times a mere afterthought to military operations and planning. In the Western, and in particular the United States Military, the employment of Military Deception is enjoying a resurgence. This resurgence is in part due to the inherent advantages of its employment that have become clear in recent conflicts.

This paper, however, will not delve into the value of Military Deception or its western applications. Rather, this paper will explore in the Soviet, and later Russian Federation, employment of maskirovka to accomplish Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic goals. This study of Russian maskirovka is extremely relevant as the tactics, techniques and procedures may be employed against both United States forces, and its allies, in both the ongoing conflicts - as well as future ones. 

To accomplish this objective this paper will first provide a short examination of maskirovka and its contrast to western Military Deception. Next the paper will delve into periods of time in which either the Soviet or successor Russian Federation employed maskirovka. Part of this examination will include the actions that forces opposing Russia undertook to employ or counter maskirovka.  In particular this paper will examine the consolidation of Soviet control over the Basmachi in Central Asia, World War II, The Cold War, Afghanistan and Chechnya. 

Maskirovka what it is and what it is not

Many individuals have attempted to translate Maskirovka directly into western military thought. Unfortunately, Maskirovka is a way of thinking that is applicable to military operations rather than a direct correlation to any western military definition of Military Deception. However:

The Soviet Military Encyclopedia defines Maskirovka as:

a form of security for the combat actions and daily activity of the forces; a complex of measures, directed at deceiving the enemy relative to the presence and location of forces(fleet), various combat objectives, their status, battle readiness, and also the plans of command 


The above definition has a doctrinal flavor with  “combat objectives” would seeming to imply an operational or tactical level of employment. However the Russian military has demonstrated a proclivity to employ Maskirovka  on Strategic, Operational and Tactical levels of war across the full range of military operations. The importance to Maskirovka  in Russian military thought is demonstrated by General Shtemenko whom noted the successful employment across Strategic Operational and Tactical levels of war against German forces in World War II :

This system of operational deceptive measures proved its worth. History has shown that the enemy was profoundly misled concerning our real intentions 



 While Maskirovka’s success against the German armies on the Eastern Front is not in doubt, General Shtemenko was not the first to employ it - nor did he invent it.

In the Russian military culture Maskirovka is embedded. While it may be tempting to ascribe the Russian proclivity to employ it to classical thinkers such as Sun Tzu or others, the reality is actually a little more complicated.  It is true that the influence of Eastern thought was branded into the Russian military culture. In particular with the experiences of waves of Mongol and Tartar invasions:

As centuries passed the nomadic Mongols settled and were assimilated into Russian society. However, their battlefield techniques continued to flourish.  


However, in addition to being exposed to Eastern military thought Russian military culture has the experience of having to face periodic invasions from nearly all quadrants of the compass.  In defending against this variety of threats the Russian military incorporated many influences from these traditional threats in order to implement suitable offensive and defensive measures.  In the realm of military deception,  Maskirovka is a unique adaptation that resulted from a diverse range of Strategic, Operational and Tactical experiences originating from multiple geographical directions. 

While Russian use of  Maskirovka seemingly first came into commonplace western military consciousness in World War II, the tendency of Russian military culture to employ  Maskirovka, and its relevance to current conflicts can be first seen Central Asia in years following World War I.


Post World War I Soviet Military Deception in Soviet Asia

In the aftermath of the Soviet exit from WWI, large portions of the former Russian Empire needed to be brought under the control of the newly formed Soviet Union. In many areas, the establishment of complete control over regions previously part of the recently dissolved Russian Empire was not easily accomplished. In the area of modern day Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan establishing such control proved especially challenging . 

To accomplish the objective, Soviet forces would have to overcome the “strong resistance”   of the Basmachi whom were Muslim and were resisting the alien Soviets as well at the associated alteration of their traditional structures .  To overcome the resistance of the Basmachi, Soviet authorities employed a variety of brutal tactics inclusive of the “scorched-ear campaigns and mass deportations of the local populations” .  However, one of perhaps more effective tactics the tactics employed was essentially perfidy. 

 In essence Soviet security forces undertook to organized soldiers whom “masqueraded as basmachi in order to intercept weapons and rebels crossing Soviet borders, and to ambush real basmachi rebels”  .  In the current western military environment it might be possible to avoid the label of perfidy given the non-state status of the basmachi. However, in practice, the employment of security or military forces clothed and equipped and attempting to be perceived as insurgent groups would likely give a commander and his legal staff substantial concerns regarding the legality of this activity. 

Regardless, on a practical front, the Soviet use of this deceptive action likely led to an ambiguity increasing problem for ‘legitimate’ basmachi forces. By introducing a degree of uncertainty into an already fractured group, Soviet security forces were likely able to open up seems that could be later exploited by both intelligence and military operations. In many ways this summarizes the goal of full scope Maskirovka which is to utilize all aspects of military capabilities to weaken the adversary.

Furthermore, the possibility of engineering basmachi on basmachi  violence via deceptive messaging becomes more viable. According to Eviskov, the basmachi ‘s were finally brought under control by “brutal terror, effective intelligence operations and indigenous forces” . However, the use of military deception likely served as a powerful tool to enable these lines of operation by creating uncertainty on the tactical and operational levels for the basmachi forces. While, employment of Maskirovka both prior to World War I and in the interwar years by the Soviet state is not perhaps well known, the use of Maskirovka  during World War II is well documented.

The Soviet- German deception battle on the Eastern Front WW II

The Soviet military continued to utilize deception or maskirovka  across the full Range of Military Operations to impact the Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic spectrums.  In fact the Soviet military became more and more competent in its use. The ultimate defeat of the Germans on the Eastern front during World War II had more to do with maskirovka then anything else. In short, the Soviets were able to decrease the ambiguity of the German forces. These German forces believed that they had superior capabilities based on strategic misperceptions of the German Field Armies Ost (FHO) . This was accomplished by basic Military Deception as well as innovative counter-intelligence operations which enabled more complex military deception operations

The Soviet Army demonstrated an “outstanding aptitude”  for “camouflage and concealment at the tactical, operational and strategic levels” .  By 1944 this success was extremely apparent when German Intelligence “routinely underestimated Soviet offensive strengths by 50 percent” . A direct result of this intelligence failure was that: “ three Germans Armies ceased to exist” .  However, the epic defeats suffered by the German military in 1944 had their roots in the extremely well thought out Soviet maskirovka  efforts in the preceding years. 

Time, combined with a lack of German airborne ISR platforms meant that the German Military on the eastern front had little to no effective ability to obtain valuable intelligence from the air . Furthermore the effective operational security measures undertaken by the Soviet military crated significant gaps in the German Intelligence Picture at the Strategic and Operational levels as: “everything behind the front line was a “blur” . With the inability to collect effective intelligence via aerial means or Signals Intelligence  beyond the tactical level the German military was at a significant disadvantage.  In an attempt to remedy this gap German Military forces attempted to form Human Intelligence networks.

For Germany the concept was seemingly an elegant solution to a complex problem: simply capture a Soviet prisoner and turn them to your side. This activity was an outgrowth of the German “aussenkommando”    that had been designed to gain intelligence from captured Soviet prisoners as well as to use the same to develop espionage and sabotage networks on the eastern front . As Perry Biddiscombe relates in his work Unternehmen Zeppelin: The Deployment of SS Saboteurs and Spies in the Soviet Union 1941-1945; German military units specialized in identifying captured Soviet soldiers whom might be vulnerable to being ‘turned’. Once these individuals had been identified training, sometimes significant in nature, would be provided. Once this training was complete these individuals would be inserted in an attempt to develop intelligence assets behind Soviet lines. 

Some of the attempts to insert these agents were extremely elegant. In one case a captured Soviet Company Commander underwent plastic surgery in order to imitate battle injuries and was air dropped in with his wife  in an attempt to establish a network.  However, the security of the operation was penetrated by a Soviet agent, a tailor, whom was preparing his authentic uniforms  . 

To compound the German operational security failure, the actual insertion failed as well. The former Company Commander and his wife were captured shortly after insertion - in part due to incorrect uniform wear . To add insult to injury to the German efforts, the newly captured former company commander as quickly re-turned and used to lure in follow on operatives.   Unfortunately, many of the agents whom were inserted met the same fate as the company commander. These compromised networks were then expertly utilized as part of the wider Maskirovka  activities to spread disinformation back to German intelligence. 

As mentioned previously, the lack of Airborne ISR assets forced the Germans into dabbling in HUMINT networks. Both of these intelligence activities were fairly unsuccessful in delivering the much needed intelligence for the German military in order to conduct effective operations. Perhaps the only modestly effective German intelligence gathering enterprise was the German SIGINT effort.  However, again then this enterprise delivered only an effective tactical product  for German Military. Ironically, these: 

tactical indicators that contradicted the strategic indicators of enemy intentions upon which the FHO had already based it assumptions  .  


Worse, much of the strategic indicators received were, unfortunately exactly what the Soviet Army wanted the German military to have via compromised HUMINT networks .

In conclusion, the integrated Soviet maskirovka had the effect of seriously degrading the capability of the German intelligence apparatus. This degradation was achieved by employing disinformation through ‘turned’ captured German intelligence assets, as well as employing:

The full Soviet armoury (sic) included camouflage and concealment, imitation, simulation, demonstration manoeuvers (sic), and radio deception” .  


However, the key component to these tactical and operational measures was that they were part of a broader strategic plan. This strategic plan incorporated an accurate understanding of the German military decision process and its default perceptions. Finally, the Soviet military implicitly understood at the highest levels that Maskirovka  could serve as a vital force multiplier  to defeat its most recent invader.  

Prior to World War II most Soviet Military maskirovka had been on establishing Soviet state influence within the traditional borders of the Russian Empire. During World War II initial Maskirovka  focused on regaining control of territory from invaders. However, in the closing days of World War II the Soviet military would for the first time utilize its now highly capable maskirovka skills for offensive operations.

The Soviet deception against Japan in World War II. 

Towards the end of World War II, the Soviet military employed skills learned from the eastern front against Japanese forces in the Manchurian Theater of operations. Major Butts relates in great detail the exact means employed by the Soviet Armies in this theatre . However, the salient point of his account is that the Soviet military employed maskirovka on the Strategic, Operational and Tactical levels in order to achieve complete surprise over Japanese forces. While it cannot be conclusively proven, it could be argued that the successful employment may have had some degree of impact on the decision of the United States to employ nuclear weapons over two Japanese cities when it did. Had the war not ended when it did, it is highly likely that the Soviet military may have made significant territorial gains. In the post war environment, the Soviet Union would increasingly employ maskirovka to achieve its ends. 



Czechoslovakia – Afghanistan 1.0. 

The reasons for the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia are interesting but not particularly relevant to this paper. How it was accomplished, however, is an intriguing case study in the Strategic employment of maskirovka. In this case maskirovka was employed to diminish perceived threats to Soviet Diplomatic and Military interests outside the borders of the Soviet Union. While it was likely clear to the Czechoslovakian government that the Soviet Union was not pleased with the direction Czechoslovakia was taking, the Soviet military nonetheless managed to obtain complete surprise. Using classic Soviet maskirovka  the Soviet military:

lowered fuel and ammunition stocks of the Czechoslovakian army by transferring these to East Germany supposedly as part of an “exercise”  . 


The Soviets were then able to further decrease the perception of Czechoslovakia of any armed intervention by scheduling an “unexpected military exercise”  , which in fact would serve as the vehicle for the actual invasion. The result was that the Soviets were able to effectively achieve strategic level surprise against Czechoslovakia using many of the same maskirovka techniques employed successfully against German and Japanese forces in World War II. 

The repeated successes of maskirovka first against the Germans, later against the Japanese and then effectively against Czechoslovakia likely emboldened the Soviet power structure. This gave the power structure the confidence that such operations could be successfully undertaken outside the proper boarders of the Soviet Union in support of  Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic goals. As Valenta says; “the Story of Czechoslovakia in 1968 repeated itself in 1979 on a lesser scale, but in even a more daring and bold fashion” . On this occasion the target of Soviet goals would be Afghanistan.


The Soviet deception in Afghanistan 

Afghanistan was in many ways Czechoslovakia 2.0. The same ambiguity decreasing methods were employed. However in Afghanistan the Soviet Military employed the full range of experiences it had accumulated since the involvement in with the Basmachi in the post-World War I years. 

From the basmachi experiences the Soviets slightly altered the fake rebel band concept. For the initial Afghanistan invasion, the Soviet military employed Soviet Special forces soldiers from its Central Asian republics that looked and spoke as locals .  While first employed in the basmachi  experience, the Soviet Military had previously employed similar tactics in Polish front in the 1920’s when a Soviet “diversionary”  :

Calvary brigade for “special assignments”  with a strength of more than two thousand cavalryman…..all dressed in Polish Uniform. Much later these diversionary units received the name Spetsnaz, now given to all special forces of the GRU .


Likewise for the invasion of Afghanistan the forces were Spetsnaz but dressed in Afghan Army uniforms . This enabled this force to obtain the element of surprise and successfully breach presidential security and execute the leader of Afghanistan .  While there were a variety of other elements of Maskirovka involved in the highly successful and surprise operation, the employment of Soviet Special forces in Afghan uniforms was a key component.

However, the employment of Soviet security services in misleading attire was not limited to the initial invasion. In fact, the Soviets drew similarities between the earlier Basmachi struggle and “thought it appropriate to carry over to Afghanistan the methods and tactics the Cheka had used against the basmachi”  .  These units:

The KGB ‘Cascade’ units operated in parallel throughout the country. They were given broad powers. As well as terrorist actions, sabotage and recruitment of agents, they were active among the tribes in disrupting the activities of the Mujahedin, and in the setting-up of self-defense units.   


However, the Soviet Forces did not limit themselves to simply using fake mujahedeen to combat real mujahedeen. In Afghanistan they employed an integrated information operations campaign designed to create or exploit gaps between the mujahedeen. 

Ironically, the information campaign employed as part of maskirovka efforts by the Soviet’s may have been slightly too effective. It is clear that the deceptive information operations targeting mujahedeen were successful in engineering mujahedeen on mujahedeen violence.   However, the information operations success:

“contributed to an atmosphere of mutual distrust and suspicion within the mujahedeen that outlasted the Soviet occupation and led to a bloody civil war in the 1990’s”  . 


Afghanistan demonstrated that he Soviet military and leadership retained the ability to exercise maskirovka in order to achieve strategic surprise and to obtain tactical effects. However, at the same time the Soviet military had lost the ability to integrate these at the operational level and on the tactical level within its non-specialized conventional forces. Books such as the “Bear Went over the Mountain” and “The other side of the Mountain” offer great detail on how Soviet conventional forces were seemingly no longer able to effectively employ Maskirovka in Afghanistan. 

The Relevance of  maskirovka to Modern conflicts

From the case studies above that cover post-World War I until the Afghanistan occupation, Soviet military doctrine demonstrated a remarkable ability to maskirovka across the Strategic, Operational and Tactical levels. This integration permitted the Soviet forces to gain advantages - and victory - that might not have been otherwise possible. From the  Czechoslovakian intervention up until the recent Georgians Russian War these skills were to attrite to the point where the Soviet military was essentially defeated or failed to perform. This poor performance was a result of the failure to employ maskirovka in an integrated fashion - on Strategic, Operational and Tactical levels to achieve Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic goals. However, the recent Georgian – Russian war seems to indicate that Russian government and its military may have re-learned the capability to successfully employ maskirovka .

Prior to these somewhat recent developments the Russian military experience in  Chechnya reveals some worrisome implications for the spread of effective maskirovka among non-state actors. It is key to understand that in the dissolution of the Soviet Union, many of the non-ethnic Soviet Spetznaz likely returned to their home regions within the Caucus’s and the Central Asia republics. The tactics employed by the resistance groups in Chechnya clearly show their linage with Soviet era maskirovka. 

Some of these examples include “Chechen fighters routinely dressed in Russian uniforms” ,  claims to possess “Nuclear Weapons” , the use of “provocative fake radio messages that were intended to be intercepted” , use of a “Radio jamming system to limit the influence that Russian mass media might have” . Furthermore, Chechens were able to successfully project power in attacks in Budennovsk (1995) , Kizlyar (1996) , at Sea on the Black Sea Ferry Eurasia (1996) , and in the air by hijacking a Cypriot Airlines flight (1996) . 

While these events in themselves may have a parallel with the activities of other terrorist groups there is a unfortunate possibility that non-state actors may also be learning the lessons of maskirovka and be attempting to integrate across strategic, operational and tactical levels to obtain Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic goals. 



Conclusion 

In an era, where tactics among non state actors quickly can spread via a networked and globalized system it will become increasingly important to understand some future enemies may be influenced by the Soviet and later Russian Federation culture of maskirovka. Furthermore, the Soviet ‘school’ of maskirovka was widely spread among client states during the Cold War. It will be vitally important for future military operations to implicitly understand that some of these states and actors will not ascribe to western definitions of Military Deception. These states and actors can - and likely will - instead use more integrated maskirovka  or maskirovka derived means that are not often in accordance with the western way of war. This will require that western military planners seeking to employ integrated Military Deception as part of resurgent importance understand that the opposing force – state or non-state – may be doing exactly the same. However, the other side may be playing an entirely different game with very different rules.





Thursday, January 13, 2022

the Russians are coming - maybe?



Another update here. Looks like some of the Russians may have got caught with their hands in at least one cookie jar

https://www.cnn.com/2022/01/14/politics/us-intelligence-russia-false-flag/index.html

for those that don't know Russian history, this is an especially favored method. Goes back at leas to the 1700's when the Russian empire was expanding. One of the tricks was to take a group of Russians whom looked spoke and acted like the lets say X country people, and insert them into X's territory and then actually attack real Russians from X territory. This would then give the Russians pretext to respond. 

The really sneaky part is that the real Russians being attacked were often unaware that the fake Russian attackers attacking them were actually Russian and pulled no punches. 

With the great side benefit that sometimes the Russians pretending to be from country X got killed and hence plausible deniability.

Another great trick was for fake Russians pretending to be from country X attack real Russians inflicting great casualties. Then - and this works best when not all the people from X know each other real well - use the attack to bolster credibility with  X. The natural progression being leading real people from country X into a nice big trap where the leaders of any resistance from country X are captured.

Actually wrote about the above example many moons ago in college. And this was in the days before electronic warfare, catfishing and any other modern means to update the old trick to be much more believable and dangerous. 

So to conclude, looks like the Russians are already looking to establish pretext, and some of them got caught.

However, in this case, catching on Russian false flag or Maskirovka, is like catching one roach in your kitchen,, there are always more.  

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_military_deception

-----------------------------------------------

- quick update here on 1/14/2022...again not to push things further to the right but Al Jazeera is reporting the Russian FM has given a next week deadline for NATO and the US to cave to demands..

Now has a country ever invaded before a deadline? Never happens right?  But, again in my opinion the number of forces that Russia has ready to go (something like 100,000 on the border with another 75,000 in quick reserve) is probably not sustainable for a very long time. 

Its analogous in my opinion to pulling a loaded weapon out, training it at a target, and holding it level. The first 10 or so seconds are that bad, but after a minute or two our arm starts shaking and you have to decide if your going to holster it or fire and holster it.

Remember while the places these troops are currently deployed to are likely improved areas. They are not garrison. Which means its not a lot of fun to be a Russian Soldier right now. 

Are they equipped and trained for this environment. yes. But after a while things are going to start breaking. Men and material and the logistics, as well as morale and health (yes I know Russians may have a slightly different take in the later then western forces) become more challenging.

So they are going to either have to pull the trigger, or put it back in the holster. Pretty soon.  

Russia demands US, NATO response next week on Ukraine

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov says Moscow has ‘run out of patience’ after diplomatic talks fail to produce a breakthrough."

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/14/russia-demands-us-nato-response-next-week-on-ukraine


-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


1/13/2022

 So looks like I may have a little crow to eat. I had predicted that the Russians would go around western Christmas / New years - and well that didn't happen. 

Do I think it may still happen - yes. 

However much like the magic 8 ball.


I think that other issues may have delayed Russian plans - mainly the issues in a really sunny tourist destination called Kazakhstan. One of the must see places if you head there is the Darvaza gas created also affectionately known as either the  Door to Hell or Gates of hell courtesy of a failed drilling operation by the soviets back in the 70's. The soviets hit a major gas field and the resultant gas leak was so bad they thought - lets just set it on fire. What could go wrong. Well it has been burning since.



But I digress. In any case. The locals got restless in Kazakhstan on January 2nd 2022. (https://www.project-syndicate.org/bigpicture/why-kazakhstan-matters) And basically the the president , Nursultan Nazarbayev https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nursultan_Nazarbayev ) cried uncle, and called on the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)

 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collective_Security_Treaty_Organization - 

And by CTSO I really mean good old Vladimir Putin

And when yo are uncle Vlad you have to answer or you loose credibility 

So In pretty good Russian form, the Russian essentially dispatched these guys - whom by no means are peacekeepers

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/45th_Guards_Spetsnaz_Brigade

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/98th_Guards_Airborne_Division

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/31st_Guards_Air_Assault_Brigade

to sweep up...

Now a couple things. The fact that these units could deploy so quickly means they were pretty much primed to go.  

Now I think that they were more primed to go west onto Ukraine then to the east and they are in a hurry to get home. News reports have them departing essentially today 13 Jan 2022

What the hurry? 

Well my guess is that the unplanned diversion will prove to be a warm up

So lets look at a very rough time line

-October – early November -Ukrainian Bayraktar TB2 UAV against the Russian backed rebels   

-2–3 November, the head of the CIAWilliam Burns, came to Moscow and met with senior Russian intelligence officials there

-13 November  Russia has again amassed 100,000 troops in the border area

-On 1 December, Russia accused Ukraine of deploying half its army – about 125,000 troops – in Donbas to confront pro-Russian separatist

-On 9 December, Russia accused Ukraine of moving heavy artillery towards the front line where separatists are fighting with Ukrainian forces

-On 31 December 2021, after a phone call between US President Biden and Russian president Putin,

"Putin declared that if the US sanctioned them it would be "a fatal mistake."

So I'm guessing two things happened. One the phone call, and two the situation in Kazakhstan  gave Putin a good excuse to pull back  and schedule talks 

Dates of those talks?

10-13 December and they did not end well

https://www.cnbc.com/2022/01/13/us-prepares-for-escalation-as-nato-russia-talks-end-with-no-ukraine-resolution.html

https://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/russia-ukraine-talks-dead-end-poland-warns-risk-war

So I don't think we are out of the woods. 

Contrary. 

Not to sound like a cult leader whom keeps pushing the date of Armageddon to the right but I am guessing the next week will be a go no go for Putin

Why, Well, a 100,000 (and I'm guessing the actual number is a lot higher) strong army is a lot of capability to have out at the pointy edge of the stick away from home garrison. 

For context imagine if the US  suddenly deployed 100,000 soldiers to any border anywhere. The chances of us just packing up and going home without doing something are slim to none. 

So lets do the old War College most dangerous most likely

Most dangerous Russia invades the Ukraine in the next 96 hours hoping for a quick win. Using specialized urban warfare units whom have gained practice in Russia's recent hot conflicts. Going against Ukrainians whom, while on home turf are going to have a rough go. 

Most likely. Well an alternate scenario is that Putin blinks and, but still wants to use his toys and send a message and basically sends the Russian troops into the Donetsk - and maybe a little further but not to be a downer, I think the most likely is tied with the most dangerous.


So while I may be eating Crow some more in the next 96 hours. I am in fact hoping I do so.

So now I have presented the strategic problem. What to do about it.

Well, we really only have - I think two elements we can use Diplomatic and Economic.  I would say informational but US info ops are C squad / Junior varsity as we have to play by the rules. 

If you include Cyber as informational...well maybe. I'm not versed in capabilities. But generally Cyber stuff is either really really hard or to soft to be noticed.  Again other smart people may say otherwise

And Military is kind of out of the question to defuse, as we play right into the Russian hands.

On the Diplomatic front, I'm hoping we have some good leverage points and that the State Department has a few grey beards (male/ female / other - don't care) still left whom know how to deal with the issue and Russians.

Economic stuff probably won't work well unless we start seizing bank accounts and playing real hardball

So what happens if as they say this goes kinetic? Well, not really alot of good options. Short of really hard kinetic options. 

As unless the Russians really piss off turkey, I don't see a lot of ships in the Black sea or conducting strikes from Turkey. The Baltic, while more open to warships all of flavors is essentially covered from entrance to ST Pete (and I don't mean Florida) by defense in depth Russian style. 




So that leaves entering or supporting through Poland...but the problem is going to be getting to Poland.

Well enough Ruminating for the evening is stream of consciousness means